Kenya's Vision 2030: An Audit From An Income And Gender Inequalities Perspective
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>Antenatal care</td>
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<td>ARIs</td>
<td>Acute respiratory infections</td>
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<td>ART</td>
<td>Anti-retroviral therapy</td>
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<td>ASALs</td>
<td>Arid and semi arid lands</td>
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<td>BPFA</td>
<td>Beijing Platform for Action</td>
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<td>BPO</td>
<td>Business process out-sourcing</td>
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<td>CBK</td>
<td>Central Bank of Kenya</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>Civilian Conservation Corps</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGD</td>
<td>Centre for Governance and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGE</td>
<td>Computable general equilibrium</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-WES</td>
<td>Constituency Women Enterprise Scheme</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Constituencies Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CSW</td>
<td>Commission on the Status of Women</td>
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<td>ECDE</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development Education</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>UN Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>EPZ</td>
<td>Export processing zone</td>
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<td>ERS</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>FPE</td>
<td>Free primary education</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Financial sector deepening</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross enrolment rates</td>
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<td>GHC</td>
<td>Geography, history and Christian religious education</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross national product</td>
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<td>GOK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>HAF</td>
<td>Harvard analytical framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immuno-deficiency Virus</td>
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<td>HSV-2</td>
<td>Herpes Simplex Virus type 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)</td>
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<td>ICPD/POA</td>
<td>International Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>IFPRI</td>
<td>International Food Policy Research Institute</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
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<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import substituting industrialization</td>
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<td>KARI</td>
<td>Kenya Agricultural Research Institute</td>
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<td>KDHS</td>
<td>Kenya Demographic and Health Survey</td>
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<td>KENSMA</td>
<td>Kenya Medical Supply Agency</td>
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<td>KENSUP</td>
<td>Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme</td>
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<td>KESSP</td>
<td>Kenya Education Sector Support Programme</td>
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<td>KIHBS</td>
<td>Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey</td>
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<td>KIPPPRA</td>
<td>Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis</td>
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<td>KIRDI</td>
<td>Kenya Industrial Research and Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNBS</td>
<td>Kenya National Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>KTDA</td>
<td>Kenya Tea Development Authority</td>
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<td>KTMM</td>
<td>KIPPRA Treasury Macro Model</td>
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<td>Kenya Service Provision Assessment</td>
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<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MF</td>
<td>Moser framework</td>
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<td>MOMS</td>
<td>Ministry of Medical Services</td>
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<td>MOPHS</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium-Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAEP</td>
<td>National Agricultural Extension Policy</td>
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<td>NALEP</td>
<td>National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Policy</td>
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<td>NCGD</td>
<td>National Commission on Gender and Development</td>
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<td>NESC</td>
<td>National Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>NER</td>
<td>Net enrolment rates</td>
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<td>NFLS</td>
<td>Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-government organizations</td>
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<td>NHIF</td>
<td>National Health Insurance Fund</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>Newly Industrializing Country</td>
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<td>NIMES</td>
<td>National Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
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<td>NCGD</td>
<td>National Commission on Gender and Development</td>
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<td>NFLS</td>
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<td>Social accounting matrix</td>
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<td>Secondary Education Bursary Fund</td>
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<td>SID</td>
<td>Society for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>Sexually transmitted disease</td>
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<td>STI</td>
<td>Sexually transmitted infection</td>
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<td>ST&amp;I</td>
<td>Science, technology and innovation</td>
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<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and medium enterprises</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>System of National Accounts</td>
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<td>TBA</td>
<td>Traditional birth attendant</td>
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<td>TIVET</td>
<td>Technical, industrial, vocational, educational and training institutions</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
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<td>Welfare Monitoring Survey</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>WEDF</td>
<td>Women Enterprise Development Fund</td>
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Executive Summary

This report constitutes an attempt to audit Kenya’s Vision 2030 from both an income inequalities perspective, and to assess the ability of the Vision to respond to both of these persistent development challenges. Historically, Kenya has been one of the most unequal societies in the world. The launch of Vision 2030 thus provided a key opportunity to suggest ways of better conceptualizing and addressing these inequalities for the good of development in the country. The rationale for this audit was grounded in what is now a well-acknowledged fact, that both income and gender inequalities hinder development. They have been found to negatively affect development efforts and present a challenge to the sustainability of development gains at individual, household and country level. The objectives of the audit are to contribute to enhancing development planning and resource allocation towards greater equity and equality. The audit is intended to help build understandings of government actors engaged in development planning and resource allocation, as well as their partners in civil society and the private sector, on the impacts of inequalities on development performance generally and specifically.

The first chapter of this publication explores Vision 2030’s abilities to tackle income inequalities. With the adoption of an export-led model of development, which has occurred with relative equality in East Asia, it is appropriate to examine whether Kenya’s vision successfully incorporates the ability to develop with relative equality. Among the drivers of inequality in Kenya are the colonial inheritance, the urban rural divide, the favouring of “high productivity” agricultural areas, and regional, ethnic and sex discrimination. Inequality is further entrenched by a rapidly increasing population that has outstripped the capacity of the formal sector to produce sufficient jobs to absorb new job seekers. An examination of Kenya’s past growth, particularly in relation to the aims of the Vision and its impact on inequality, finds that contrary to popular perception Kenya’s growth vis-à-vis other African countries has not been impressive. Principally because of the relatively high inequality in the country, the increases in incomes associated with growth have been skewed towards the top of the distribution. For example, the difference between a 6 per cent growth rate in agriculture for a smallholder and a flower exporter are tremendous. While the smallholder may gain an increase in income of around a thousand shillings a year, the flower exporter ends up with an increase in income counted in millions of shillings. This tends to increase inequality.

Because most of the recent measures of inequality at the national level have been measures of expenditure (not including housing expenses) in adult equivalent terms, they tend to underestimate income inequality. Some commentators have used these measures and compared them with East Asian measures and claimed that inequality in Kenya is similar. We point out why this argument is incorrect. If you actually looked at comparable measures of income inequality, Kenya would have higher inequality.

The methodology used in the chapter on income inequalities involves actual simulations to estimate the impact of growth on inequality as envisioned in Vision 2030. The simulations cover employment and income effects at the national level, employment effects by sex at the national level, and regional employment effects. The analysis of the employment effects of growth on the formal sector by using gross employment elasticity concludes that the formal sector is unable to produce sufficient jobs to absorb the new entrants into the job market, even at the very high growth rates assumed in the Vision. Because of this and the suppression of wages that will occur, there is likely to be increased inequality. Job seekers are thus forced into the informal and smallholder sectors where their increasing numbers will tend to further suppress the already low wages in the sector. The simulations are also done for sex, region and rural versus urban sectors. In all instances, despite using the most generous assumptions towards the Vision, the chapter finds that inequality increases for a period of time as the formal sector fails to generate sufficient employment.
A further examination considers whether the sectoral emphasis and the welfare programmes proposed in the Vision can make up for the failure of growth to produce sufficient formal sector jobs. The analysis suggests that the success of the Vision is heavily reliant on growth and that the projected sectoral employment is not likely to produce enough growth in employment to close the gap that is found. The welfare programmes are also small and cannot be sustained without a rapidly expanding formal sector.

The main finding, then, is that Vision 2030 does not address the structural determinants of inequality, and unless these are dealt with, inequality will increase. A number of policy recommendations are drawn from the findings, notably that government, through collaboration and other mechanisms, should aim to:

- Improve information on inequality, employment and productivity to allow for better planning.
- Intensify the use of labour intensive methods in both the public and the private sectors.
- Articulate and implement land redistribution via a tax policy.
- Create jobs and enhance food security through rural environmental conservation.
- Involve the private sector in an urban housing and redistribution scheme.
- Make microenterprises a platform for exports through the institutional development of associated service linkages.
- Encourage worker- and community-owned enterprises.

An important conclusion is that reducing inequality is essential, but it is a political action as well as an economic one. It is a process of inclusion. By bringing economic benefits to individuals, groups and regions that hitherto have not gained much from what little growth has taken place, the government enhances the benefits of citizenship. This, in turn, results in a more politically stable, safer and more prosperous nation.

Chapter 2 considers the economic pillar from a gender perspective. An overview of this pillar reveals that Vision 2030 regards gender inequality as one of the key development challenges facing the country, but the measures aimed at achieving gender equity are mainly concentrated in the social pillar of the Vision. The Vision assumes that the economic pillar is gender neutral, despite the differential impact of economic policies on men and women. Gender dimensions arise as a result of the different roles played by men and women in the society, and because gender disparities exist in terms of access, ownership and control of productive resources, as well as differences in capabilities. The government should therefore aim to reduce gender inequality in the following ways:

- Under the agriculture sector, increase women’s access to and control of productive assets (land, capital, inputs) and extension services, and increase their participation in producer organizations.
- In manufacturing, improve employment terms, especially for women working in the export processing zones, and also increase women’s access to finance.
- In tourism, reduce job segregation (through more specialized training targeted at women), increase women’s access to formal finance and create awareness of the rights of women to mitigate against the negative concerns in the sector.
- Under the retail trade sector, increase the participation of women in producer groups and ensure that they graduate from small-scale informal activities to more formal and sustainable livelihood options.
- In financial services, expand access to formal finance and introduce the use of non-conventional collateral for accessing credit, a move that would greatly benefit women whose major constraint to credit access has been lack of collateral.
- For the business process outsourcing sector, enhance women’s skill level (through training) and increase their access to finance to ensure that they are able to take advantage of the opportunities that will arise.

The third chapter applies a gender perspective to the social pillar. The approach taken here is to combine aspects of two gender analysis tools, i.e., the Harvard analytical framework and the Moser framework. The audit first briefly reviews the respective agendas of the subsectors of the social pillar. Then, using the selected frameworks (and incorporating quantitative data), the discussion delves into how gender differences and disparities contribute to the challenges facing each subsector and relates these issues to the proposed strategies and targets provided for each subsector. Additional strategies are suggested under each subsector for ways in which the Vision could have been engendered. These suggestions are not exhaustive; they seek mainly to highlight some ways in which the Vision could target gender disparities.
Differences were found to exist in the extent to which the various subsectors attempted to integrate some gender analysis within them. The education and training and the health subsectors referenced gender inequalities within the context of addressing inequity within these subsectors. However, only the education and training subsector went to the extent of including sex-disaggregated target indicators, specifically for promoting equity in access to education. In the health subsector, two indicators are specific to females, while all others are non-disaggregated. The environment, water and sanitation, and housing and urbanization subsectors, on the other hand, were generally gender-blind in the situation analyses.

The bulk of the social pillar’s concern with gender issues was reserved for the subsector on gender, youth and vulnerable groups. Here, specific gender issues were identified – areas of inequalities in the social, economic and political areas. Specific strategies and targets are articulated, including gender mainstreaming and gender-responsive budgeting. With respect to the latter, however, it is not clear how this will be undertaken under the Vision. No institutional or process mechanisms are given on what plans the government will put in place to ensure that gender issues are mainstreamed across each of the broad areas where inequalities have been identified.

Generally, it is clear that efforts at gender mainstreaming were limited. There was no apparent vision at the outset for addressing the gender relations, inequalities and differences that could be translated across all of the subsectors. From the content of the analyses and strategies, the impression that comes out is that while these issues do have a place, they are not central to understanding the development challenges facing Kenya. Apparently, achieving gender equality and equity was not considered important to achieving the Vision’s objectives.

The conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that the Vision fell short when it came to the gender mainstreaming of the different subsectors of the social pillar. Gender mainstreaming requires that a gender analysis be undertaken of any development issue, first to identify the differences and inequalities that exist around the specific issue, and then to determine the extent to which these contribute to the challenges of the development subsector. The outcomes of such analysis can be used to articulate gender-specific objectives for the subsector. Both the “how” and the “what” of gender mainstreaming objectives must then be articulated within the operation of development activities and in the desired outcomes, i.e., the monitoring and evaluation of development objectives and activities. None of these issues seems to have been considered for most of the Vision’s social pillar, but they need to be addressed if the country is to reduce the inequalities and inequities that hinder Kenya’s development progress.

The recommendations flowing from this audit are as follows:

- Make a gender analysis of issues, a prerequisite to any situation analysis.
- Collect sex-disaggregated and gender-sensitive data.
- Engender performance monitoring and evaluation frameworks.
- Ensure budgeting is gender responsive.
- Build awareness, capacity and ownership.
- Strategically locate the Ministry of Gender and gender focal points.
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Growing Unequally:
An audit of the impact of Kenya’s Vision 2030 growth on equality

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With the change of government that occurred in Kenya in 2002 came an intense focus on the part of policy makers to address the dismal economic growth the country had experienced for nearly two decades. This response was captured initially in the Government’s Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (GOK, 2003; generally referred to as ERS), which was the immediate short-term approach to the malaise besetting the economy. As the new government settled in, it soon became apparent that short-term strategies had to be put in the context of long-term development planning. It was with this in mind that the Government created the National and Economic Social Council (NESC) as an advisory group to the government on the articulation of a long-term vision of the economy and more broadly the future direction of the nation. NESC’s core mandate was the production of a long-term vision for the country. Encapsulated in Kenya Vision 2030: A globally competitive and prosperous Kenya (GOK, 2007), this long-term vision has become the reference point for all government policy activities. The vision rests on three pillars: economic, political and social. It spells out long-term objectives for government programmes and provides the overarching guidelines for the design and implementation of the programmes. Central to this effort has been a reconsideration of the appropriate way for the state to engage in development policy, and which models of development to emulate.

A distinct effort to learn – particularly from the success of the East Asian countries – has marked the process of assessing the various development models. Over the last 40 years these countries have been the leading examples of a successful transition from poor agrarian societies to middle and high income industrial economies. The turn to the east is an interesting aspect of recent economic policy in Kenya, which has previously been dominated by adherence to Western norms of development. NESC names the East Asian countries of South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, plus Mauritius and Chile, as inspiration. The Eastern influence has also become more pronounced over time. In the first council, which was in existence from 2004 to 2007, the outside representation was made of three experts, one from Malaysia, a former UK minister and a Kenyan expatriate based in the USA. In the second council, all four international experts are from East Asian countries – Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea (Githinji and Holmquist, 2009).

The basic model that underlies the success of the East Asian countries is an emphasis on export-led growth and industrialization. The growth of these economies has also occurred with a remarkable degree of equality, prompting a re-examination of the relationship between inequality and growth. As Kenya embarks on this path, given its existing high inequality, it is prudent to examine whether the model for growth as envisioned in Vision 2030 adequately addresses the issue of inequality. The chapter proceeds as follows. The following section reviews in some detail the relationship between inequality and growth in general and the state of inequality in Kenya. This is followed by a discussion of Vision 2030, past growth in the country and the drivers of inequality. The chapter then describes the simulation methodology used to examine Vision 2030’s potential impact on inequality and presents the simulations and discussion of the results, as well as an examination of the priority sectors and specifically whether they can compensate for the failure of growth to deal with inequality. Subsequent sections examine whether the limited welfare measures that have been put in place also address the concerns, and then draw out the policy implications of the results and present conclusions.

1. Introduction
2. Inequality and Growth

The economics profession has long contended that there is a trade-off between growth and equality. The standard view has been that inequalities created incentives that improved efficiency. According to this view, redistribution was likely to decrease efficiency and therefore lead to a slowdown in growth. Two of the main currents in early modern development economics were the foundations of the view that growth with inequality in the early phases of development was benign at worst and may even be beneficial. Sir Arthur Lewis’s (1954) perspective on development viewed inequality as a natural outcome of the increased growth in the capitalist sector, with Kuznetz (1955) suggesting that development would eventually reduce inequality. When these two were combined with observations by Kaldor (1955) and Keynes (1920) that the marginal propensity to save was higher for the wealthy, the result was that policymakers in developing countries did not need to be concerned primarily with distributional issues but should focus on growth.

In the last decade and a half this view has been increasingly challenged as more high quality data on growth and inequality became available, and also by the success of the East Asian countries’ development. This success has in many instances included an initial redistribution of productive resources, such as land, in the case of Taiwan, South Korea and China, or redistribution along with growth as in the cases of housing in Singapore and affirmative action in Malaysia (Deininger and Squire, 1997; Aghion et al., 1999; Griffin and Ickowitz, 2000). The new studies assert that inequality can be detrimental to growth for a number of reasons, including disincentives to investment, particularly in human capital. They also point to political instability or the perception of political instability leading to increased risk that lowers investments, violence related to horizontal inequality, higher violent crime rates, and lobbying by better endowed agents against changes that may enhance efficiency via redistribution (Deininger and Squire, 1998; Aghion et al., 1999; Griffin and Ickowitz, 2000; Nel, 2003; Easterly, 2007; Galor, 2009).

Countering the standard view among mainstream economists, within the field of development there have long existed challenges to the idea that inequality was good for growth. Among the reasons included were unproductive investment by the rich, the higher demand for imported goods by the rich, lower levels of human capital associated with inequality and political instability due to a rejection of the status quo by the masses (Todaro, 1997).

In the specific case of African countries, recent evidence and studies suggest that high inequality lowers the rate at which growth reduces poverty (Fosu, 2009); results in lower literacy, for example among women, which in turn lowers growth (Balamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2009); reduces investment in secondary and tertiary education and increases fertility rates (Odedokun and Round, 2004); increases political instability and ethnic violence (Stewart, 2000; Langer, 2005; Murshed and Gates, 2005); and lowers investment rates because of perceived risk (Nel, 2003).

Given the present state of knowledge on the relationship between growth/development and inequality, it makes sense for several reasons to interrogate the Kenyan government’s economic policy impact on inequality. In the first place, increased inequality over time may have adverse effects on growth itself. This may occur as individuals at the top of the distribution pyramid block changes that may negatively affect them, even if such changes benefit the country as a whole. The second is that democracy does not thrive in the context of highly unequal power relations, as these are correlated with highly unequal distributions of wealth and income. The third arises when the inequality is horizontal (i.e., across groups) since this may result in instability and violence. One can convincingly argue that the highly contested nature of Kenyan politics and the accompanying instability is intimately related to inequality in the country. A fourth reason is grounded in lessons of experience: In most major reductions of poverty recently, such as in China, redistributive measures taken prior to the onset of growth have been to be found to be
as important, if not more important, for poverty alleviation as growth (Chandrashekar and Ghosh, 2009). The fifth derives from a basic premise of Vision 2030, which relies on an export-led approach to growth and industrialization. Since gains from increased trade are likely to be diminished when large inequality exists (Caselli, 2008), it is important to audit the ability of Vision 2030 to reduce inequality, as reducing inequality will lead to larger gains from the increased trade. Last but not least, in a democracy all citizens should have equality at least in opportunity if not outcome. Where there are vast degrees of material inequality this is unlikely to hold.

2.1 The state of inequality in Kenya over time

Before beginning the audit of Vision 20301 let us briefly summarize the literature on inequality in Kenya. Owing to both the lack of data and political resistance, inequality is not a well-studied subject in the country, largely because the first two regimes did not stomach much discussion of inequality. In fact, until around 2000 no major national level studies on inequality had been published by the government or other entities in the country. This was despite the fact that the Kenyan government’s earliest economic policy was supposedly aimed at growth with equitable distribution (GOK, 1965). The studies that existed prior to the millennium (ILO, 1972; Jain, 1975; Crawford and Thorbecke, 1978; Jamal, 1982; Anker and Knowles, 1983; Vandemoortele, 1984; Jamal and Weeks, 1993) had been done by international agencies or at their behest. Most of these studies found Kenya to be a highly unequal country compared with other countries. Even so, given the general expectation in the discipline that growth and inequality went hand-in-hand, along with the relatively favourable view economists had of Kenya relative to other African countries, the wide disparities did not draw much professional concern. The exception to this was the rural–urban divide, but this exception was fashionable across the discipline and not specific to Kenya.

To demonstrate historically the degree of inequality found in Kenya relative to the rest of the world, we have compiled some summary statistics from the Deininger and Squire (1996) study. Their data set includes all published comparable Gini coefficients for income distribution at the national level that were available between 1896 and 1996 (see Table 1.1). The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality that ranges between 0 and 100. A score of 100 means you have perfect inequality whilst 0 represents perfect equality. Countries with Gini coefficients above 45 would be considered high inequality countries (Githinji, 2007). Although one cannot necessarily directly compare any two coefficients in the data set because of the different methodologies used in obtaining them, the entire group of coefficients for a country may give an approximation of the level of inequality vis-à-vis other countries especially if the estimated Ginis are relatively similar.

Table 1.1: Income Gini coefficients, 1890–1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Gini coefficient range</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>1890–1996</td>
<td>12.1–79.5</td>
<td>2,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>1890–1993</td>
<td>12.1–58.3</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>1950–1992</td>
<td>14.7–54.1</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European</td>
<td>1955–1995</td>
<td>15.9–40.4</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1948–1993</td>
<td>19.3–55.7</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1980–1993</td>
<td>24.6–30.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1952–1992</td>
<td>25.2–62.9</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>1951–1993</td>
<td>27–65.5</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/New Zealand and Pacific Islands</td>
<td>1954–1990</td>
<td>27–67</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>1948–1993</td>
<td>30–61.9</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1953–1994</td>
<td>30–75.8</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1914–1996</td>
<td>25–79.5</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected African countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1914–1992</td>
<td>48–70</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1964–1993</td>
<td>34–59.7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1970–1992</td>
<td>26.6–43.9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1959–1996</td>
<td>43.2–79.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1959–1991</td>
<td>25–43.37</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1959–1993</td>
<td>31–61.8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Deininger and Squire (1996).

A total of 2,632 measurements of the coefficient were collected, ranging from a low of 12.1 for China in 1982 to a high of 79.5 for Zambia in 1970. By any measure and whether compared with other regions in the world or African countries, Kenya’s historical inequality is extremely high. Its lowest measured Gini is 48 in 1967 and its highest in this data set is 70. This does not include a measure of 71 for 1988 published after the compilation of the Deininger and Squire data set (Githinji, 2000a). Kenya’s range is higher than that of countries traditionally considered highly unequal such as Brazil (34.8–69.9) and South Africa (48–62), and also of its neighbours Tanzania (34–59.7) and Uganda (26.6–43.9). In fact,

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1 Wherever Vision 2030 is referred to, it also includes the Medium-Term Plan, 2008–2012 (GOK, 2008).
of the top eleven Ginis in this entire data set, six come from Kenya, including the third to the sixth highest measurements. Although one cannot directly translate a Gini coefficient into percentile measures, on average the measurements for Kenya would be consistent with the top 20 per cent of the population receiving over 50 per cent of the national income, while the bottom 20 per cent received less than 5 per cent of national income (Githinji, 2007).

Since 2000 there has been an increase in the number of studies of inequality done locally or by Kenyans, a trend that coincides with an acknowledgement by the government that inequality is a concern. These studies include Githinji (2000a), UNDP (2001) and SID (2004; 2006). In addition to these, the reports from the Welfare Monitoring Surveys of the 1990s, the Integrated Labour Force Survey of 1998/99 and the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey of 2005/06 reported measures of distribution. The Ginis calculated from this series of works has ranged from 42 to as high as 55.6/62.5 (Wambugu and Munga, 2009). When compared with other countries in the world, these numbers are still relatively high and are within the same range of the coefficients from the pre 1992 period.

Further, the practice of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) has been to calculate Ginis using adult equivalences (KNBS, 2007a) rather than per capita measures, which are generally what is reported elsewhere in the world. This has the effect of compressing the distribution as larger households tend to be dominated by children who are then not given equivalent weight to adults in the population, since larger households also tend to be poorer. The effect of this approach is to reduce the Gini, an effect seen quite clearly in the 1999 measure where we have both the per capita and the adult equivalence measure reported in SID (2004). In adult equivalent terms, the Gini is 55.6 and in per capita terms it is 62.5. A significant difference! Further, the measure used is a household measure rather than individual. Finally, and significantly, most of the official measures produced by the KNBS, although often secondarily reported as Ginis of income distribution, are actually Ginis for expenditure. Expenditure on average tends to be more compressed in distribution than income. In addition, in the Kenyan case the largest consistent household expenditure, namely rent, is excluded. Given the differences in costs between housing the rich and the poor, this further compresses the reported distribution, resulting in lower Gini measures. Since these are expenditure measures, the actual measures of income distribution will be significantly higher.

2.2 Drivers of inequality in Kenya

More recent work on inequality has emphasized the highly unequal nature of the Kenyan economy stemming from its colonial history, ethnic and sex discrimination, economic policies favouring the so-called highly productive agricultural areas, and regional economic favouritisms by the central government. This body of work has brought to the fore not only the vertical inequality that had been studied by previous researchers, but also horizontal inequality and inequality in dimensions such as time needed to access resources such as water, fuel wood and health facilities and for participating in market work.

In general, one finds that inequality in Kenya exists across the following major dimensions. First, there is a large degree of vertical (interpersonal) inequality within the country, mainly driven by unequal access to education, jobs, credit, land and markets. Second, there is also a large degree of inequality between the sexes driven by the factors mentioned above as well as by the law (both customary and common), especially vis-à-vis property ownership and sex discrimination more generally. Third, there is inequality across different regions, races and ethnic groups in Kenya. This takes two forms. One is the differences in regions that are rooted in the economic history of Kenya. Examples of such differences are the concentration by policy makers on “high productive” areas and the favouritism shown by different regimes to different areas of the country in provision of infrastructure such as schools, roads, health centres, etc. Because the vast majority of each ethnic group in the country often lives within a specific region, a regional disparity automatically becomes an ethnic disparity. Within this is also the inheritance of a colonial legacy in which racial groups favoured during colonialism at independence have a head start over others. The other difference occurs at the level of the individual and is captured via the favouring of individuals from specific communities for employment, education or credit opportunities.

The fourth major dimension of inequality is the significant rural–urban divide regardless of region. On average, individuals in urban areas earn much higher incomes than those in rural areas. The fifth is based on the sector of activity. In Kenya there are two major sectors where economic activity takes place: The formal or modern sector, which is fully integrated into the market and global economy and where production takes place essentially for the market, and the informal sector along with smallholder production for self-provisioning.
Particularly in the rural areas this sector is often less connected to the market. Those who are engaged in the formal sector earn much higher returns than those engaged in the self-provisioning or informal sector. In fact, the vast majority of individuals in these two areas are there because they have not had opportunities in the formal sector. Because of this sectoral difference – and despite the wide rural–urban difference that exists – there also exist intra-rural and intra-urban differences that at times can be as large as the difference between the rural and urban (Githinji, 2000b).

2.3 A structural explanation for inequality in Kenya

To explore further what the drivers of inequality are, we have disaggregated Kenya’s GDP per capita data from 1972 to 2007. We follow this strategy because unfortunately there is not a consistent time series of measures of inequality such as Ginis or decile shares that we can use. This approach of disaggregating income has its roots in the work done across a number of countries including Kenya by Jamal (1982) and Jamal and Weeks (1993). We have done the following, using data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010) and various issues of the Statistical Abstracts of Kenya (GOK, various): We divide GDP by the various sectors – agriculture, industry and services – according to the proportion each sector produces. We allocate all agricultural income to the rural area. This we expect is a slight overestimate of rural income. We then divide industry and services based on the proportion of employees in these sectors found in the rural and urban areas. We are able to do this because we have the total number of rural employees and the total number of agricultural employees. The difference between the two is assumed to be the number of rural persons employed in services and industry. We can then divide the income from this sector between rural and urban areas based on the proportion of workers.

Finally, we calculate the agricultural income per capita. Here we need to separate rural residents into two groups – those in agriculture and those in the non-farm sector. We assume that each household is made up of 5.5 individuals as reported in the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KNBS, 2007b). This will slightly overestimate the agricultural population in the early years, as the average household would have been larger, meaning that our agricultural income for the early years is slightly underestimated. However, since we have national survey estimates of 1988 that put the number at 5.5 (Githinji, 2000b), we expect this effect to be small.

Given these caveats, what can we say about the distribution of income in Kenya and what maintains or drives inequality over time? Figure 1.1 illustrates the ratio of rural to urban per capita earnings and the proportion of the population in the urban and rural sectors with formal jobs. In a sense, this last measure is a dependency measure for the formal sector.

Figure 1.1: Ratio of rural to urban earning and formal sector job dependency, 1972–2007

At first glance the good news is that the gap between rural and urban incomes has closed as rural income per capita rose from 11 per cent of urban income in 1972 to a high of just under 26 percent in 1995 before oscillating between 23 and 25 percent from then until 2007, with the recent past having an upward trend. The seeming narrowing of the rural–urban gap has occurred during a period in which access to formal, higher paying, jobs has diminished. This is particularly the case in urban Kenya. In 1972 one in four urban Kenyans had a formal sector job, but by 2007 the situation was much bleaker; only one in just under eight urban Kenyans had a formal sector job. In the rural areas, even though the number of formal sector jobs increased substantially, access to those jobs has not increased because of the parallel growth of the population. In 1974, close to 1 in 25 rural Kenyans had access to a formal job; by 2007 the ratio was 1 in 34.

Apart from the decrease in access to formal employment, three other important trends require attention. Figure 1.2 illustrates the trends in urban, rural and agricultural real per capita earnings using indexes with 1972 as the base year. Urban per capita earnings have had a consistent downward trend since 1972 with only brief periods of recovery. In
real terms, per capita earnings in urban areas in 2007 are only 60 per cent of their 1972 level. On the other hand, rural per capita earnings have seen significant growth. From 1972 to 1977 they grew rapidly on the back of growth in agriculture. During this period agriculture per capita earnings matched rural earnings per capita in general. Rural earnings peaked at 28 per cent above their 1972 value in 1977. After a brief slump they rose to 35 per cent above their 1972 values in 1990. This was followed by a long downward trend that was only reversed in 2003, so that in 2007 rural earnings were once more at their peak of 35 per cent above the 1972 base.

It can be seen that rural earnings have generally out performed urban earnings, but the majority of people in the rural areas are in agriculture and these earnings have not performed as well. From the high in 1977, when agricultural earnings were 26 per cent above the 1972 base year, agriculture earnings have had a secular downward trend and by 2002 had fallen below their 1972 level in real terms. It is only in 2006 and 2007 that we began to see a recovery in these earnings. In 2007 they returned to their 1972 levels.

There have been some spectacular successes, such as in floriculture and horticulture, and steady growth if not spectacular success in tea (Pollin et al., 2008). Much of the stagnation can be attributed to an increase in the rural population without a concurrent increase in agricultural investment. At the national level, the growth in capital per worker was negative between 1980 and 1997 (Mwea et al., 2008). During this period the amount of arable land per person dropped drastically, from a density of 250 people per square kilometre to 530 (World Bank, 2010). The result is that agricultural output per capita went down and with it incomes, particularly in the period post 1977. This trend, along with the increase in households in the non-farm rural sector, has maintained rural inequality in the following ways. The first is that there is a gap between the average smallholder and those who have been able to participate in the more lucrative agricultural sectors such as floriculture and horticulture. In addition, there is a gap between those with formal sector jobs in the rural sector and those who depend wholly on small-scale agriculture. In Figure 1.2 we can see the gap growing steadily throughout the period. Between 1972 and 1981 the average gap between the indexes was four. It was 16 and 18 in the periods 1982–1991 and 1992–2001, respectively. Post 2001, the average gap was 26.

What do these trends tell us about the major drivers of inequality within the country? Because much of the population is in the rural areas and based in agriculture, let us begin there. Average agricultural sector incomes have drifted downwards since 1977. The stagnation in agriculture post 1977 is well documented. In some parts of the sector, however, the gap between the rural and urban areas by our measure has become somewhat smaller, this result is not necessarily due to positive trends (see ratio of rural per capita incomes to urban per capita...
incomes in Figure 1). In fact, the major cause has been the fall in the average real incomes of those in the urban sector, in part because of the fall in access to the formal sector’s higher paying jobs. There has therefore been an increase in the “informalization” of the economy. The formal sector is now a smaller part of the urban economy, but still with relatively high wages vis-à-vis the informal sector (Pollin et al., 2008; Muindi, 2010). Within the formal sector wages have also become more unequal as globalization and the move to more market determined wages led to higher pay for highly skilled workers who could be employed internationally, particularly in the private sector. This is a trend that has recently been captured in the biannual comparison of executive versus average worker salaries. Between 2007 and 2009, for example, chief executive salaries outpaced inflation and went from being 315 times those of the lowest employees to 414 times as large. During the same period the salaries of the lowest employees grew at only 0.5 per cent per year – an increase that was lower than inflation – so they actually experienced a reduction in their real earnings (Ondari, 2009).

To tackle inequality, one must tackle the drivers portrayed above. The first are relatively low agricultural earnings on average in the smallholder sector. Apart from the fact that low earnings in the sector employing the largest part of the population leads to higher poverty rates and increased inequality, these low incomes also act as a push factor in rural to urban migration. The second is the rural to urban migration itself, which results in depressed urban wages as a result of the large supply of labour and an increase in the informal sector and the informalization of jobs. All these factors together lead to a repression of the incomes of lowly skilled workers. The third is the inability of the economy to create enough well-paying jobs to absorb the entrants into the labour force.
3. Vision 2030, Past Growth and Inequality

Kenya’s Vision 2030 is a response to the failure of 40 years of development practice in the country. With a focus on agriculture and a limited import substituting industrialization policy during the first two decades of independence, Kenya was perceived by many commentators and indeed by its own population as doing relatively well. During the second two decades, however, in the context of an increasingly authoritarian regime and “stop and go” structural adjustment the economy was at best moribund. Post 2002, buoyed by the defeat of the ruling party, a somewhat more focused economic policy regime and favourable export prices, the economy rebounded, peaking in 2007 before a collapse stemming from the post-election political crisis, recurrent drought and the global financial meltdown. While improving the lives of a significant proportion of the population compared with the colonial period, growth was not superlative vis-à-vis comparative countries. This last point is clearly illustrated in figures 1.3 and 1.4, which depict, respectively, the GDP per capita in real terms and the ratio of Kenya’s GDP per capita to comparative regions.

In per capita terms, Kenya at independence was poor by African standards, with a GDP per capita of only 55 per cent of the African average. Even though Kenya’s economy has on average marginally outperformed those of other African countries during the 40 plus years of independence, the GDP per capita remains low and in 2007 was only 76 per cent of the African average. During the first ten years of independence – often seen as a golden era of Kenyan development – Kenya’s GDP per capita grew on average at 4.5 per cent annually, slightly slower than East Asia’s 4.8 per cent – but nearly twice as fast as sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. This initial rapid growth allowed Kenya to close the gap between itself and other sub-Saharan African countries, so that by 1973 Kenya’s GDP per capita had reached 69 per cent of the sub-

Figure 1.3: GDP per capita in US$ (2001), 1964–2007


1 Import substituting industrialization (ISI) is often blamed for the failure of African development and therefore the need for structural adjustment. While ISI had been implemented for a significant length of time in Latin America, most African countries received their independence between 1960 and 1964. If you allow for three years of planning and implementation, most African countries had 7–10 years of the policy before the first oil crisis if it was implemented straight away. During this period many African countries achieved their highest growth rates. While not suggesting ISI was the cause of the growth, given these facts it is hard to make it the major cause of African development failure.
Over the following two decades, despite slow growth from 1974 to 1983 and negative growth from 1984 to 1993, the ratio increased to 85 per cent in 1991 primarily because of the dismal performance of other African economies. As other African countries began to recover around 1995, slightly ahead of Kenya’s own recovery, the ratio began to fall again, ending at 76 per cent in 2007. Compared with East Asian countries, on the other hand, the direction of the ratio was the opposite as the East Asian continued to improve the rapid pace of their growth. In 1980 East Asian countries that at independence had per capita incomes equivalent to half of Kenya’s, had per capita incomes equal to that of Kenya. By 2007 Kenya’s per capita income was equal to only 16 per cent of the per capita income of East Asian countries. Relative to all developing countries, Kenyans have lost ground since 1990.

The impact of the slow growth is accentuated by massive inequality. Because of the inequality, such growth as occurred did not have as big an impact on poverty as it might have otherwise, and the poverty head-count ratio has remained consistently close to 50 per cent. The vast majority of this poverty is rural, which can be demonstrated by deconstructing the effect of growth in a single year. In 2005, one of the best years of growth, 78 per cent of the value added growth generated by exports was due to the cut flower sector. This amounts to 25 per cent of the growth in agriculture. The flower sector occupies approximately 2,000ha, which is well under 0.01 per cent of the agricultural land in the country (Githinji and Holmquist, 2008; Pollin et al., 2008). We can then assume that the other 75 per cent of the growth in agriculture was distributed equally in the rest of the rural areas – a very generous assumption since we know that there are other large commercial farms in other crops.

If we distribute the growth equally, then Ksh 12.8 billion extra was earned on the 99.99 per cent of the land that is not in flower farming. Under these assumptions, the land under flower farms earned an extra Ksh 2.13 million per hectare, while all other land earned Ksh6,400 extra per hectare. On average, Kenyan farms – which are dominated by smallholders – are 2.4 acres (0.97ha) (KNBS, 2007a). So the average household in the rural area (approximately 5.5 people each) received an extra Ksh 6,400 a year, or Ksh 1,163 per person. Now let us assume that the approximately 50 flower farms shared equally in the increase. This is again a generous assumption because we know that the top ten farms produce over 75 per cent and the largest farm over 50 per cent (Pollin et al., 2008). Assume that only 5 per cent of the increase in value is profit. Each owner (assume it is a family and again the size is 5 – another generous assumption since we know higher income families are smaller) therefore receives Ksh 4.3 million with each member receiving 0.775 million. In summary, in a good year of growth in agriculture the average rural inhabitant receives Ksh 1,163 extra, while those at the top of the income distribution pyramid (the flower farmers in this case) receive Ksh 0.775 million. We must reiterate that this all assumes a distribution more equal than we believe exists. Under these conditions the growth rate needed to lift people in the rural areas out of poverty has to be heroic.

Given this kind of distribution, it is not surprising that there is a need to re-evaluate previous development practice. Inspired by the successes of development in East Asia, the Kenyan government produced Vision 2030 as its long-term economic development plan and successor to the ERS (GOK, 2003), which had been the basis for the newly installed Kibaki regime’s initial economic policy. The Vision framework is one
in which Kenya attains an average growth rate of 10 per cent per annum by approximately 2012, and maintains that through 2030. The expectation is that sustained growth at this level will lead to Kenya becoming a middle income country by 2030. The assumption and the vision are based on an export-led economy in which the private sector – with the assistance of the government – takes the lead in employment and wealth creation. Undergirding the anticipated growth are the six priority sectors that constitute Vision 2030’s economic pillar: tourism, agriculture and livestock, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, finance, and business process outsourcing (BPO).

Although the Vision names specific projects and talks broadly of structural transformation, an examination of the economic pillar suggests a reliance on improving existing structures by higher investments in infrastructure, education and training, research and development, and marketing, as well as improvements in efficiencies in these areas. In tourism, for example, it is clear that the recent experience in the sector, which was an increase in the number of tourists from 1 million in 2002 to 1.8 million in 2007, resulting in the creation of 20,000 new jobs, is seen as a basis for future growth. This would be done by expanding the number of tourists who come to the country by close to five times to rival the top destinations in the continent and joining the leading long-haul destinations in the world. In addition, there is a suggestion that increasing the amount that tourists spend in the country is important, but there is no indication of how this will be accomplished. Central to the Vision is the attainment of the high growth rate as the mechanism to transform Kenya into a middle income country. In essence there is an expectation that growth would trickle down to the poor.

Given the foregoing, the intention of this paper is to examine the potential effects of the expected growth rates on inequality. While an average growth of 10 per cent during the period of the Vision would raise average income to that of middle income countries’ average, per capita income is a notoriously bad measure of the actual level of development since averages do not capture distributional issues. For example, there are many very high income mineral producers whose underlying economic and social infrastructure does not compare with that of the middle income countries referenced in the Vision. Further, despite mentioning equity and poverty alleviation in the economic pillar, the Vision does not really address distributional issues. In fact, the World Bank, which pays short shrift to distributional issues in general, raises this issue in its recent broad analysis of Kenyan growth (World Bank, 2008).

Why should we be concerned about inequality in Kenya? There are many reasons, some relating to the spiral created by inequality, and some to the impact of increased equality. On the positive side, in highly unequal and poor countries, a reduction in inequality effectively translates into a reduction in poverty. The increased equality thus creates broader local markets and can be an impetus for local manufacturing and processing of agricultural products. Local markets are important as they create an arena in which companies can “practice” before participating in global commerce. Inequality, on the other hand, leads to a lack of trust within societies and this in turn is rooted in issues of fairness and can thus directly affect productivity as individuals question whether their returns from economic activities are just. Pervasive distrust and questions of whether returns are just may result in instability and can lower investment. Finally, gains from trade are reduced in the context of high inequality (Caselli, 2008).

The relationships among growth, development and equity are today clearer than they were 30 or so years ago when the neoliberal “growth first” strategies were put in place. Indeed, it is now recognized that one of the key planks in the successful industrialization of the pioneer newly industrializing countries (NICs) was the establishment and maintenance of relative equity in the first 40 or so years of growth (Griffin and Ickowitz, 2000).

Recent work commissioned by the NESC suggests that the growth impacts on poverty can dominate the inequality impacts and thus lead to a lowering of poverty (Wambugu and Munga, 2009). It follows from this that policy makers can then focus on growth, as poverty will be reduced. The evidence suggested for this comes from the experiences of Malaysia, China, Kenya and Uganda. The basic argument advanced is that given that these countries have similar inequality (Ginis ranging from 45 to 49) and that in all of them there is either low poverty (China and Malaysia) or the existence of two data points showing some decrease in poverty (Kenya and Uganda), the growth effects outweigh the inequality effect. We would like to caution against this line of thinking because of the potential negative effects of high inequality, the graver of which are political instability and the potential impacts on investment and growth.

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1 Despite this suggestion, Wambugu and Munga (2009) do provide some suggestions for addressing inequality that in a number of ways are quite compatible with the policy suggestions in this paper.
We agree that growth impacts can outweigh inequality impacts in poverty reduction, but we believe the argument made above ignores five things. The first is the cost of reducing poverty in highly unequal countries. The second is the nature of growth, and the third is the question of whether the data provided for Ginis are actually comparable. The fourth is a consideration of the trend of inequality particularly in China and the last is that the discussion of inequality is not limited strictly to vertical inequality, which they discuss, but should also extend to group or horizontal inequalities such as those rooted in gender, regional and ethnic disparities. In the following paragraphs we consider each of these points.

Let us take the first two points together. A highly unequal country will require higher growth rates or more specific pro-poor growth policies in order to reduce poverty. That is, because in an unequal country where the poor control even less of the income on average than in a more equal country, the same growth rate across two countries with different distributions will result in two different poverty reduction outcomes. In the more equal country, more people would be removed from poverty. In the unequal country the same result can be achieved only by taking specifically pro-poor policy approaches, which will be more involved than simply allowing growth to reduce poverty.

The third point is the question of the comparability of the measures used. As noted above, for example, the measures used in the Kenyan case are measures of expenditure in adult equivalent terms and for households. So by definition these are not measures of income inequality. Moreover, they actually exclude rent, which would be the biggest source of difference of recurrent expenditure between the rich and the poor, thus further compressing the distribution. It is therefore unlikely that the Kenyan measures are comparable with the measures from other parts of the world. Furthermore, to make the claim that either poverty or inequality moved in a particular direction requires that the two data points be estimated from surveys that are similar. We know that the Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) III and the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2005/06 are not similar. Apart from having different questionnaires they were collected over different periods of time in the year; to make the results comparable the WMS III figures would have to be corrected for seasonality, as the data were collected over only part of the year as opposed to the KIHBS figures, which were collected over an entire year (KNBS, 2007c).

The fourth point is that the inequality in China is a result of the growth, and was not present at the beginning of the growth. In fact, when China began its period of tremendous growth it was one of the most equal countries in the world. A series of studies with a consistent instrument and measurement of inequality has documented this fact from 1988 through to the past decade (Khan and Griffin, 1992; Khan and Riskin, 1998, 2005). Therefore one cannot argue here that inequality was high at the point that poverty decreased. More recently the argument has been made even more forcefully that the reduction in poverty was due more to the initial equality rather than to the growth (Chandrashekhar and Ghosh, 2009): Starting from a Gini coefficient of below 40 (with rental income included), China reduced most of its poverty, which in the rural region ranged from 32 per cent in 1978 to 16 per cent in 1984. During that seven-year period annual GDP growth averaged 9.6 per cent. It took 23 years at a growth rate of 10 per cent to reduce the Gini to the present 4.5 (IBRD, 2007; Chandrashekhar and Ghosh, 2009). Clearly, the efficiency of the ability of growth to reduce poverty decreased as the society became more unequal (Khan and Riskin, 2005). In the case of Malaysia, two things are ignored. First, the reported poverty rate of 15.5 has been in place since at least 1989, therefore it is at best somewhat problematic to associate it with a Gini from 1997. Further, Wambugu and Munga (2009) ignore the fact that a great deal of the effort in decreasing inequality in Malaysia has been focused on decreasing group or horizontal inequality between Malays and Chinese. This aspect of inequality is not necessarily captured by a standard Gini.

This last point is particularly important with regard to Kenya. While there are no objective national measures as yet of ethnic inequality, it is arguable that at least its perception, let alone its real existence, has been the cause of the country’s extremely volatile politics. In fact, the desire for decentralization is intimately linked to the desire of different groups in the population to obtain their fair share of the national product. Ignoring inequality in Kenya could be fatally destabilizing.
4. Methodology

For Vision 2030 to result in both growth and a decrease in inequality a number of factors must be considered. These include the following:

» The creation of sufficient jobs in the formal sector to absorb unemployed and underutilized labour in other sectors;

» A more rapid increase in incomes of people in the low paying economic sectors such as the informal sector and the small-scale agricultural sector; and

» The creation of a large number of new entrepreneurs – but in order for this to be equalizing the new entrepreneurs will have to differ from the existing entrepreneurs by race, ethnicity and sex.

Given the huge relative surplus of labour in Kenya and the inequality and poverty, measures for reducing inequality must be labour intensive so as to draw in the large underemployed population and raise the reservation wage for all labour. These measures must also transform relations of production so that those at the bottom get a larger share of income. An examination of the prospects of Vision 2030 will therefore have to answer the following questions:

» Are sufficient jobs/entrepreneurial opportunities being created in the formal sector to increase the incomes of those in the bottom half of the distribution?

» Are relations of production changing so that the new income being created favours the bottom half of the distribution?

There are two ways in which these questions could be addressed. The straightforward approach is to establish an attainable and sustainable growth rate within the existing economic framework that enables the targets to be met. The second way is a change in economic relations so that a different rate of growth may achieve the targets. Our reading of the Vision suggests that the manner in which this is to be attained is primarily through the high growth rate. This audit therefore focuses on ascertaining whether the suggested rate of growth will establish sufficient economic activities to achieve the goals.

4.1 Employment growth in Vision 2030

How is employment growth addressed with the Vision’s framework? The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (GOK, 2008) projections of both employment and growth are provided up to 2012. The expectation is that practically all informal sector growth will be formalized (GOK, 2008). In this way, since the informal sector acts as a reservoir for all those who cannot get jobs in the formal sector, by sleight of hand there will be no surplus labour from this source. A similar process is expected to occur in the smallholder agriculture sector.

We have two concerns with these claims. First, the Vision does not provide a credible process or a set of reasons why most if not all informal sector jobs will become formalized or how the conversion of the smallholder sector to a commercial sector will take place. For example, if average farm size is 2.4 acres as reported earlier, it would take massive injections of capital to transform farms that small into labour absorbers. The planned improved extension services and lower input prices will increase incomes, but are not on the scale necessary to turn such small farms into commercial labour absorbing farms. Second, Kenya’s economic history is one in which the formal sector has consistently and drastically contracted as a proportion of employment (see Figure 1.1, for example). Reversing this trend would likely take more than a few years. Given that most of the new jobs under the Kibaki regime have also been in the informal sector, despite its efforts, there is no reason to believe that this will change suddenly.

Our second and more important cause of concern is based on the actual projections and what they imply for productivity. On average over the period 2008–2012, employment grows by 8.2 per cent while output will grow by 8.1 per cent (see Table 1.2). We know that in simple terms labour productivity is total output divided by total employment and growth in productivity is GDP growth minus employment
growth.

The projections indicate a small decrease in labour productivity. Another way of saying this is since productivity is output/employment then if employment (the denominator) grows at a faster rate than output (the numerator) the ratio must decrease in size, which in this case means a fall in labour productivity. This is not consistent with development, nor with the claims in the rest of the MTEF, that productivity will improve after the reforms.

Table 1.2: Projected GDP and employment growth rates, 2008–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment growth</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The reason this occurs is that both informal sector employment and formal sector employment have been treated generically as employment. In the informal sector, which is the “employer of last resort” in Kenya, there is no assurance that new employees actually increase productivity. The same is the case in the smallholder sector, where family members provide most of the labour.

Further, if employment growth does outstrip output growth it would mean that workers cannot expect to see any improvements in income as Kenyan employees are already complaining about the cost of employment, especially compared with countries such as China. If incomes of workers decline with growth, then the entire gains from expansion will go to owners of enterprises thus exacerbating the problem of inequality.

4.2 The possibility of 10 per cent growth

We recognize that one can question whether the projected growth is attainable, particularly the 10 per cent per annum average growth rate after 2012. The World Bank (2008) points out that in the period 1980–2005 only one country in the world with a population of more than one million people, namely China, managed to sustain a growth rate that averaged above 10 per cent. During that same period only ten economies were able to sustain per capita growth rates of above 4 per cent for the entire period.

We are also aware that since independence the average growth rate for Kenya has been 4.8 per cent. In 90 per cent of the period growth has been less than 8 per cent and in half the period less than 4.1 per cent. In only four of the years has Kenya achieved growth above 9 per cent. Table 1.3 presents data on the fastest three-, five- and ten-year periods in the country’s history so as to put in context the tremendous difficulty of attaining a 10 per cent growth rate consistently over a period of 25 or so years. When you consider periods longer than two years, whether three, five or ten, there are very few times that the economy has grown above 10 per cent and in the recorded instances not only was there favourable government policy with relatively high rates of investment, there was also the good fortune of high international prices for Kenya’s exports.

That said, we start our analysis by assuming that Kenya will in fact achieve its growth targets and our concern will be what the distributional impacts are.

Table 1.3: Highest Kenyan GDP growth rates for 3-, 5- and 10-year periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of years</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Highest average growth rate</th>
<th>Total periods above 10%</th>
<th>Average of periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1971–1973</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1968–1972</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1971–1980</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by author from World Bank (2010).

4.3 Estimating the impact of growth on employment

Our study is limited by the data available – particularly in the form of time series that include income measures that can be used for examining distributional issues. Indeed, one of our recommendations at the end of this study is to improve the collection and publication of data that can be used to measure inequality over time in the country at a number of different levels.

Given the aims of Vision 2030 and the nature of the Kenyan economy, we believe that we can estimate the directions of inequality by examining the potential employment that will be created if the Vision is carried out as planned and the growth targets are attained. Our study relies on some specific

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5 That is to say if people fail to find jobs in the formal sector, they work by default in the informal or smallholder sector.

6 An example of this is the plantation tea sector in which tea picking machines were introduced a couple of years ago supposedly because of high labour costs.
characteristics of the Kenyan economy and the nature of successful development in East Asian countries. There are three main sectors of employment in the country: the formal sector, the informal sector and the smallholder agricultural sector. Half of the labour force is found in the smallholder agricultural sector, while the remaining 50 per cent is in the informal and formal sectors. The formal sector comprises approximately 13 per cent and unemployment is just above 10 per cent, with the rest of the labour force being in the informal sector (Pollin et al., 2008). Income across the sectors is distributed as follows: Those in the formal sector earn the most, over five times what those in the informal sector earn. Small-scale farmers earn the least, on average less than the GDP per capita per household member.

In Kenya and other countries the informal and the smallholder agricultural sectors have essentially been reservoirs of labour in the process of transition from a predominantly low productivity agrarian economy to higher productivity service- and manufacturing-based economies. The transition requires sufficient labour absorbing growth in the leading sectors to push up wages and productivity in the rural and informal sector, so that producers in these sectors have to compete for labour with the formal sector. In the present Kenyan case, people default to the reserve sectors because of the inability of the formal sector to create sufficient jobs. As long as this happens, the wages in these sectors will remain depressed because of the overabundance of cheap labour.

In order for transformational change to occur in a country, the growth of industry as a whole has to be rapid enough to remove individuals from the countryside to jobs in the formal industrial sector. In fact, a graph of the share of the economy devoted to industry against rural income would show that as the share of industry goes up the income in the rural areas goes up. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 illustrate the process of transition and absorption of excess labour for South Korea and Malaysia using agriculture value added divided by the rural population as a proxy for rural income. As is clear from the figures, the increase of industry in South Korea and Malaysia from below 20 per cent to approximately 43 and 48 per cent of the economy, respectively, is accompanied by a rapid increase in rural income.

In both instances rural incomes have more than tripled. In addition, there was a rapid fall in the rural population with both countries moving from having over 70 per cent of their population in the rural areas to 19 (South Korea) and 31 (Malaysia) per cent (Githinji, 2009). While initially the decline was just a fall in proportion, by the end of the process both countries had significantly fewer people in the rural areas. In the case of South Korea, the numbers were less than half of what they had been in the early 1960s.

Figure 1.5: Rural income per capita in US$ (2000) by industry as proportion of GDP for South Korea, 1960–2006

Figure 1.6: Rural income per capita in US$ (2000) by industry as percentage of GDP for Malaysia, 1960–2006

The question in the Kenyan case then, is whether the targeted growth rates can achieve results similar to those obtaining in Malaysia and South Korea. That is, does the formal sector produce sufficient jobs to reduce the number of people in the informal and rural sectors, whom we term as the reserve labour?

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7 The formal sector includes both urban- and rural-based manufacturing and service industries, the public sector, and the commercial agricultural sector.

8 The gross employment elasticity is simply the ratio of the growth in employment in percentage terms to the growth rate of GDP in percentage terms. This gives the change in employment due to a 1 per cent change in growth. Say the change in employment in year x is 3 per cent and the growth rate is 6 per cent, then the gross elasticity of employment is 3/6, which equals 0.5. That is, for every 1 per cent increase in growth there is a 0.5 per cent increase in employment. One can calculate this arc elasticity directly from the growth and employment figures. The result of this assumes that all employment growth is directly related to growth of GDP, which is a overestimate of the impact of growth. This direct calculation has also often been found to be highly variable from year to year and therefore an econometric estimation is favoured (Kapos, 2005; Islam, 2004).
Simulations of the impact of growth on employment creation will help to answer this question. The first step is to estimate how much employment is created by a 1 per cent increase in growth, i.e., the gross output elasticity of employment. This methodology was used in a number of studies by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as reported in Khan (2007), to examine the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty. Here we estimate elasticities by sector (public and private), by region, by sex, and by rural and urban areas in order to be able to comment on the impact on inequality across these lines.


Our model for calculating the elasticity is: \( Y_t = C + \alpha X_t + \beta Y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \) where \( Y_t \) is the employment at time \( t \), \( X_t \) is GDP and \( i \) is 1 to 2. Both of these (\( X \) and \( Y \)) are in log terms, so our coefficients can be directly interpreted as elasticity. The short-term elasticity is \( \alpha \), while the long-term elasticity can be found by calculating \( a/(1-b) \). The total amount of growth in employment after \( n \) years for an initial increase in GDP is: \( \sum_{t=0}^{n} a(\beta)^t \) (Johnston, 1984). In order to ensure that our results were not spurious regressions we checked for series cointegration. Our series were cointegrated and therefore the least square estimates were a consistent estimator. We checked both AR1 specifications and AR2. With the exception of rural employment, the AR1 specification performed better in terms of goodness of fit and statistical significance. The data are obtained from the World Development Indicators and the Statistical Abstracts of Kenya (various years) and run from 1966 to 2006 with the exception of the public and private sector data, which run from 1972 to 2006.

We also estimated coefficients based on industrial sector and region – rural and urban sectors. Because of data limitations these are not reliable and significant for many of the sectors; we therefore do not do any simulations using them.

### Table 1.4: Gross elasticities of employment, 1966–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Lagged auto regressed variable 1</th>
<th>Lagged auto regressed variable 2</th>
<th>Long-term elasticity</th>
<th>% Impact 5 years</th>
<th>% Impact 10 years</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total employment</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male employment</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female employment</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Not statistically significant*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not statistically significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not statistically significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Where parameters are not significant, long-term elasticities were not calculated.

---


10 Our model for calculating the elasticity is: \( Y_t = C + \alpha X_t + \beta Y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \) where \( Y_t \) is the employment at time \( t \), \( X_t \) is GDP and \( i \) is 1 to 2. Both of these (\( X \) and \( Y \)) are in log terms, so our coefficients can be directly interpreted as elasticity. The short-term elasticity is \( \alpha \), while the long-term elasticity can be found by calculating \( a/(1-b) \). The total amount of growth in employment after \( n \) years for an initial increase in GDP is: \( \sum_{t=0}^{n} a(\beta)^t \) (Johnston, 1984). In order to ensure that our results were not spurious regressions we checked for series cointegration. Our series were cointegrated and therefore the least square estimates were a consistent estimator. We checked both AR1 specifications and AR2. With the exception of rural employment, the AR1 specification performed better in terms of goodness of fit and statistical significance. The data are obtained from the World Development Indicators and the Statistical Abstracts of Kenya (various years) and run from 1966 to 2006 with the exception of the public and private sector data, which run from 1972 to 2006.

11 We also estimated coefficients based on industrial sector and region – rural and urban sectors. Because of data limitations these are not reliable and significant for many of the sectors; we therefore do not do any simulations using them.
We use these elasticities in Table 1.4 to look at the impact of growth in the various sectors. The first data column of the table gives us the coefficient for GDP or the short-term elasticity. The next two columns show the coefficients on lagged employment. The fourth column is the calculated long-term elasticity based on the first two or three columns (where applicable). The fifth and sixth columns give us the percentage of impact that will have taken place in five years and ten years, respectively.

The normal range for long-term elasticity would be between zero and one under the assumption that additional employment is at least as productive as existing employment, so additional employment does not lead to a fall in overall labour productivity. For our major categories – total employment, employment by sex and by sector as well as the regional and urban rural elasticities – our elasticities are well behaved. All are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level and in most instances at the 1 per cent level with the exception of female employment and Rift Valley and Western provinces. In the case of the long-term elasticity is above one. This is probably because of increased participation rates that are not related to the size of economy or to past employment. In the case of females this could be due to cultural changes that are leading to more women going into the formal market. This underlying long-term change would lead to elasticity greater than one. In our calculations we therefore use an estimate that is just below one by calculating long-term elasticity on the basis of the estimated short-term coefficients that are consistent with an increase in productivity. In Western Province we hypothesize that the population density underlies this trend. We therefore use the national average when doing our estimates for Western Province. The estimate for the Rift Valley is not statistically significant; we believe this is due to its large size and differentiation within this province. Various parts of Rift Valley Province may be differentially integrated into the national economy, resulting in statistically insignificant results. We therefore use national elasticities, which in this case we suspect are an overestimate of the actual ability of the region to create employment in response to growth. For North Eastern Province, where reliable estimates were unattainable, we also use the national average.

We use these elasticities in the following manner. We estimate the change in employment due to growth for the total formal employment, male and female workers, regions, and all urban and all rural employment. To do this we multiply the existing employment by the growth rate and the amount of employment created each year until 2016. We restrict our estimates to 2016 as the longer the period the more likely that some of our assumptions may not hold, since we have no way of knowing what some parameters may be in the distant future. As can be seen in Table 1.4, the impact of growth not only differs in terms of magnitude but also in terms of the time that it may take for the whole impact to play out. The number of jobs created decreases with the distance from the initial shock. For example, using the estimated elasticity for total employment, which is 0.16 in the short term and 0.67 in the long term, means for each 10 per cent change in GDP, employment grows by 1.6 per cent in the first year. In the second year, employment grows by 1.2 per cent and so on. In the case of total employment, after five years 75 per cent of the impact will have taken place and after ten years 94 per cent will have occurred (Table 1.4).

---

12 The $b$ that is consistent with a long-term elasticity of less than one is 0.65, given that $a = 0.34$. 
5. **Simulations**

Results of three simulations of the impact of growth on employment creation are presented here: A simulation of national level employment and income effects, one of employment effects by sex at the national level, and one of regional employment effects.

5.1 Simulation of employment and income effects at the national level

In our first simulation we estimate the impact of employment first by using the elasticities for national employment and then by using the elasticity for the private sector alone, which is higher in the short term than that of total employment. We do this for three reasons; one because it gives a probable range and two because in the recent past, particularly since 2002, public sector employment has slowed drastically, which seems to be a conscious decision on the part of government to rationalize public sector employment (see Appendix Figure 1.A1).

Private employment follows a cyclical path similar to the growth rate with a drop off coinciding with the recessions of 1973/74 and the early 1980s caused by oil shocks, slows down in the 1991 recessions and the late 1990s, and then picks up particularly after 2002.

The third reason is that public sector employment is less a function of GDP. The public sector does not follow GDP but seems to have a clear political cycle with inflections in the trends occurring around elections and the major growth occurring between 1982 and 1991/92. This was a period in which the economy was relatively weak and was before the return of multi-party elections. During this period the then relatively new Moi regime entrenched its presence with an expansion of the public sector.

The simulations are based on the following assumptions. We have chosen the least restrictive assumptions to show the most favourable employment impacts. We expect our results to be an overestimate of the ability of the economy to create jobs in the formal sector and to increase incomes for all. For example, we have retained the projected growth rates in the Vision, which have now been revised downwards as a result of the impact of the post election crisis and the world economic crisis. We begin by using the labour force figures as estimated from the 2006 KIHBS found in Pollin et al. (2008). That is, a labour force of 13.5 million, which is 71.5 per cent of 15–64-year-olds.

Given that past measurements of the labour force have been around 70 per cent, we assume that this will be constant over our estimates. From the KIHBS Pollin et al. (2008) estimated an unemployment rate of 10.4. Because there is no unemployment insurance in the country it is difficult for individuals to be unemployed. In fact, a number of those found to be unemployed in the KIHBS were individuals with higher degrees, suggesting that they might have access to other resources or social networks to tide them over during periods of unemployment. We also assume that this rate will remain constant, which implicitly assumes that the informal sector and the small-scale subsistence sector will absorb all other entrants into the job market who are not employed by the formal sector. We assume that a quarter of all 15–19-year-olds are available for the labour market each year and this grows at 2 per cent per annum (this is the net increase in the size of the labour force) based on past labour force growth. Of this group, 71.5 per cent will actually participate in the labour market. Given the output elasticity of employment and a given growth rate, we can estimate the number of jobs created every year and therefore calculate the impact on the reserve labour pool. These results are presented in tables 1.5 and 1.6. Table 1.5 uses the total employment elasticities, which we treat as a lower bound, while Table 1.6 uses the private sector elasticities, which are higher and suggest a more efficient job creation process.

---

13 Note the very weak short-term elasticity of public employment at 0.06, compared with 0.22 for the private sector and the longer duration for the impact to take place. Also take note that the public employment short-term elasticity is not statistically significant (Table 1.4).

14 We begin our simulation in 2006 because it is the year for which we have actual data estimated from a survey. Beginning in a different year would require us to make additional assumptions that would restrict the scope of our arguments.
In both our simulations the total formal employment rises by over a million from 1.7 million to 2.78 million (total employment elasticity) and 2.94 million (private sector elasticity). The labour force increases from 13.5 million by over 7 million by the year 2016, to close to 22 million. We find that on average the Kenyan economy does not produce enough jobs in the formal sector to absorb all the new entrants into the labour market. The number of jobs created rises steadily from 29,000 in the first year to 180,000 or so by the last year in our simulation when using the total employment elasticity and 40,000 and 190,000, respectively, when using the private sector elasticity. However, the total number of jobs in the formal sector needed to absorb the new entrants in the market is just over 750,000 in the first year and rises to 897,000 by year ten.  

We consign the large surpluses who are not absorbed to the informal and small-scale sector according to their current proportions. Whether one uses the more favourable (in the short term) private sector elasticity or the total employment elasticity, the basic results and the implications for the direction of inequality are the same in both our simulations. Because the formal sector does not create enough jobs there is an increase in the reserve labour pool. The initial increase is both as a proportion of the population and in actual numbers. After three years the proportion begins to decrease but the numbers still increase. The ramifications of this are clear: As more people get crowded into these two sectors, there will be downward pressure on earnings because of the increased supply of labour. While this will affect the earnings in this sector the most, it will also have the effect of dampening any increase in wages in the formal sector as the rural and informal sectors set the reservation wage in the formal sector. If labour income is held down and growth occurs, this will mean that the distribution of earnings will favour an increase in the profit share. In total, such a sequence of events will increase inequality.

Table 1.5: Simulation of employment and income changes with fixed unemployment rate using total employment elasticity, 2007–2016

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour force (71.5% of 15—64 age group)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour force formal employment (millions)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force (millions)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>15.02</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>16.59</td>
<td>17.41</td>
<td>18.24</td>
<td>19.08</td>
<td>19.94</td>
<td>20.82</td>
<td>21.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal employment (%)</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve labour (smallholder + informal sectors)</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>77.9%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income in pounds</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal wage sector</td>
<td>13,448</td>
<td>13,744</td>
<td>14,046</td>
<td>14,355</td>
<td>14,671</td>
<td>14,994</td>
<td>15,324</td>
<td>15,661</td>
<td>16,005</td>
<td>16,357</td>
<td>16,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>1,889</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>2,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural proxy</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>1,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>2,506</td>
<td>2,542</td>
<td>2,579</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>2,654</td>
<td>2,693</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>2,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal wages as % of GDP per capita</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
<td>84.1%</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural income as % of GDP per capita</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector as % of GDP per capita</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
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<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of variation for income</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate (%)</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>7.25%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>9.40%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 In the MTEF 2008–2012, there are projections that by 2012 the economy will produce over 900,000 jobs. Please note that these include informal sector jobs while our estimates are only for the formal sector as we treat the informal sector as an employer of last resort.

16 In order to do a sensitivity analysis, and also because the 10 per cent growth rate is difficult. we run the simulation with the total employment elasticity with an average 5 per cent growth rate after 2012. In this scenario our basic trends do not change, but since formal sector growth is not as fast, inequality does not grow as fast.
Table 1.6: Simulation of employment and income changes with fixed unemployment rate using private sector employment elasticity, 2007–2016

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour force (71.5% of 15–64 age group)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force formal employment (millions)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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<td>19.94</td>
<td>20.82</td>
<td>21.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total national employment</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.78</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>15.03</td>
<td>15.84</td>
<td>16.68</td>
<td>17.55</td>
<td>18.45</td>
<td>19.38</td>
<td>20.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal employment</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
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<td>77.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income in pounds</td>
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<td>1,708</td>
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<td>1,784</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>1,836</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>1,889</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>1,973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural proxy</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>1,792</td>
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<td>2,579</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>2,654</td>
<td>2,693</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>2,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal wages as % of GDP per capita</td>
<td>787%</td>
<td>793%</td>
<td>799%</td>
<td>805%</td>
<td>811%</td>
<td>817%</td>
<td>823%</td>
<td>829%</td>
<td>835%</td>
<td>841%</td>
<td>847%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural income as % of GDP per capita</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informal sector as % of GDP per capita</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>140%</td>
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<td>Coefficient of variation for income</td>
<td>1.62</td>
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<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>7.25%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>9.40%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
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</table>

To get some idea of the changes in distribution among labour incomes we run a similar simulation for three measures of income. Results are reported in tables 1.5 and 1.6 in the bottom half of the table. We initially attempted to calculate an output elasticity of income but because of limited data were unable to compute reliable measures. Our results did consistently produce a negative elasticity with respect to GDP. Since all our monetary variables are in real terms, this suggests that Kenyan workers have lost in real terms vis-à-vis other claimants to the earnings as the economy grows. This is consistent with the work of Mazumdar (1994) who found that the Kenyan government through the tripartite arrangement allowed for inflation to bring down the real cost of labour by awarding nominal increases that were lower than the rate of inflation. This is also consistent with the falling real urban incomes reported earlier in this chapter.

Our method here is quite simple. Given the unreliable regression results, we simply assume that wages in the formal sector will change at the same rate at which they have averaged over the period for which we have data (1966–2006), which is 2.2 per cent. We then compare this with changes in the GDP per capita given the targeted growth rates. We compare formal wages to a proxy of rural income and informal sector wages. For the informal sector we have an estimate of the wages from KIHBS. On average, those in the informal sector earn 18 per cent of the average formal sector wage. Since we do not have a time series of informal sector wages, we assume that the informal sector wages grow at the same rate as GDP per capita. We caution that this is a generous estimate. Given the increased supply we would expect that the wages in this sector would not even keep up with the wages in the formal sector.

We note that within both sectors there are distributional issues and that some of the higher paid informal sector workers earn more than lower formal sector workers. This is rarely the case, however, when you correct for human capital.
For rural income we are again hamstrung by the lack of reliable estimates. We are aware, however, that rural income is below the GDP per capita given the size of the rural population and previous measures (Githinji, 2000a). So we assume that the rural income is equal at the beginning to the GDP per capita and we apply the rate of growth of value added in agriculture. Again we need to caution that this too is generous given our earlier example of the distribution resulting from an increase in flower exports. The division of the increases in value added in agriculture tends to favour commercial farmers and rather than the smallholder. Further, in the MTEF 2008–2012 the agricultural sector is predicted to grow at rates much lower than those of manufacturing and services. The cumulative growth rates are given in Table 1.7.

Table 1.7: Cumulative growth of labour incomes compared with per capita GDP, 2007–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Growth 2012</th>
<th>Growth 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal wages</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural income</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under these rather favourable conditions towards the lower income earners, we find inequality still increases at least till 2012 as measured by the coefficient of variation. Most of the modest decrease after that period can be attributed to our assumption that the informal sector income grows at the rate of GDP per capita growth. So not only would we have an increase in inequality between income earned by labour and profits but also between different sections of labour.

5.2 Simulation of employment effects by sex at the national level

It is well known that there is on average a great deal of inequality between men and women in Kenya (Githinji, 2000a; UNDP, 2001; IBRD, 2007). This exists at the level of income, time burden, wealth, access to credit, land and business opportunities as well as access to education and employment. Without a commitment to directly addressing these issues, growth will not be neutral vis-à-vis the distribution of earnings between men and women.

In this area we are particularly limited by the availability of data, so we are not able to do as complete a simulation as we have done for national employment. As noted earlier, for women the output elasticity of employment is greater than one, suggesting that the entry of women into the market is driven by factors other than the demand for women workers. The result of this is that women have been increasing as a proportion of the labour force, as is clearly illustrated in Figure 1.7. As in much of the world this is probably driven by increased labour force participation rates and also by the increased demand for women, particularly in export-oriented production. Because some of this demand involves substituting women for men, the impacts are not likely to be benign at the household level. This substitution may take place for a number of reasons, including the past inability of women to become union members thus leaving them as an unorganized work force, much weaker vis-à-vis corporations and therefore most likely employable at a lower wage.

Figure 1.7: Employment by sex, 1972–2006

Source: GOK (various).

After an initial decline as a proportion of the workforce, women have been increasing as a proportion of total employment since 1972. In 2006 women constituted 30 per cent of the labour force or 43 per cent of male employment. That compares favourably with their numbers in 1966, when they were 18 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively. This rapid participation of women is likely to continue. (See Table 1.8.)
To estimate the impact for women over time we use the short-term elasticity to construct a long-term elasticity that is consistent with improvements in productivity as more women join the labour force. Since the elasticity for women is higher than that for men, as one would expect, the number of women as a proportion of male employment will continue to grow. While we should applaud this, it does not necessarily mean that equality between men and women will also increase. Women are presently segregated into lower paying jobs (Githinji, 2000a). As more women join the labour force there will be increased downward pressure on wages in the sectors in which women are concentrated. So it is possible that while the numbers of women employed may increase, the income gap between men and women may also increase.

5.3 Simulation of regional employment effects

Kenyans have always known of the impact of the biases of central government allocation, but it was not until the UNDP (2001) and SID (2004) reported the issue that a careful accounting of the impact was done. Both of these publications highlighted the difference in infrastructure and the resultant differences in health, education and income. What is particularly insidious about the regional differences in the basic provision of infrastructure is that after a time even if government were to treat all regions equally the early boost given to those in previously favoured regions gives them a head start, particularly in market-based activities. Self-serving claims can then be made to the effect that the rewards and the inequalities are justified because they come out of differential abilities.

Despite data constraints, for illustrative purposes we run our basic model for the region with the inclusion of a dummy variable for the three different political regimes. Because of the limited nature of our data and the loss of degrees of freedom we expected that it might be difficult to pick up the effect of regimes on region, particularly for the Kibaki regime because of the relatively short period in power compared with the others. We report here the effects that are statistically significant. We should remember that what we are reporting is the effect the regimes had on growth in employment in a region. We find that during the Kenyatta regime there was a negative impact on growth in employment in Nairobi, Nyanza and Rift Valley provinces compared with the other two regimes. During the Moi regime there is a positive impact on growth in employment in Nyanza and Western provinces, and during the Kibaki regime we find a negative impact on Western province.

As noted earlier (Table 1.4), there is a variation in the long-term elasticities for different regions. Since our main independent variable for output is national output rather than regional, our short-term elasticities are in a sense a measure of how well integrated an area is into the national economy. Of the regions, employment in Nairobi and Central seems to respond very well to overall changes in output, while in the other regions it does so only moderately. In the longer term, however, the other regions respond more favourably to the existing stock of employment.

Based on the elasticities we simulated, what would be the impact of the growth at the national level on employment at the regional level? Our results are found in Table 1.9. The results indicate relatively little difference in employment creation with the exception of Central, which scores significantly lower at the end of ten years. Because it starts from a higher base in terms of total jobs, however, this difference is not as obvious. We are also unable to compare this with population growth, as we do not have reliable population growth figures at the regional level for the last decade. The likely impact therefore is an entrenchment of existing inequalities if the regional disparities are not critically addressed.

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We have also simulated the impact on rural versus urban sectors (Table 1.10). As one might expect the urban areas have a much larger elasticity of employment with respect to overall growth than the rural areas. Over the long term the impact is telling. Starting at a higher base the urban areas grow by close to 100 per cent over the ten-year period as compared with 45 per cent in the rural areas. The result is that despite having a significantly larger proportion of the population, rural employment as a percentage of total formal employment diminishes. Combine this with the fact that the formal sector does not produce sufficient jobs and there is reason to be concerned. The ability of the rural area to absorb those who cannot be employed elsewhere is already strained. Under this scenario one can only expect increased struggles over resources such as land and water. The scenario will also enhance the push factor into the urban informal sector, and further depress the wages in this sector thus enhancing inequality.

While we have no direct measure of ethnic inequality and its direction of change, two observations can be made given our results. First, because of the coincidence between region and ethnicity, any increase in regional diversity may easily translate into ethnic inequality. Second, the scarcity of the better remunerated formal jobs increases the premium for them and will potentially increase non-market means of the distribution of the jobs.
6. Priority Sectors: Growth, employment and inequality

While Vision 2030 depends on general growth for most of its impact, it also articulates a range of actions in six specific sectors, which the government has begun to implement. It may be the case that the expectation is that the sector specific programmes will create the additional growth over the 10 per cent general growth in order to address the formal sector job deficit that we have found. The six sectors are tourism, business processing outsourcing (BPO), manufacturing, agriculture, finance, and the wholesale/retail sector.

The specific policy measures for each of these sectors are numerous but tend to focus on improving efficiencies and enhancing growth, with the expectation that over time the growth will lead to structural change in the economy. For the most part the policies do not directly address employment and equality issues. In what follows we present a limited analysis of the policies’ effects on employment and inequality and examine whether they mitigate the impacts revealed through our simulations. Let us begin by stating that with relation to growth our reading of the proposed policies is that they will be positive in this respect.

6.1 Employment impacts

In general, in all the sectors the focus on improvements in efficiency will be good for growth and employment. The question is really how much growth will be created in the formal sector to absorb the vast pool of reserve labour that exists. In the four sectors where employment is specifically mentioned and quantified – tourism, manufacturing, BPO and agriculture – the concern is that the levels of job creation would be insufficient to substantially decrease the pool of reserve labour found in the rural and informal sectors. This would hold even if the new jobs were additional to those created by a general 10 per cent rate of growth.

Let us start with the tourism sector. The key aim here is to become a top ten long-haul destination by 2030. According to the Vision, this involves increasing the number of visitors by five times the present amount. This would be an increase of 7.2 million visitors from the present 1.8 million to 9 million a year. The Vision points to tourism’s impressive growth of 12.5 per cent annually between 2002 and 2007 – an increase of 800,000 visitors. This growth resulted in a 3 per cent per annum growth in employment in the industry (a gross employment elasticity of 0.24) or 26,000 new jobs. Assume for a moment that this employment creation was due only to the growth in international visitors. If 800,000 new visitors create 26,000 jobs, then it takes approximately 31 visitors to create one new job. Therefore an increase of 7.2 million as envisaged in the Vision will result in the creation of 223,000 jobs between 2008 and 2030. This would be roughly 10,000 jobs a year. This sector represents 10 per cent of the economy (GOK, 2008). If, as argued in the Vision, tourism has a higher labour intensity than other sectors, this level of expansion will have little effect on the formal sector job deficit, which our simulations put at just over 700,000 per year. In fact, even if we were to assume that the entire economy produced jobs at this rate, we would still be short some 660,000 jobs a year.

The second key sector is manufacturing. In the period 2003–2007 manufacturing grew at 5.5 per cent per annum with employment growth being 2.6 per cent per annum. A 10 per cent rate of growth would therefore result in a 4.7 per cent growth in employment assuming present technology. This would roughly translate into just over 12,000 jobs a year. This would be larger, by over 20 per cent, than the number of jobs created in tourism but would still have little impact on the pool of reserve labour.

The other major areas in which there is direct mention of employment creation are the BPO sector and the agriculture sector. The BPO sector is a sector

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18 In reality, domestic tourism has also grown substantially during this period. The number of bed nights by local tourists in hotels nearly tripled from 656,000 a year to 1,870,000 (GOK, 2008).

19 The gross elasticity of employment of 0.47 is substantially higher than that in tourism.
of potential promise in Kenya, particularly given the large availability of a relatively well-skilled, English proficient labour force and more recently the emergence of a small but sophisticated sector of software programmers. Given the capital intensive nature of this sector, however, even though it produces significant foreign exchange earnings it will create limited employment. The government expects only 20,000 new jobs from this sector over the duration of the Vision. In agriculture, via the construction of fishponds, the expectation is that 120,000 new jobs will be created over the life of the Vision (Ministry of Finance, 2009).

Finally, we examine the potential contribution of the wholesale/retail sector to direct employment creation. One challenge here is to convert the numerous informal sector jobs to formal sector jobs. The plans for creating permanent markets for traders will assist in this. It is difficult to quantify how many informal jobs will be formalized, however. Much of this depends on where the markets are placed. Past attempts in Nairobi, for example, to place markets away from the street traffic hawkers depend on have been resisted, sometimes violently.

Overall, if you were to assume that the rates of job creation in manufacturing or tourism would be the average rate of yearly job creation across the economy you would have a rate that would be higher than that in our simulation. Even so, this rate would still not be sufficient to accommodate the yearly entrants into the job market.

### 6.2 Inequality

As noted earlier, a number of initiatives are being taken across the six key sectors with the aim of promoting growth. Since the actual effects of many of these initiatives are difficult to quantify with the available information we restrict ourselves to a mostly qualitative discussion of the potential effects on inequality.

Of the key sectors, two stand out as possibly having an equalizing effect if these plans are fully implemented. These are the tourism sector and the agricultural sector. In the tourism sector the plans to diversify the tourism product by creating three resort centres and enhancing the western tourist circuit are likely to have an equalizing effect at the regional and rural–urban levels. Further, if there is an emphasis on community owned and run facilities, this will further enhance the equalizing effects. Along these lines, local sourcing of construction, furniture and ongoing inputs such as food would increase the local multiplier effect of such operations and further contribute to equality. In particular the building of the western tourist circuit will be important for two provinces, Nyanza and Western, which have consistently reported high levels of poverty in various national surveys.

Any programme that raises agricultural outcomes for smallholders is likely to have a beneficial impact on inequality in the country. While the magnitude of the task in Kenya is large – compared for example with the huge success of the Malawi fertilizer and seed subsidy programme – we expect the Vision 2030 programme, which includes lowering input costs to farmers and increasing the amount of extension services, to have significant impacts that could lower inequality particularly inter rural–urban. The challenge we highlight is ensuring that the improved services and lower input prices actually get to the poorest households. Standard extension services in the past have been successful with larger, more capital intensive and educated farmers – who also tended to be male. It is essential to design extension services that can be taken up by poorer farmers and also women farmers.

The other sectors targeted for improvement are manufacturing, BPO, wholesale/retail and finance. It is hard to gauge the impact of manufacturing on inequality, as it will depend on the labour intensity of the manufacturing that is supported. On the other hand, BPO and finance are likely to be disequalizing because they tend to employ relatively highly educated labour. If they remain relatively small compared with the rest of the economy in employment terms they will remain small islands of prosperity as they have relatively low linkages with other sectors. There is the possibility that a well designed financial sector that particularly addresses the needs of micro-entrepreneurs and firms that engage in labour intensive employment would lead to some equalization in the economy. This would be the case because a large majority of start up small and medium-sized enterprises point to credit as a limiting constraint and depend mostly on family savings for start up capital thus limiting their size.

In the Vision, however, while the first goal for 2030 in the financial sector is to broaden access to financial services for all Kenyans there is no description of how this is to be done. Further, the immediate aims up to 2012 do not explicitly address this. They

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20 For the last three years Malawi has provided subsidized fertilizers to its farmers. The net result has been to turn the formerly food deficit country into an exporter of maize.

21 Here we are talking of backwards and forwards linkages. We are of course aware that a more efficient financial sector that makes credit easily available across the economy is beneficial to all sectors.
include: institutional reform that focuses on the commercial justice system; provision of long-term finance; creation of an enabling environment; and enhancing capital markets. In the MTEF 2008–2012, only 2 of the 18 medium-term goals address this issue and it is not addressed in the actual policy and legal reforms that are to be made. It seems again that a general reform of the financial system is expected to address the goal rather than specific policies targeted at this problem. Given this, it is unlikely that the financial sector will play a much greater role in creating equality than it has in the past. On the other hand, improvements in the retail sector will tend to be equalizing given the large number of low income earners employed in this sector.

On the whole, the plans for the six sectors are commendable. They focus on efficiency gains within the existing economic structure. They, however, do not address the large structural problems that generate inequality in the Kenyan economy. Given that this renewed attempt at growth starts with an economy that is already highly unequal, one cannot discount the possibility of these initiatives ending up with net disequalizing effects.
7. **Addressing Inequality: Social programmes**

Inequality is fundamentally driven by the structure of an economy, particularly ownership patterns. Long-term sustainable efforts to manage inequality therefore need to address the structural drivers. In the short to medium term, however, it is possible to deal with moderate levels of inequality through a progressive tax system and redistributive state. Despite the fiscal constraints it faces, the government has undertaken a number of initiatives that are likely to have an equalizing impact although the exact impact cannot be adduced because of the lack of data.

The most important of these initiatives has been the free primary education (FPE) programme that began in 2003 and the newly implemented subsidization of secondary school fees. This set of programmes to some extent addresses some of the structural drivers of inequality. In this case the difference is access to education. In addition, the recent budget announcement of creating schools that are centres of excellence in every constituency, will in the long term contribute towards reducing regional inequality (Ministry of Finance, 2009). Since education often determines life opportunities, equalizing access goes a long way towards creating a more equal nation in the future.

In terms of dealing with group inequality of various kinds, the creation of the Constituencies Development Fund and the youth and women’s enterprise development funds are also likely to have an impact on inequality. This impact will be further enhanced by the recent implementation of the pilot transfer programmes to poor households and the elderly.

There is a need to evaluate these programmes and examine to what extent they reduce inequality and also assist households in increasing future income earnings. As welcome as such programmes are, given the relatively limited resources of the government, reducing poverty and inequality and then maintaining moderate rates of inequality will in the Kenyan case depend on creating a structure that delivers relatively equal growth rather than transfers. This is particularly so because the number of formal jobs per member of the population has been falling since independence (refer back to Figure 1.1). Government revenues come from a variety of sources, but a significant amount comes from taxation of those in the formal sector. If the access to formal jobs continues to shrink, then effectively the weight of the transfers is being taken up by a smaller part of the population. This kind of scenario is not sustainable in the long run.

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22 We say to “some extent” because richer families can opt for private schools, which often have better facilities and student to teacher ratios. In fact, the Ministry of Education has stopped publishing league tables for exams as private schools were using this as advertising. More recently there has been a finding that the rich are actually leaving the public education sector and this may be having some effect on quality (Bold et al., 2010, Forthcoming). It has also been found elsewhere that mixed income schools tend to be beneficial for all students, rich and poor. A move towards more income-segregated schools would therefore result in lower learning over the long term and eventually lower productivity in the economy. It would also diminish the equalizing effect of the FPE.
8. Policy Implications

Via Vision 2030, the MTEP 2008–2012 and the 2009/10 national budget, it is clear that the Kenyan government has acknowledged the problem of inequality more than any other time in its past, with the possible exception of the years immediately after independence. Our reading of the various plans suggests, however, that the primary mechanism of addressing both poverty and inequality is to improve efficiencies and use growth. While we applaud this commendable first step and acknowledge the need for accelerated growth, we would argue that to both sustain this growth and maintain social stability there is a need to address the drivers of structural inequality in the country. This view is bolstered by the fact that in the past Kenya has had fairly decent episodes of growth but still suffers from very high levels of poverty and inequality. Growth in the context of huge inequality does not trickle down to the poor.

Our study suggests that the inequality challenge facing Kenya is primarily due to the large pools of reserve labour in both the smallholder and informal sectors. The individuals are not in these sectors out of choice but because of their inability to get formal sector jobs or create formal sector firms. The result is depressed earnings in these sectors and across the economy, as these sectors effectively set the reservation wage for the formal sector.

We must note here three important characteristics of our simulations and therefore our findings:

- The first is that all of our assumptions have erred on the side of optimism, thus they are in fact an overestimation of the creation of jobs.
- The second is that despite the optimism we find a gap in formal job creation that is bigger than the total number of jobs created in the formal sector. This suggests that dealing with the problems requires fundamental structural transformations and not marginal changes.
- The third thing to note is that the formal sector economy is actually becoming more technologically sophisticated and therefore more capital intensive. It may be the case, then, that the gross employment elasticity of growth is actually decreasing over time. This would mean that we have another bias in our simulation that tends to overestimate the economy’s ability to create jobs.

Our study thus leads us to three main conclusions:

- The first is that growth alone will not produce sufficient jobs in the formal sector to absorb all the new entrants into the labour market. As the excess supply of labour remains in the smallholder sector or moves to the informal sector, wages in these sectors will be repressed by the over abundance of labour. This repression of wages will affect inequality in two ways. The first is that the direct repression will lead to either the maintenance of the present gap between the formal sector and the reserve sector or the expansion of that gap. The second is that the overall suppression of wages will lead to a larger gap between wages and profits – also increasing inequality. The people most likely to be affected by these processes are the youth. This is a ticking time bomb for the nation. A permanent solution must be found rather than the present stop-gap public investment projects.
- The second is that regional and sex differences are also likely to continue unless addressed specifically. Here we must also emphasize the coincidence between regional inequality and ethnic inequality. This form of horizontal inequality is of particular importance because it is a source of political instability and if not dealt with appropriately could have dire consequences for the country.
- Last there is a need to improve the data collection for work on inequality. Of utmost importance is the creation of a time series data set on income that would allow for household comparisons over time.

It is clear that policies to specifically address the structural causes of inequality in the country are needed urgently. We emphasize again that the
primary cause is the large pool of underemployed labour in the smallholder and informal sectors that cannot be absorbed into decent employment even at growth rates of 10 per cent. We emphasize again that not only does large inequality make poverty alleviation more difficult, but that gains from trade are also reduced in the context of inequality.

8.1 Data and information recommendations

A number of additional policy prescriptions also have potential for enhancing the possibility of creating inclusive growth between now and 2030. In order for Vision 2030 to fulfil its goals and to produce inclusive growth, it will be important for policy makers and planners to have more detailed information of two kinds.

The first kind of information is a more detailed accounting and modelling of the relationship between growth and employment. This will help the government create incentives for sectors that are more labour absorbing. Within the Vision as it is presently constituted there is no clear indication that the labour intensity of sectors and their ability to create jobs has been taken into account in the planning. Such an exercise should be a priority for the NESC secretariat.

The second type of information is a better accounting of inequality in the country. The first aspect of this is the production of comparable measures of income (not expenditure) distribution over time. A secondary aspect is an understanding of the income dynamics of Kenyan households over time so that we can understand more clearly which factors lead to households exiting and entering poverty and also being successful. To do this there is need for more frequent surveys of income to permit the creation of a data panel that can be followed through time. In this respect it would be worthwhile to constitute a permanent working group at KNBS that regularly produced information on income dynamics.

The third aspect of understanding income inequality is the realization that income is simply a flow from a set of assets. Asset differences – both individual and social – in the form of physical, human and social capital are the major causes underlying income inequality. To maintain long-term moderate income inequality an evaluation of how asset inequality leads to income inequality in the specific case of Kenya is needed.

8.2 Labour intensive employment

For Kenya to successfully absorb the large pools of labour there is a need in the short term to encourage labour intensive employment. This can be done in both the public and private sectors. The public sector can play an important role in creating a basis for sustainable, equitable growth, particularly via the provision of infrastructure. For public investment, labour intensive technologies should be mandated across the board. For example, while the Ministry of Roads presently has labour intensive strategies the Ministry of Water does not. In industry this can be done by creating a favourable tax regime for more labour intensive production. The impact of this is that the same amount of growth would lead to higher employment. Over time this tax regime can also be targeted to create labour intensive jobs in regions where they are needed, while allowing for more capital intensive employment in other areas. This is a practice that is presently in use in China, for example, where labour intensive industries in the interior, which has not grown as fast as the coastal regions, are taxed favourably with respect to the use of labour intensive methods, while firms in the coastal region are not.

8.3 The agrarian and rural questions

The reserve labour is held in two pools. The first is the smallholder sector. How do you reduce the amount of underemployment in this proportion of the population in the absence of jobs to absorb them? The limiting production factor in the smallholder sector is land. Most rural Kenyans exist on extremely small portions of land. We therefore have excess labour on much of the land in the smallholder sector. If this labour had access to more land we would not only see higher agricultural production but also diminish the flow of individuals into the informal sector. While Vision 2030 has in place proposals to increase the amount of land utilized via irrigation and more scientific management, we would argue that these take time and may still not be sufficient to absorb the rapid increase in the rural population. We propose two approaches to the problem in the rural areas beyond what is contained in Vision 2030: land redistribution and labour intensive environmental conservation.

Land redistribution

The fastest way and historically the most successful approach to land distribution has been to transfer land directly to smallholders (Griffin and Ickowitz, 2000). This distribution could be done in a relatively non-controversial way via the creation of a tax on
public Works Programme. Historically, countries such as 

Across the world we have now become aware of the 

time of global and national environmental crisis. 

Rural environmental conservation 

produce in urban markets, thus creating more rural 

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to give those who are subsistence farmers today an opportunity to become small commercial farmers. With the growth in urbanization in the country we now have a large enough market so that effectively all food crops can now be grown for the market. The key is having sufficient land complemented by access to markets. In fact, small groups of small farmers could potentially come together to package, transport and market their produce in urban markets, thus creating more rural jobs.  

Rural environmental conservation 

Kenya embarks on its new path of development at a time of global and national environmental crisis. Across the world we have now become aware of the 

global impact of climate change. Nationally skewed land distribution and the failure of employment to absorb the growing population have resulted in massive environmental degradation in rural areas. On farms this is seen in erosion and loss of soil fertility, resulting in lower yields for rain fed agriculture. Off-farm it has resulted in deforestation, the encroachment of forests and reserves, and the closure of important wildlife corridors. In total, this has lowered agricultural productivity, increased flooding and costs for water supplies, and increased human and wildlife conflict, to say nothing about the impact on the tourism potential as wildlife numbers have decreased. This situation presents challenges to the country but also opportunities.

The opportunities are the chance to engage in a labour intensive environmental conservation programme, at a time where there is particular worldwide goodwill toward such projects. Historically, countries such as the United States have used these methods not only to employ people during a crisis but also to create vast national reserves and a legacy for future generations (UNEP, 2008; UNDP, 2009a). During the Great Depression the government of the USA established the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) as part of its effort to put young men to work, in the process creating 2 million jobs. Among a wide range of other projects the CCC reclaimed over 40 million acres of land from soil erosion and planted over 2 billion trees (UNDP, 2009b).

Kenya should embark on a broad rural environmental programme aimed at conserving watersheds, terracing fragile agricultural lands, getting rid of invasive species, and reforesting both public and private land. Within this programme there should also be a particular emphasis on arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) – which are at any rate a focal area of Vision 2030. The labour intensive nature of such projects could absorb a substantial proportion of the surplus labour that exists in the rural areas. A present example of this approach is the Environmental Sector of the Expanded Public Works Programme in South Africa (UNDP, 2009b). In the Kenyan case, where the project focused on the reclamation of formerly unoccupied fragile lands, a plan to create new economic opportunities in these areas along with continued conservation would allow the easing

all land. Individuals would receive an exemption for their primary residence and a limited amount of quality adjusted land. The impact of this tax would be to force individuals to use land rationally. Holding land for speculative purposes or as a hedge against inflation would become expensive. A land bank that would purchase and sell or transfer the land would be created. This would be financed by the tax, which would be initially earmarked for land redistribution purposes. Once sufficient redistribution has taken place, the funds could then be earmarked for further agricultural improvements and rural infrastructure. The advantage of land redistribution is that apart from immediately slowing down the flow of labour into the informal sector, it rapidly creates a rural middle class that will begin to demand products from the formal and informal sectors. This increase in demand will help stimulate employment in other areas. In a sense you begin the creation of a virtuous demand driven cycle of employment creation.

We are of course aware of the sensitivity of land distribution in the country. We would like to note two things here. The first is that the programme need not take place in every region (UNDP, 2001), as there are areas where it may not be necessary. The second is that this may actually provide an opportunity to systematically and rationally address some of the historical injustices associated with land distribution in the country (Kanyinga, 2009).

In suggesting land redistribution our aim is not to prolong the existence of subsistence farming, but rather in fact to give those who are subsistence farmers today an opportunity to become small commercial farmers. With the growth in urbanization in the country we now have a large enough market so that effectively all food crops can now be grown for the market. The key is having sufficient land complemented by access to markets. In fact, small groups of small farmers could potentially come together to package, transport and market their produce in urban markets, thus creating more rural jobs.

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23 For a more complete proposal including tentative budget please see Githinji and Holmquist (2008). Much of the proposal can be accommodated within the newly passed National Land Policy (Ministry of Lands, 2006).
24 Because of the deepening of the financial system and the increased availability of other instruments for holding wealth, this proposal may receive less opposition from those holding land as a hedge against inflation than expected. This does not mean that there would be no opposition, just that the importance of land as a hedge against inflation may have somewhat decreased. Of course, as evidenced by the discussion of the new constitution, land is an emotive issue in Kenya and any reform will likely face some stiff challenges.
25 Since Kenya has turned east towards East Asia in its development planning, it would be remiss for us to not mention that in most of the successful Asian cases, namely Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China, land redistribution was a crucial component of the economic plans before growth took off (Griffin et al., 2000).
26 The Nyangorora Banana Youth group, which processes bananas into a number of products, is a good example of this (Gisesa, 2009).
of pressure in some presently overpopulated areas.

The worldwide goodwill that exists towards the environment, coupled with Kenya’s prominence as a host of rare species, habitats, natural vistas and the headquarters of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), could be leveraged to raise funds for such a project. This combined with creative use of the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon offset mechanisms for reforestation may provide a significant amount of the funding for an extensive programme.

8.4 The urban question and transforming the Jua Kali

The question of land and rural conservation deals with one part of the reserve pool. There is still a question of the reserve labour found in the informal sector. In the main, the approach taken by the Vision involves the formalization of this sector, particularly via the provision of jua kali sheds in various urban centres. The specific collection of firms in each urban centre will depend on what kind of industry has the biggest backward linkages in the area. For example, the sheds in Eldoret have been designated for agro-processing. While we applaud this, we believe that given the size of the sector and its importance in terms of employment, a much more aggressive approach needs to be taken. We advocate two different tacks. The first is redistribution through housing as was done in the case of Singapore (Lee, 2000). The second is the upgrading of jua kali to make it a basis for not only local but also export production.

Redistribution is important here, too, because the development and graduation of informal sector firms depends on the initial wealth distribution. Where wealth is unequally distributed, the informal sector tends to be larger, longer-lived and with fewer graduations of firms to the formal sector (Gutierrez-Romero, 2010). This is because the growth of the informal sector – where wealth is unequally distributed – is driven by the entrants of new microenterprises rather than by the growth and graduation of existing firms. Graduation to formal sector activity does not occur via the growth of small firms, but rather via selection, whereby firms that started as relatively large firms graduate (Sandefur, 2010).

Urban housing, redistribution and creating green jobs

The lack of and the low quality of urban housing for the poor and low income residents of Kenya’s urban areas present both a challenge and opportunity for the country. The opportunity is to create wealth for lower income individuals via the creation of housing – which across the world tends to be the largest store of wealth for people in market societies. This wealth can be leveraged by individuals to obtain credit for entrepreneurial activities and thus provision of housing becomes a virtuous cycle of creating further entrepreneurial and employment opportunities. More importantly, the building of the housing – if sourced to labour intensive smaller constructors – will immediately create jobs and demand for the products from industries that produce house furnishings and finishings. Finally, home ownership or ownership generally gives individuals a stake in society and contributes to political stability. An example of a country that took this approach was Singapore through its Housing Development Board and the use of pensions (Lee, 2000).

There are several key advantages of such a plan, which would be broader than the presently existing slum upgrading and – crucially – would include ownership of the houses rather than rental. Among the key aspects and advantages of such an approach are the following:

- For the plan to be successful in providing both employment and long-lasting housing requires that the workers be well skilled. A key component therefore would be the creation of a training programme that would train apprentices in the building crafts or alternatively assist jobless individuals to get training in existing institutions. The plan would thus serve to improve the human capital of individuals.
- The plan would also create an opportunity for entrepreneurial activities via the creation of small construction firms.
- The lack of basic infrastructure in many Kenyan urban residential areas increases the cost of housing by up to 30 per cent (Ayieko, 2010; Turama, 2010). In this plan infrastructure could be constructed by the public sector using labour intensive methods that would absorb

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27 See for example, Odingo (2001) and Shah et al. (2009).

28 Jua kali is a Kiswahili term that means “hot sun”. It is applied to Kenya’s informal sector because for a variety of historical and economic reasons practitioners often do not have fixed premises and literally work outdoors in the sun.

29 To protect against loss of housing, a mortgage insurance industry would be created to protect both the individual borrower and the financier as is the practice in most advanced mortgage markets. Further, to ensure that individuals’ homes are not put unduly at risk, regulations on borrowing against housing would be put in place in order to ensure that the entire family is protected. This is especially important with respect to gender relations. We know that in the past land titling made only in the husband’s name in some instances led to women losing their livelihood where husbands had taken risks without consulting the family.
some of the excess urban labour supply.

- To further bring down costs and give individuals a stake, sweat equity could be used as part of the payment as is done by the non-government organization (NGO) Habitat for Humanity across the world and in Kenya (Mobley, 2009).

- As in Singapore, national pension funds could be used for the construction, as well as allowing individuals to use their pensions for the down payment. This could then be repaid to the Pension Board over time (Lee, 2000).

- The use of pension funds for down payment could also be a way of encouraging the formalization of the informal sector. If formalization enabled entrepreneurs and workers in the informal sector to contribute to and benefit from a national pension fund, they would be more likely to register their firms.

- The housing would use local materials, with “local” meaning that where possible materials are sourced within the specific region. This would encourage backward linkages within regions, thus contributing to more industrial activities regionally and a more equal regional benefit from the programme.

- There would be an emphasis on the use of local and appropriate technology such as local brick making enterprises and soil-cement block making machines. This would help jump-start manufacturing industries and after successful provision for the local markets these same manufacturers may have potential to graduate to exporting to other African countries with large housing deficits (Karani, 2010).

- Like the conservation programmes in the rural areas, urban housing provides an opportunity to take on the challenges of global climate change at a number of different levels, such as:
  - Appropriate designs that take climate challenges into account could be sourced from local architects.
  - Appropriate building codes could create a demand for “green” construction inputs such as solar water heaters, water capturing and recycling systems, air dried blocks instead of kiln dried, and so on. The impact of this would be the creation of local industries that produce these materials. Furthermore, the use of some of the materials such as air dried blocks could potentially benefit from the carbon offset programmes that exist (Mobley, 2009). The same may be possible for solar water heaters. Potentially in the future this industry would also engage in export.

**Upgrading the Jua Kali**

While housing construction would affect one important part of the jua kali sector, namely the construction sector, numerous other sectors should be upgraded in order to absorb the surplus labour. For the sake of illustration we believe that the kind of effort needed is equivalent to that which was made from independence in the smallholder tea sector through the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA). One difference, however, is that the broader organization need not be national in character but may comprise regional producers, for example Lamu furniture makers, which are used as an illustration of how such a plan might work. It is important to note that use of the furniture sector is simply an illustration; other parts of the jua kali sector would benefit from similar plans.  

Before the complete details of such a plan can be established – because much of it depends on the formalization of informal sector businesses – more analytic work needs to be done to establish how informal sector firms have graduated to the formal sector. Whereas there is some work on barriers facing the informal sector, there is little on graduation by informal firms.

Let us turn our attention now to the broad outline of what such a plan might look like for the furniture sector. The reasons for picking the furniture sector, which received relatively little attention in the Vision, are the following:

- It is composed of numerous small informal firms spread throughout the country.
- Skills learnt here can be transferred to more complex skill-intensive industries.
- Its products enjoy a relatively robust internal demand.
- It has strong backward linkages (with the forestry sector) and could also have strong linkages with the wider manufacturing sector because of its demand for tools and inputs such as screws, paints, varnishes, etc.
- It has strong forward linkages with other industry, for example the tourist industry, where local furniture has been fairly successful (House, 1981; Schneider, 1999). In addition, it could supply the government and education sector. Using local carpenters also means that it can provide work in most constituencies.

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30 An example in agro processing would be replicating and expanding the model of the Nyangorora Banana Youth group, which has built a Ksh 6 million factory for producing a range of products from bananas and the banana plant, including banana flour, wine, beer, cakes, ropes, mats and caps. They source their bananas from local farmers in Kisii, thus ensuring a market for farmers and employment for the youth in Miri in Kisii district. This group has benefited from the Youth Development Fund, KIRDI and KARI (Gisesa, 2009).
Industry is generally successful when it is able to take advantage of returns to scale. In tea production, KTDA was organized to allow small tea holders to take advantage of the returns to scale in input purchasing, processing and marketing that had hitherto been organized via a plantation system and thus were not available to smallholders. A similar undertaking could take place with furniture making. Small furniture makers in various locations could be organized into umbrella firms/cooperatives. These umbrella organizations, which could be set up in the context of creating the *jua kali* sheds already in the process of construction, would provide the following services:

- Bulk purchases of inputs especially timber and other materials used in furniture making. This would serve to lower the individual costs of a small firm’s inputs.
- Shared machine shops for larger equipment that cannot be fully exploited by any one firm.
- Shared accounting services.
- Shared marketing services. This would be particularly important especially in export markets and markets for government tenders where small firms are often not competitive, not because they do not produce a good product but rather because they do not have the human capital and resources to produce tender documents or to analyse foreign market intelligence. While streamlining of government procurement for small firms may go some way in solving part of the problem, exports still need a lot of groundwork. For example, Sunripe, a successful horticultural exporter, has a marketing director who spends every other month in Europe collecting and analysing foreign market intelligence (English et al., 2006). On the other hand, producers of Lamu furniture lose out on the huge returns that accompany exporting their own product rather than selling it in Kenya to foreign firms or individuals who then export it.

It would be remiss for us in using the furniture sector not to mention the challenges it faces from producers in Malaysia, Indonesia, India, China, etc. In supporting Kenyan industry the government will also have to engage in bilateral talks to ensure that Kenyan producers get a fair opportunity to become competitive producers before local markets are opened completely to outside producers.

### 8.5 Dividing national income: The wage versus profit share

Beyond tackling the large pools of reserve labour that we argue are the structural drivers of Kenya’s inequality, there is also a need to examine how income from production is distributed. There are two basic streams of production income, wages and profits. As long as profits are accumulated by only a small group within the country, they will drive inequality.

Our simulation suggests that wages will be suppressed because of the failure to increase employment. This would mean that the share of profits in national income would increase, as most profits accrue to the already rich and this would further exacerbate inequality. Furthermore, owing to both historical patterns of capitalist development in Kenya and colonial and post colonial economic discrimination, ownership in Kenyan enterprises is concentrated in Kenya by race, ethnicity, region and sex. That is to say, the capitalist class in Kenya is dominated by individuals from a very limited number of ethnicities. This does not portend well for future economic and political development as economic tensions may be interpreted through ethnic lenses and result in wrong solutions.

To address this we would suggest finding ways to distribute profits more broadly across race, ethnicity, region and sex in Kenya. Let us be clear that we are *not* advocating constraints on private companies, but rather that the government’s efforts to develop the private sector include incentives not only to individually owned firms or standard corporations, but also to community and/or worker owned firms. Firms of this nature distribute their profits to the workers or community. Especially if...
such firms are established in the rural areas and among women and/or youth, they will contribute to minimizing not only vertical inequality but also horizontal inequality. Examples of such firms are cooperatives in many sectors or community-owned tourist facilities.
Conclusions

In this study we examined the potential impact on inequality of the growth projected by Vision 2030. We find that the Vision 2030 project, while being a commendable step towards improving growth and development in the country, does not adequately address the structural causes of inequality in the country.

Even though based on Kenyan reality, Vision 2030 recognizes the success of East Asian countries and attempts to emulate them where possible. We encourage policy makers to look beyond the industrial policy of East Asia and note other features of these countries that played a role. Among the features are the measures taken initially to address structural inequality such as land redistribution in Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan, or concurrent with growth such as distribution through housing in Singapore and affirmative action in Malaysia. These measures have meant that even when growth has become disequalizing such as in China because you start from much equal distribution, the efficiency of poverty reduction is higher and the increase in inequality is moderated. Note that despite its tremendous and unequalizing growth, China is still more equal than Kenya if you consider the most recently available income Gini.

We also would like to reiterate that dealing with inequality results in actually increasing the demand for local goods. A more equal distribution means that more income will go to the lower income groups. These groups tend to purchase labour intensive locally produced goods (House, 1981). The increased demand for such goods can be a catalyst for the industries that produce them. In turn, these industries may employ more workers thus setting off a virtuous cycle of employment and growth. Moreover, as Kenya moves further in the direction of an export led model of growth, we must be cognizant that the gains from trade are reduced by inequality. Dealing with inequality at the outset would therefore make the Vision more successful in generating growth.

Reducing inequality is not only an economic action but also a political one. It is a process of inclusion. By bringing economic benefits to individuals, groups and regions that hitherto have not benefited much from what little growth has taken place, the government enhances the benefits of citizenship. This in turn results in a more politically stable, safer and prosperous nation.
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Appendix

Figure 1.A1: Public and private sector employment, 1972–2007
Acknowledgements

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Gender and Kenya Vision 2030: An audit of the economic pillar

Section 2

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1. Introduction

Promoting gender equality is widely acknowledged as an essential component of an effective economic and human development strategy (Chen, 2004). This has necessitated the integration of gender issues into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in the political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally. According to World Bank (2001), gender equality is a core development issue – a development objective in its own right. It strengthens countries’ abilities to grow, reduce poverty and govern effectively.

Gender refers to the array of society-determined roles, personality traits, attitudes, behaviours, values, relative power and influence that society ascribes to females and males on a differential basis according to their sex. World Bank (2001) argues that like race, ethnicity and class, gender is a social category that largely establishes one’s life chances, shaping one’s participation in society and in the economy. Men and women are systematically differently placed in the economy and hence face different constraints, assume different socially determined responsibilities and are ultimately likely to behave differently in response to economic policy (Himmelweit, 2002).

Equity and inequality are quite interrelated. Gender equity refers to the process of being fair to women and men, mainly achieved by putting in place strategies and measures that are meant to compensate for constraints that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field. Equity leads to equality. Gender equality, on the other hand, requires equal enjoyment by women and men of socially valued goods, opportunities, resources and rewards. Where gender inequality exists, it is generally women who are excluded or disadvantaged in relation to decision making and access to economic and social resources. Therefore a critical aspect of promoting gender equality is the empowerment of women, with a focus on identifying and redressing power imbalances and giving women more autonomy to manage their own lives. Gender equality does not mean that men and women become the same, only that access to opportunities and life chances is neither dependent on, nor constrained by, their sex.

Advancement of women brings important economic, business and societal impacts on the growth of nations. Internationally, considerable progress has been made in closing the health outcomes and education gender gaps (Hausmann et al., 2008). Despite the gains, the gap between women and men in economic participation (captured through the participation gap, the remuneration gap and the advancement gap) and political empowerment remains wide: only 62 per cent of the economic outcomes gap and only 16 per cent of the political outcomes gap has been closed.¹

The Government of Kenya (GOK) officially acknowledges the importance of gender equality in development. At the national level, the case for gender equality has been strengthened over the years by international and national policy discourse, research and advocacy. In the current long-term development blueprint, *Kenya Vision 2030* (GOK, 2007a), gender imbalance is viewed as one of the key developmental challenges facing the country. The Vision for the gender, youth and vulnerable groups sector is that ‘men and women enjoy a high quality of life and equal opportunities’ (GOK, 2007a: 113). Various strategies, programmes and projects in the areas of opportunity and empowerment, capabilities and vulnerabilities have been proposed to ensure that both men and women benefit equally from the available resources.

Of the three pillars of Vision 2030 – economic, social and political – the focus of this paper is on the economic pillar, with the aim of assessing the extent to which gender issues have been addressed within the pillar. The paper adopts a gender mainstreaming approach, which makes a gender dimension...
explicit in all policy sectors. This is attained by integrating a gender perspective into existing mainstream institutions and all programme sectors. Gender equality is no longer viewed as a separate question, but becomes a concern for all policies and programmes. Furthermore, a gender mainstreaming approach does not look at women in isolation, but looks at both men and women – both as actors in the development process and as its beneficiaries. Unlike a gender neutral approach to development, a gender mainstreaming approach does not assume that policies and interventions will affect men and women, boys and girls, in the same way (Niemanis, 2007).

Specifically, the study aims to:

- Undertake a situation analysis, highlighting the current gender disparities within the economy and an overview of the areas in which the Kenyan government has made deliberate attempts to improve gender equality.
- Provide an understanding of the links among gender, economic development and the macro economy.
- Analyse the flagship projects of the key sectors in the economic pillar of Vision 2030 from a gender perspective.
- Provide policy recommendations for achieving gender equality in Kenya.

The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief background of Vision 2030, as well as a situation analysis of key gender gaps in Kenya, in relation to the economic pillar. This is meant to provide an understanding of existing gender gaps, as these are likely to have implications for the outcomes of the projects encompassed by the economic pillar. The section also provides an overview of the efforts the Kenyan government has made in mainstreaming gender into the development policy framework. Section three reviews literature on gender and development, with the aim of underscoring the importance of integrating gender into development. In addition, the section provides an understanding of the link between gender and macroeconomics, with a brief focus on Kenya’s policy analysis experience. This is mainly because having an adequate understanding of the link between gender and the macro economy requires proper gendered databases and well-designed analytical tools that are also used to guide policy formulation (such as Vision 2030). Section four audits the economic pillar of Vision 2030 from a gender dimension, while section five presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis and proposes policy recommendations.
2. Background Information

Kenya Vision 2030 was formulated as the long-term development blueprint for the period 2008–2030. The Vision is of ‘a globally competitive and prosperous country with high quality of life for its citizens by the year 2030’ (GOK, 2007a: vii). Kenya Vision 2030 is anchored on three key pillars: economic, social and political. The economic pillar aims at achieving a 10 per cent economic growth rate by 2012, and thereafter, sustaining the average annual economic growth rate at 10 per cent or above. The social pillar seeks to create and build a just and cohesive society, with a healthy citizenry and equitable social development in a clean and secure environment. The political pillar seeks an issue-based, people-centred, results-oriented and accountable democratic political system that respects the rule of law and protects all rights and freedoms of every individual in society.

2.1 The economic pillar of Kenya Vision 2030

The economic pillar of Vision 2030 identifies six priority sectors with the greatest potential to drive growth in the Kenyan economy. These are agriculture, tourism, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, financial services, and business process out-sourcing (BPO). These priority sectors were selected on the basis of their existing and potential contribution to economic growth and employment opportunity, as well as their capacity for growth and competition within the regional markets. The six areas are briefly described below:

- **Agriculture**: Long the mainstay of Kenya’s economy, agriculture contributed about 23.4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 (GOK, 2009a, *Economic Survey*). The sector is also key to growth in exports with its forwards and backwards linkages with other sectors of the economy. A total of six flagship projects and nine key initiatives will be implemented over the Vision 2030 period. The six are: Enactment of the Consolidated Agricultural Reform Bill; a fertilizer cost-reduction initiative; establishment of five livestock disease free zones in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) regions, a land registry, a land use master plan, and ASAL development projects.
  - **Manufacturing**: This sector is expected to play a critical role in propelling the economy to the 10 per cent growth rate by creating jobs, generating foreign exchange and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The sector contributed about 10.6 per cent of the GDP in 2008 (GOK, 2009a). The sector is also considered to have a sizeable domestic and regional market and potential to develop global niche products, especially agro-processed products. The two flagship projects identified are the development of special economic zones in all the eight regions, and development of five small and medium enterprise parks in five regions.
  - **Tourism**: Although a leading foreign exchange earner for the country, it is not possible to ascertain this sector’s exact contribution to GDP because it is not captured as a stand-alone sector in national accounts. The Vision 2030 flagship projects for the sector include: development of three resort cities, two at Kenya’s coast and one in Isiolo (northern Kenya); a premium park initiative; an underutilized parks initiative; and development of niche tourism products.
  - **Wholesale and retail trade**: The sector has expanded rapidly since the introduction of trade liberalization, growing at an average rate of 10 per cent per annum and contributing about 10 per cent of the GDP in 2008 (GOK, 2009a). The sector is extremely fragmented and predominantly informal, however, and Vision 2030 intends to move it towards being formal, efficient, multi-tiered, innovative and diversified in product range. The flagship projects identified are to: build one free trade port in Mombasa; create at least ten hubs and 1,000–1,500 producer business groups, starting with a pilot project in Maragua in central Kenya; and build at least ten tier-one...
markets in all the regions, starting with a pilot project at Athi River, which is within the Nairobi suburbs.

Financial services: This sector is expected to play a critical enabling role by providing better intermediation between savings and investments. The sector has experienced significant growth over the past few years in the banking, insurance, pensions, microfinance and capital market subsectors. It contributed about 4.7 per cent of GDP in 2008 (GOK, 2009a). The key flagship projects include: facilitation of the transformation towards stronger, larger-scale banks; development and execution of a comprehensive model for pension reform; articulation of a comprehensive remittances strategy; and the issuance of a benchmark sovereign bond.

Business process out-sourcing (BPO): The goal here is to make Kenya a top off-shore destination in Africa. The sector is fairly new and has a potential for growth as a source of income and employment. The flagship project for the sector is to establish one major BPO park at Athi River.

2.2 Situation analysis of gender in Kenya

Gender gaps in a number of areas determine the gender dimensions within the Vision 2030 economic pillar. The main areas highlighted here are education, labour force participation, employment, access to finance and participation of women in cooperative societies.

Education

Level of education attainment is an important factor in human development because it directly determines the skill level of individuals. Despite significant improvements in recent years, gender disparities continue to be a key issue in the education sector. Disparities are reflected in gaps in primary and secondary enrolment and completion rates, low achievement levels, and high levels of adult female illiteracy. The government implemented free primary education (FPE) in 2003, which resulted in a tremendous increase in the enrolment rate of both boys and girls. The enrolment rate of girls averaged 49 per cent during the period 2003–2008, compared with an average of 51 per cent for boys over the same period (GOK, 2008e). Net enrolment rates were estimated at 95 per cent for boys and 91 per cent for girls in 2008. In secondary schools, girls’ enrolment was estimated at 46 per cent in 2008, compared with an enrolment rate of 54 per cent for boys. The enrolment of women in the public universities has increased over time from 36.7 per cent in 2004 to 40.13 per cent in 2008. Despite the improved enrolment rates, especially in primary schools, transition rates remain relatively low. The main challenges in this sector relate to access, quality, relevance and equity, especially in the ASALs (GOK, 2007a).

The overall literacy rate for Kenya is 76.8 per cent, with literacy rates among males amounting to 82.5 per cent and those of females reaching only 71.2 per cent (GOK, 2008e). The rural literacy rates for both males and females are much lower than urban rates. For rural areas, the overall literacy rate is 72 per cent; for males it is 78.6 per cent and for females it is 65.4 per cent. The overall literacy rate in urban areas is 87.7 per cent, with the rate among males estimated at 91.0 per cent and among females at 84.4 per cent. The lower levels of literacy are reflected in the lower skill level of most women and consequently the lower capacity of women to participate in employment.

Labour force participation and employment

Statistics from the 2008 Labour Force Report and the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) of the same year indicate that Kenya’s economically active population – those aged 15–64 years – constituted 12.7 million employed persons and 1.9 million unemployed persons, while the inactive population amounted to 5.3 million persons (GOK, 2008b, 2008c). The overall participation rates were slightly higher in urban (74 per cent) than in rural areas (72.2 per cent). The distribution of employed persons indicates that rural areas absorbed 73.6 per cent of the employed persons. An analysis by gender showed that the proportion of working females in the rural areas was higher than that of males, recording 77.1 per cent and 70.3 per cent, respectively. This difference could be explained by the fact that a majority of the women who reside in the rural areas are engaged mostly in agricultural activities. The agriculture sector has been found to have low labour ratios, which is mainly attributed to the low wages prevailing in the sector, as well as the dominance of self-employment and unpaid family workers (GOK, 1996). Given the disparities in the agriculture sector, Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006, on Gender Equality and Development (GOK, 2006b), proposed the implementation of agricultural programmes that would address the difference between men and women in the agricultural sector and focus on equality and equity of outcomes rather than just equal treatment.

3 The employed and the unemployed categories together make up the labour force or the currently active population, which gives the number of people comprising the labour force at a specified period.
Significant disparities in employment and wage rates persist; combined with considerable gaps in asset ownership; these disparities seriously limit women’s economic opportunities. Statistics indicate that males account for about 70 per cent of the total modern sector wage employment in Kenya (GOK, 2009a). As shown in Figure 2.1, males also account for the largest proportion of wage employment in all the sectors of the economy. The proportion of female employees is highest in the agriculture and education sectors, while the finance, insurance and real estate sector has the lowest proportion of female wage employment.

In addition, about 40 per cent of female wage employment is casual employment, compared with only 30 per cent for males (GOK, 2009a). Once well instituted, however, the 30 per cent affirmative action being implemented by the Kenyan government would ensure greater representation by women in the public service.

Distribution of wage employment by sex and income groups in 2007 revealed that there are more males than females in all the income groups (see Figure 2.2). The analysis reveals that on average, 84 per cent of the males who engaged in modern wage employment earn a monthly income of Ksh6,000–7,999, compared with only 14 per cent of the females. In the Ksh25,000–29,000 income group, females account for only 33 per cent. One of the key strategies identified by Vision 2030 for addressing gender disparities is to provide financial support to women so as to raise their incomes and reduce the gap in estimated earned incomes between men and women (GOK 2007a: pg 113).
Access to finance

A Financial Access Survey (FSD Kenya and CBK, 2009) revealed that only 17.8 per cent of women had access to formal finance in 2009, compared with 27.9 per cent of men (see Figure 2.3). This was an increase from 23.8 per cent of males and 14.3 per cent of females having access to formal finance in 2006. In contrast, a higher proportion of women (33.4 per cent) than men (19.5 per cent) access informal finance. The statistics indicate that access to formal financial services still remains a major challenge especially for women, yet it is the availability of an efficient and competitive financial system that will help drive savings and investments for sustainable development. Access to finance is an important key to achieving the Vision 2030 goals, as it provides the capacity to invest in the flagship projects identified in the Vision.

Figure 2.3: Access to finance by sex, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal (other)*</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* Formal (other) refers to non-bank financial institutions such as savings and credit cooperative societies (SACCOs) and microfinance institutions. Source: FSD Kenya and CBK (2009).

The government established the Women’s Enterprise Development Fund (WEDF) as a strategy to address poverty reduction through socio-economic empowerment of women. The aim of the WEDF is to facilitate women’s access to microfinance credit and other financial services at affordable rates. The Fund is disbursed through two distribution channels: selected financial intermediaries and the Constituency Women Enterprise Scheme (C-WES). As at February 2009, a total of Ksh586 million had been loaned to women, out of which Ksh449 million was loaned through financial institutions and Ksh137 million through C-WES. A total of 67,180 women have benefited from the WEDF through both the financial intermediaries and the C-WES.

Further, as highlighted by GOK (2007b), the government has addressed the challenge of women’s access to credit through various initiatives, including the following:

- Several credit facilities make credit available at low interest rates, among them the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Kenya Women Finance Trust, the Kenya Farmers Association and the Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (K-REP).
- Women can now access credit from non-banking institutions without collateral.
- The GOK has also established a Ministerial Grants Committee under the Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services that is intended to give grants to rural men/women groups. The Government has continuously encouraged women to form self-help and welfare groups in order to enable them to access the various available services.
- The Cooperative Societies Act has been amended to streamline the formation of cooperative societies and thus women’s access credit.

Participation in women groups and cooperative societies

The economic and social welfare activities that women engage in through women’s groups serve to harness women’s economic power at the community level (mainly in the form of social capital). In addition, women’s groups represent the primary decision making forums for women in Kenya. Such activities often allow women access to household decision making by creating a realm and resources that they control, although the household as a whole is a beneficiary (World Bank, 2003b). The number of women groups in Kenya increased from 133,135 in 2004 to 140,482 in 2008, while membership increased from 5,115,980 in 2004 to 5,484,275 in 2008 (see Table 2.1). The government has recognized the important role played by these groups. In 2008, grants from the government to women’s groups doubled from Ksh40 million to Ksh80 million. The increase can be attributed to the increase in the number of women’s groups.
groups requesting grants and the establishment of the Social Protection Fund for individual poor women.

Table 2.1: Registered women’s groups by membership, contribution and Government of Kenya grants, 2004–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of women’s groups</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Group contribution (Ksh million)</th>
<th>Grants by GOK to women’s groups (Ksh million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>133,135</td>
<td>5,115,980</td>
<td>531.6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>135,294</td>
<td>5,279,691</td>
<td>538.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>136,972</td>
<td>5,353,607</td>
<td>540.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>138,753</td>
<td>5,417,850</td>
<td>544.6</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>140,482</td>
<td>5,484,275</td>
<td>547.3</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


An analysis of women’s participation in cooperative societies indicates that in 2007 there were 11,269 cooperatives in Kenya with a total membership of 3.6 million, out of which only 23 per cent were women (Table 2.2). Nairobi Province had the highest representation of women (40.3 per cent) while North Eastern had the lowest (8.9 per cent). This means that there still exists a high level of inequality in women’s access to facilities that could be availed through cooperative societies, including credit and farm inputs.

Table 2.2: Women’s participation in cooperative societies in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total No. of cooperatives</th>
<th>Total No. of members</th>
<th>Percentage of females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>11,269</td>
<td>3,642,078</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>598,099</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>999,794</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>86,780</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>692,075</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2,782</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>469,490</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>547,874</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>245,184</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development, Gender Data Sheet (2008).

In general, these statistics indeed indicate that gender gaps still exist in Kenya despite attempts to achieve gender equality as stipulated under international initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and national machineries and institutional mechanisms for implementation of the plan of action. There is need to further incorporate the goal of gender equality into development planning given that gender equality is important for development.

2.3 Gender mainstreaming in public policy in Kenya

The need to integrate gender issues into national development is reflected in the signing and ratification of various instruments, treaties and international conventions, and recognized in many government policy pronouncements and commitments. According to the National Policy on Gender and Development (GOK, 2000), the need for a national policy arose from the government’s realization that without a coherent and comprehensive overall framework for guiding gender mainstreaming within different sectors and ministries, enormous resources may continue to be misplaced.

Kenya’s participation in the first UN Conference on Women in 1975 4 in Mexico set in motion the process that led to the establishment of the Women’s Bureau in the Ministry of Culture and Social Services in 1976. The Women’s Bureau was given the national mandate to support the advancement of women in social, economic and political development.

Its continuing role entails policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, as well as coordination of government initiatives and programmes for women, collection and analysis of sex-disaggregated data and information, and support to and liaison with non-government organizations (NGOs), women’s organizations, and other stakeholders (GOK, 2006b).

Kenya further recognizes the importance of international and regional treaties, conventions and agreements/instruments and their role in promoting gender equality. In 1984, Kenya signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Subsequent to the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the UN Decade for Women, held in Nairobi in 1985, Kenya adopted the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women (NFLS). 5 Kenya also committed to the Beijing Platform for Action 6 (BPFA) in 1995 and in

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4 The Mexico conference launched the UN Decade for Women, which ran from 1975 to 1985.
5 The Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000, adopted at the Nairobi conference, is a blueprint for women's advancement. Its 372 paragraphs deal with the entire spectrum of women's role in society. The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, reviewed the advancement of women in light of these guidelines and adopted a Platform for Action addressing the challenges and demands of the next century (UN Commission on the Status of Women, http://www.un.org/Conferences/Women/Public/Status/textOnly.htm).
November 1996, the National Assembly adopted a motion for the implementation of the BPFA. Other commitments include the MDGs, which were signed in September 2000; the Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa made during the African Union Summit (July 2004) on employment creation and poverty alleviation; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989; the United Nations Declaration on Violence against Women (1993); and the Programme of Action adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994 (GOK, 2008d).

The commitment of the Government of Kenya to mainstream gender into national development for equitable growth and poverty reduction is also evidenced by the establishment of different national machineries with distinct but complementary roles. The establishment of the Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services in 2003 marked the beginning of a focused consideration of the situation and status of women and their participation in various spheres of life in the country. Within the ministry, the Department of Gender was set up in December 2004 and assigned the task of providing technical support for promoting the range of mechanisms in gender mainstreaming.\(^6\) This includes aspects of policy, plans, programmes and laws. The National Commission on Gender and Development (NCGD) was also established in December 2003. It was mandated to coordinate, implement and facilitate gender mainstreaming in national development and to advise the Government on gender concerns. The Commission’s core mandate is to undertake lobbying and advocacy, monitoring and evaluation, and oversight for legal reforms on issues affecting women and girls. Gender desks have also been set up in every ministry to sensitize ministries on gender and push for gender mainstreaming in policy making, planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. A gender database was also officially launched by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development in 2009.

In addition to the creation of national machineries, several policy documents relating to gender have been developed and adopted. Among these are the National Policy on Gender and Development (GOK, 2000) and its plan of action for 2008–2012 (GOK, 2008d), Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 on Gender Equality and Development (GOK, 2006b), and the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Gender Mainstreaming (GOK, 2009b). These are described below.

### The National Policy on Gender and Development

The GOK formulated the National Policy on Gender and Development in 2000. As a framework for the state to reduce gender imbalance and inequality, the policy articulates and reiterates Kenya’s commitment to the various international treaties to which the country is a signatory for their potential as mutually supporting processes for the advancement of gender equality. The overall objective of the policy is to promote the empowerment of women and the mainstreaming of the needs of women, men, girls and boys in all sectors of development in the country so that they can participate and benefit equally from development initiatives. The policy framework recognizes that equality between women and men is a matter of human rights, development and a condition for social justice. It underlines the need to focus on empowerment strategies that demonstrate understanding of essential linkages within and across sectors. In addition, it recognizes that gender is central and cross-cutting, and therefore programme strategies should incorporate gender equality as a goal. The policy also underscores social, cultural, legal and political factors that perpetuate inequalities.

### Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 on Gender Equality and Development


The paper recognizes that it is the right of women, men, girls and boys to participate in and benefit equally from development initiatives. It further recognizes that socio-cultural attitudes held by men and women, and resultant socialization processes, are of great significance in determining the unequal status between men and women. Moreover, the paper also points out that development initiatives affect men and women differently, and in turn women and men have different impacts on development processes.

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\(^6\) This was adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women – FWCW – held in Beijing in 1995.

\(^7\) The Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services has since been divided into two ministries, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports and the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. It is the latter that deals with efficient mechanisms for driving gender mainstreaming and promoting the implementation of international agreements that address gender equality.
Plan of Action to Implement the National Policy on Gender and Development

The Plan of Action to Implement the 2000 National Policy on Gender and Development was launched in 2008 (GOK, 2008d). The Plan is further anchored on Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 on Gender Equality and Development (GOK, 2006b). It captures the gender concerns in key sectors and outlines interventions and strategies that are required to bring real change to women and girls in the society. Broadly, the Plan of Action addresses the nine areas of the national gender policy and Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006: removal of impediments to equal access to economic and employment opportunities for men and women; poverty eradication and promotion of sustainable livelihoods; legal reforms to guarantee Kenyan men and women equality before the law; gender parity in political participation and decision making; education and training; health and population; media; peace, security and conflict resolution; and environmental sustainability (GOK, 2006b). The plan also provides clear indicators that will facilitate monitoring and evaluation during implementation of the policy.

Among the key objectives of gender mainstreaming highlighted in the action plan are improving access to economic and employment opportunities for both men and women; instituting measures that guarantee equity and fairness in access to employment opportunities, in both formal and informal sectors; promoting gender-responsive agriculture; and increasing women’s access to and control over productive assets in a safe environment. The plan also calls for the establishment and maintenance of an up to date e-database for women’s participation in economic development at all levels; the collection, analysis and dissemination of sex-disaggregated data on poverty reduction; and the conduct and dissemination of a national study to review policy responsiveness to gender and poverty eradication. To ensure that these and other objectives are taken seriously, the plan also aims at improving the responsiveness of the national budget to the needs of the poorest women; enhancing equitable distribution of productive assets, wealth and opportunities; putting in place gender-responsive macroeconomic policy formulation systems for sustainable development; and conducting gender responsive annual budget audits to highlight the gender expenditure patterns.

However, the action plan recognized that most ministries were not aware of the national gender policy and proposed that a first step towards gender mainstreaming would be the development of policy statements linking gender to ministries’ core functions, purpose and values. This process would require a harmonized approach and include high-level stakeholders from sector ministries, including permanent secretaries, directors, planners, treasury and parliamentarians, local level political leaders and NGOs.

Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Gender Mainstreaming

A monitoring and evaluation framework for gender mainstreaming was developed by the Department of Gender and Social Development (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development) in 2009 as an institutional framework for providing feedback on the effectiveness of the implementation of the policies and programmes set out in the policy documents, ministries’ strategic plans, annual work plans and performance targets (GOK, 2009b). The M&E Framework intends to ensure that the objectives, programmes/activities and projections are based on sound understanding of the various gender-related circumstances, parameters and dynamics that can influence the outcome of such activities by applying lessons learnt from current plan implementation to future planning. Some 35 core performance indicators were developed for the core priority areas drawn from the 2000 National Policy on Gender and Development, the National Plan of Action 2008–2012 for Implementation of The National Policy on Gender and Development (GOK, 2008d), the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development’s Strategic Plan 2008–2012, the Vision 2030 Medium-Term Plan 2008–2012 (GOK, 2008a), and the National Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES).

Despite the existence of the policies, legislative reforms, plans and programmes, gender disparities persist in legal, social, economic and political levels of decision making, as well as access to and control of resources, opportunities and benefits. The Plan of Action (GOK, 2008d) attributes the slow implementation process mainly to gaps in the laws, delayed enactment of gender-related legislation and lack of comprehensiveness in the content of some laws. Other challenges include weak coordination, harmonization and networking among actors at all levels; inadequate resources (human and financial); limited technical capacity; and capacity consistency resulting from deployment/transfers. Socio-cultural issues, misinterpretation of the concept of gender as applying only to women rather than to women, men, boys and girls, and a lack of gender sensitivity in the development of core sector indicators and targets are also well entrenched barriers. Finally, despite the ambition of the gender action plan, sector and national budgetary allocations are lacking to support targeted gender activities at all levels.
Over the past several decades gender issues have gained greater prominence in the debate on development. It is widely acknowledged that promoting gender equality is an essential component of an effective economic and human development strategy (Chen, 2004). As World Bank (2003a: 4) reports,

There is now a shared understanding within the development community that development policies and actions that fail to take gender inequality into account and fail to address disparities between males and females will have limited effectiveness and serious cost implications.

3.1 Understanding the link between gender and development

Despite the strides in gender awareness, the importance of bringing a gender perspective to policy analysis and design is still not widely understood, the lessons for development not fully integrated by donors and national policy makers (Bamberger et al., 2001). Gender inequalities are still pervasive worldwide and exist across many dimensions of life. In no developing region do women experience equality with men in legal, social and economic rights. Gender gaps remain widespread in access to and control of resources, in economic participation, in power, and in political voice. These gaps are wider in poorer countries and in the poorest groups within countries.

Gender equality and the empowerment of women to fully participate in social, economic and political life is also recognized as ‘an important development outcome, reflected in countries’ national development plans and their specific policies and action plans for the advancement of women’ (ADB et al., 2006: 3). By assuming a role in the decision making process, women enhance their influence on human development. For example, children whose mothers have an equal voice in family decisions are found to be more likely to receive proper nourishment, education and health care services since women create a beneficial environment where they improve the wellbeing of their offspring who can then survive and contribute to future economic growth. Thus, the ability to voice decisions makes gender equality crucial to economic progress and human development. It is widely acknowledged that empowered women contribute to the health and productivity of their families and communities.

In addition, empowering women by promoting their rights and increasing their access to resources and education can prove critical to the advancement of a country’s economic development. The influential role of gender equality on economic growth is most directly illustrated in the participation of women in the labour force. When women are not involved in the workforce, only part of the able workforce is being utilized and, thus, economic resources are wasted. Gender equality allows for an increase in women in the working sector, thereby leading to an expansion of the labour force and an increase in economic productivity. Klasen (1999) argues that when women are kept out of the paid labour force completely, average labour force quality will be lower than otherwise, as more productive female workers are kept from working in favour of less productive male workers.

Gender inequality may have adverse impacts on a number of valuable development goals (Klasen, 1999). It has been shown that gender gaps, especially in education, employment and access to inputs, have a negative impact on growth. Blackden et al. (2006) analysed gender gaps in education, in formal sector employment, and in access to assets and inputs in agricultural production and their effects with the idea of determining how these differences reduce the ability of women to contribute to economic growth. The study findings revealed that gender gaps in education and formal sector employment led to lower rates of growth. Inequalities in access to land and productive inputs reduce agricultural productivity, investment and modernization, and inequalities in time burdens, alongside a high demographic burden, contribute to reducing women’s ability to...
participate effectively in, and benefit equally from, growth and poverty reduction in Africa.

It is also recognized that gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls are among the most effective ways to ‘combat poverty, hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable’ (The Millennium Declaration, 2000, p. 5). The MDGs not only place gender equality as one of the goals, but also recognize its importance to other targets. As World Bank (2003a: 1) states,

Gender equality is not only a goal in its own right, but an essential ingredient for achieving all the other Millennium Development Goals. Attempting to meet the MDGs without promoting gender equality will both increase the costs and minimize the likelihood of attaining the goals.

While there is broad support for the gender-specific MDGs (Goal 3 on gender equality and women’s empowerment, and Goal 5 on maternal health), the MDGs as a whole have been widely criticized for their narrow approach to gender issues. Gender inequalities operate on several levels – within households and in communities, markets and government institutions – and in virtually all spheres of social, economic and political activity (ADB et al., 2006). As pointed out by the UN Millennium Project, the MDGs are interdependent. Countries are unlikely to make meaningful progress in reducing poverty, improving children’s access to education and quality health care, reducing the burden of infectious diseases, or improving access to safe water and improved sanitation, unless they take into account the different vulnerabilities of poor women and men, and the socio-cultural and other conditions that limit poor women’s and girls’ access to basic services.

All of these factors add up to an overwhelming argument for greater gender awareness in development policy making, given that economic growth furthers the improvement in wellbeing (measured through indicators such as longevity, literacy and reduced poverty). Societies that discriminate on the basis of sex pay a significant price – in more poverty, slower economic growth, weaker governance and a lower quality of life (World Bank, 2001). Where gender inequalities impose high human costs and constrain countries’ development prospects, there is a strong argument for a state’s role in promoting gender equality. Gender should be incorporated into the way we think about and approach development, from project design to methods of work and statistics (Stern, 2001).

3.2 Linking gender and macroeconomics

Whether economic analysis is conducted at the macro-, meso- or micro-level, it needs to ask questions about the gender division of labour, resources, power and decision-making. (Kabeer, 2003: 43)

It has been extremely difficult to include gender as a variable in macroeconomic analysis even though it is acknowledged that gender inequality negatively affects growth and development. Elson (2002) argues that the conventional conceptual frameworks and statistics used to design macroeconomic policy are gender-blind because they fail to recognize that (a) women’s contribution to the economy is systematically underestimated, and (b) there is an unpaid care economy in which women do most of the work of maintaining the labour force and keeping the social fabric in good order, maintaining social cohesion, civic responsibility and good neighbourliness.

According to Elson (1996, 2002), the gender-neutrality of macroeconomic analysis was an illusion. It was not only the impact of policies but also the view of the economy on which they were based that was gender-biased. This is because, in neoclassical economics, human resources were treated as ‘non-produced factors of production’ like natural resources, a concept implying that shifting between different activities is possible without cost, which is not always the case. Production and reproduction are regarded as parallel to each other (Kabeer, 2003). “Production” is viewed as activities that contribute to a country’s gross national product (GNP), i.e., those that are bought and sold in the marketplace, while “reproduction” refers to those activities that add to, and take care of, the society’s human resources, including bearing and rearing children and caring for the old, the sick, the disabled, etc. Reproductive work has typically been excluded from economic analysis. There is a tendency to view it as a “natural” aspect of women’s roles and as not being “work” because it is unpaid. Such non-market work is indeed “economic” in the sense that it requires the use of scarce resources, and in the sense that they provide vital inputs to the public and private sectors of the economy (Elson, 2002). By using male economic activity as its standpoint, economic analysis has become skewed and fails to appreciate what is distinctive about women’s work patterns (Kabeer, 2003).
Gendered databases

It is important to note that economic analysis relies heavily on the use of quantitative economic data. Despite the critical role of economic data in decision making and policy, most sex-disaggregated statistics have largely been confined to social, demographic and labour force statistics, which are mainly collected through population censuses and household and labour force surveys (see for example, GOK, 2008b). In Kenya, gendered economic data beyond those derived from these sources are largely lacking, even though the Action Plan 2008–2012 (2008) to mainstream gender underscores the importance of collecting and synthesizing such data. Kenya’s statistics are based on the System of National Accounts (SNA) 1993,8 which is a comprehensive and consistent economic database designed for economic analysis, decision making and policy analysis. The SNA does not include sex-disaggregated data, however, a drawback to its utility in gender programming.

Although the 1993 SNA was revised to assign a market value to some subsistence activities, where goods were produced and consumed in the household, the bias against unpaid work remains (Kabeer, 2003). Yet unpaid work is critical to the reproduction, care and maintenance of labour as well as to the accumulation of human capital. One of the concerns has largely been the non-market economy in which women perform a wide range of productive activities (mostly unpaid work). The contribution of women, despite being critical to the wellbeing of the society, is more often than not missed out since it is not easily quantifiable – e.g., unpaid domestic and social work, quality of the nursing care, community volunteer work, etc. Thus the national accounts still do not fully capture the role of women in national development. For example, it has been estimated that only 60 per cent of female activities in Kenya are captured in the national accounting system (World Bank, 2003b, as quoted by GOK, undated).

Gender and macroeconomic policy analysis

Economic policies affect men and women differently, and any analysis of the impact of economic policies needs to take this fact into account. Properly gendered analytical tools would provide a key input in gender mainstreaming, especially by guiding the formulation of gender-aware economic policies.

In terms of modelling, Kenya relies on the KIPPRA-Treasury macro model (KTMM)10 for economic policy analysis by way of simulations and forecasting of macroeconomic variables. Unfortunately, the model, which is built along the SNA 1993 framework, is highly aggregated and does not incorporate gender perspectives. Therefore, it is not possible to conduct gender-based simulations, for example analysing the gendered impacts of public spending or other economic policy actions so as to facilitate cases of gender-specific expenditure targeting or pro-gender equity fiscal policies.

Gender-aware macroeconomic modelling can mainly be done using a gender-aware social accounting matrix (SAM)11 and gendered computable general equilibrium modelling. These type of models could help bridge the gap between the social – mainly micro – aspects and the economic – mainly macro – aspects of the economy. Such models are not used much in guiding Kenya’s economic policy process, however, which could explain the disjoint between the social and economic aspects of the economy. Kenya has only two SAMs – a 1976 SAM developed by Vandermoortele (ILO) and a 2003 version developed by KIPPRA in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).12 Neither SAM is gendered and therefore cannot be adequately used to analyse the gendered impact of policies, which is a key input in the mainstreaming of gender into economic policy.

8 The System of National Accounts 1993 is a conceptual framework that sets the international statistical standard for the measurement of the market economy. It consists of an integrated set of macroeconomic accounts, balance sheets and tables based on internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and accounting rules. Together, these principles provide a comprehensive accounting framework within which economic data can be compiled and presented in a format that is designed for purposes of economic analysis and policy making.
9 Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis.
10 However, the Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 and Ministry of Finance also have their own smaller models that are used to guide policy, but these are also gender blind.
11 A SAM is a database that provides a snapshot picture of the economy in one year, showing, among other things, how income is generated, how it is distributed among different institutions and how different institutions spend their income. A SAM has two main objectives: first, organizing information about the economic and social structure of a country over a period of time, and second, providing a statistical basis for the creation of a plausible model capable of presenting a static image of the economy along with simulating the effects of policy interventions in the economy. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are economic models that use actual economic data (mostly derived from a SAM model) to estimate how an economy might react to changes in policy, technology or other external factors.
12 For details on the SAM methodology, see Thurlow et al. (2007).
Gender and Kenya Vision 2030: An audit of the economic pillar

Gendered SAM modelling can provide important information about the impact of economic policies on gendered outcomes. For instance, Wanjala and Were (2009) used the 2003 Kenya SAM to simulate the impact of investing in key sectoral priority areas as identified in Vision 2030 on employment outcomes (disaggregated by sex) and compensation of employees. They demonstrated that males mainly benefited from the generation of more skilled well-paying jobs as compared with women, who are mostly concentrated in the informal sector in jobs that are mostly unskilled and low paying. Thus, development and use of up-to-date SAMs (preferably one for every five years) would greatly contribute to gender-aware macro-policy modelling. Time use data are also important for carrying out gender-aware macro modelling, even though a national time use survey has not been carried out for Kenya.
4. Gender and the Economic Pillar of Vision 2030

Vision 2030 is based on several foundations, key among them being the achievement of enhanced equity and wealth creation opportunities for the poor. It is recognized that no society can gain social cohesion if significant sections of the population live in abject poverty. It is for this reason that the vision includes equity as a recurrent principle in its economic, social and political programmes. Special attention is given to investment in the ASAL districts, for example, along with other communities with high incidence of poverty, unemployed youth, women and other vulnerable groups.

Measures aimed at achieving equity, especially gender equity, are mainly concentrated in the social sector, however, This is despite pronouncements made in the various documents\textsuperscript{13} that highlight gender aspects within different key sectors of the Kenyan economy, especially agriculture. For instance, Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 sought the implementation of agricultural programmes that would address the differences between men and women in the agricultural sector and focus on equality and equity of outcomes rather than just equal treatment. The National Policy on Gender and Development (2000) also acknowledges that even though women play a major role in agricultural production, traditional and social practices governing land and livestock ownership, as well as access to and control over resources and benefits accruing from agricultural production, severely limit women’s capacity to increase production.

Despite the contribution by such documents towards understanding the link between key economic sectors and gender inequalities, the recommended actions they raise are not reflected in the economic pillar of Vision 2030. There are no clear gender benchmarks and indicators within the implementation of the sectoral projects, as there is no disaggregation of the various actors within the sectors according to their sex. For instance, the number of farmers is regarded as an indicator for access to extension services. Putting a gender perspective would entail disaggregating the farmers into males and females. The lack of gendered indicators impedes monitoring and evaluation of the implementation progress of sectoral and national objectives, and the pace of gender mainstreaming.

Vision 2030 assumes that the economic pillar is gender neutral, even though various gender dimensions are inherent in the several flagship projects that are proposed. These gender dimensions are rooted in the different roles of men and women in the society, and in the gender disparities in access, ownership and control of productive resources. Men and women also have different capacities for taking advantage of opportunities that arise from investing in the key sectors in Vision 2030.

As stated earlier, the economic pillar identifies six priority sectors with the greatest potential to drive growth in the Kenyan economy. These are agriculture, tourism, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, financial services, and BPO. Using a gender mainstreaming approach, this paper presents a discussion of the various gender dimensions that arise from examination of each flagship project. The flagships projects identified under each sector have different gender dimensions, as discussed below.

4.1 Agriculture

Under the economic pillar, the vision is to transform agriculture into an innovative, commercially-oriented, thoroughly modern sector. The achievement of this vision will be attained through five key strategies:

» Reforming institutions by transforming key organizations such as cooperatives, regulatory bodies and research institutions into complementary and high-performing entities that facilitate growth in the sector. Key among the reforms are implementing

\textsuperscript{13} As discussed above, these particularly include the National Policy on Gender and Development (2000), Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 on Gender Equality and Development (GO\textsc{i}, 2006\textsc{b}), and the 2007 CEDAW Kenya report (GO\textsc{i}, 2007\textsc{b}).
the Consolidated Agricultural Reform Bill; strengthening research and development; improving delivery of extension services by increasing the number of extension officers per farm household and outsourcing extension services; strengthening producer organizations; and integrating agricultural investment into the activities of investment and export promotion authorities.

Increasing productivity through provision of widely accessible inputs and services to farmers and pastoralists. This will mainly be done by reducing the cost of fertilizer; intensifying and expanding irrigation; improving seed quality and adoption; and enhancing livestock development.

Transforming land use to ensure better utilization of high and medium potential lands. This will be through the creation of a land registry that allows for idle and under-utilized land to be utilized; development of an agricultural land use master plan for more efficient utilization of all forms of land; and investing in institutions that link farmers to credit and markets.

Developing arid and semi-arid areas for both crops and livestock. The measures include: investing in water provision, infrastructure, pasture, fodder and veterinary services; creation of disease free zones; and putting more land under cultivation.

Increasing market access through value addition in the processing, packaging and branding of the bulk of agricultural produce.

Selected gender dimensions of these strategies in agriculture are summarized below.

Reforming institutions

Various gender aspects arise with respect to the strategy of reforming institutions. For example, most producer organizations and cooperatives are still male-dominated in terms of management and membership (refer back to Table 2.2). Registration/membership of such organizations is pegged to land ownership, which is mainly male dominated (GOK, undated). This limits the extent to which women can participate in and benefit from these associations. There is need to increase the participation of women to ensure that they contribute to decision making and also benefit from their membership.

Furthermore, the current system of offering extension services can also be said to be gender-blind: Despite the fact that women are central to Kenya’s agricultural productivity, they are not major beneficiaries and focus of agricultural extension services (Kabutha, 1999). Currently, female extension service officers account for only about 27 per cent of the total employment of extension officers – which is even below the required 30 per cent. The National Agricultural Extension Policy (NAEP) of 2001 (GOK, 2001) states that male extension workers tend to target male farmers for training and in the allocation of farm inputs. They also tend to focus on male heads of households as landowners, thus giving them preferential treatment. In addition, in some areas men are constrained from freely interacting with women because of cultural and religious norms and values. Lastly, women’s time constraints may limit them from accessing extension services, also depending on the mode of delivering the services; for example, if through barazas, most women would not be able to attend because of other time consuming household chores and they might also be barred from attending due to cultural reasons. This points to the need to make provision of extension services gender sensitive.

Increasing productivity

Gendered divisions of labour are common in agriculture in Kenya, where women perform about 80 per cent of the work in food production, especially in subsistence and small-scale farming (AfDB, 2007). Women in rural Kenya are also said to spend on average 23 per cent more time in crop activities than do men (Githinji, 2000). In addition, women on average work longer hours than men (CGD, 2008). For instance, AfDB (2007) reports that women in rural Kenya spend about 40 per cent of their time collecting water, averaging about 3 to 5.25 hours, which is even greater for women in the ASALs. Another study also found that adult women work nearly 33 per cent more hours than adult men in all the tasks put together (Githinji, 2000): While adult females work a total of 56 hours a week, adult males work only 42 hours a week. Adult women are also disproportionately responsible for non-market tasks such as domestic work and fuel wood and water collection.

Because of women’s time-poverty, their time constraints make it necessary for them to make hard choices in terms of how they allocate their time, with these choices having implications for the welfare of the individual and her household (Blackden and Wodon, 2006). This results in trade-offs between different productive and reproductive activities, and between market and household tasks. For these reasons many women are constrained from participating in formal and paid employment where they would be remunerated and benefit

from protection by labour, wage, health and safety regulations. Time-poverty issues continue to be treated distinctly as a “women’s problem”, which ignores the implications these time constraints have for the productivity and welfare of women and their households. Reducing the burden on women would thus help them increase their labour productivity.

Previous research has shown that agricultural yields obtained by women farmers could increase by more than 20 per cent if the women were given the same level of agricultural inputs and education as male farmers (Quisumbing 1996; AfDB, 2007). This shows that there is need to look at the gendered distribution of farm inputs, which is mostly in favour of men given that they are the majority owners (or controllers) of agricultural land.

Traditionally, women are also more involved in more traditional food crops (such as roots and tubers and traditional vegetables), while men control more market-oriented high-value cash crops, such as sugarcane, coffee, tea, etc. (GOK, 2006a). In most rural areas, food crop farming is mostly on small parcels of land as compared with the size of land that is usually allocated to cash crop farming. Also, the food crop farming that is controlled by women is mostly for subsistence, while men tend to control the commercially-oriented food crops. Thus, there is need to look beyond crops that are male-dominated when considering agricultural interventions, given that women play a major role in ensuring food security. The challenge, as experience has shown, is that men tend to take over control of the farming of subsistence crops once such crops become lucrative, such as the case of banana farming in Kiambu (Heyer, 2006). The issues involved here narrow down to questions of land ownership, control and use, given that women would have greater control over the benefits of farming if they owned or controlled the resources (land), which would consequently allow them to make decisions about land use.

Uptake of improved seed and technology by men and women is another area of gender discrepancy, with consequent impact on farm output. A survey by the Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development of Egerton University (Tegemeo Institute, 2007) showed that female-headed households used about 60 per cent of the fertilizer volume and a quarter of the hybrid seed volume used by male-headed households. Their yields were also found to be lower, about 73 per cent of those of male-headed households. The lower level of purchased input use among female-headed households could be attributed to their higher poverty levels and higher levels of illiteracy among rural women, which is compounded by their multiple roles of reproduction and production and their lack of access to extension services.

**Land transformation**

Land ownership in Kenya is mainly male-dominated, primarily because of cultural norms that exclude women from inheriting land. Women in Kenya are estimated to own only about 1 per cent of registered and titled land (GOK, 1994). Only a few have control over the land that they have access to (AfDB, 2007; SID, 2007).

**Development of ASAL areas**

Owing to the gendered division of labour, the flagship projects mooted for the development of ASAL areas (especially investment in providing water and putting more land under cultivation) have potential for significant benefit to women because they would spend less time looking for water, while diversifying into agriculture would help ensure food security. Also, the provision of pasture, fodder and veterinary services and the creation of livestock disease-free zones would ensure more sustainable livelihoods and should serve to limit male migrations, which place more burden on women to take charge of the household in the absence of men.

**Increasing market access through value chain addition**

Women and men play different roles and get different benefits along the value chain. It is therefore important to consider gender imbalances not only within agriculture but also in agro-processing, which has higher value added.

### 4.2 Manufacturing

The vision of the manufacturing sector is the development of ‘robust, diversified and competitive manufacturing’ (GOK, 2007a: 63). This is to be achieved through three key strategies:

- **Strengthening local production capacity:** This will be through encouraging consolidation and establishment of regional special economic zones and parks for better targeting of services to export-oriented firms within the parks. Development of various industrial clusters will be promoted.

- **Raising the share of Kenyan products in the regional market:** There is need to increase the country’s regional market share from the current 7 per cent to 15 per cent by 2015. This
will be done by improving capacity utilization and eliminating impediments to Kenya’s competitiveness.

*Developing niche products:* This can be done especially by enhancing value addition in agro-based industries and increasing exports.

Other cross-cutting strategies include: strengthening small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to become key industries by improving productivity and innovation; boosting science, technology and innovation; improving infrastructure; improving the business environment, especially licensing and security; and implementing efficiency-enhancing institutional reforms in the sector. The gender perspective is summarized in the following paragraphs.

**Gender dimensions of the flagship projects in the manufacturing sector**

There are two main gender aspects in these flagship projects – women as employees and women as entrepreneurs. In the first instance, although exact data for Kenya are not available, women form the majority of employees in export processing zones (EPZs), especially in garment production (Manda, 2002). According to ILO (1998), the work force in EPZs worldwide is usually female in majority, but in certain activities, notably textiles, garment manufacturing and electronics assembly, women can account for 90 per cent or more of the workers. Thus, it can be inferred that creation of more of these special economic zones would likely generate sizeable employment for women.

Nevertheless, there are major concerns about EPZ employment. Lax labour laws, lack of government supervision and exemption from labour regulations/unionization make jobs in the EPZ less secure than those in the formal sector and lead to poor working conditions (Manda, 2002). Poor pay, working overtime without commensurate compensation and cases of sexual harassment have also been cited. Women tend to suffer more from the inherent problems of EPZs, including the long working hours, low wages, the almost total absence of social welfare facilities (such as for child care) and the often demanding nature of the work. Thus, while the potential for this sector to provide more opportunities for more women as a way of escaping from poverty can be explored, better incentives and working conditions must be taken into consideration.

**Gender constraints**

As entrepreneurs, women – like men – can take advantage of opportunities created in the special economic zones by setting up businesses. Here, too, however, women face a number of obstacles in venturing into businesses, which mostly condemn them to low income occupations (McCormick and Mitullah, 1995; ILO, 1995). Women’s businesses generally start small, grow slowly and end smaller than men-owned enterprises. Women locate more in the home, rely more on less skilled and unpaid workers, and are less likely to diversify into other activities. In addition, women’s activities tend to be less remunerative than men’s. The participation of women is also low in sectors that require high capital requirements (especially in manufacturing), where they have been found to earn only about 32 per cent of what their male counterparts earn (Githinji, 2000). Such characteristics need to be considered when seeking to encourage entrepreneurial activity, especially by women. Access to credit is a major obstacle to women venturing into such businesses, but attempts to increase women’s access to credit, such as WEDF, can be lauded. Training in entrepreneurial skills would also help women venture into entrepreneurship, especially in the manufacturing sector.

### 4.3 Tourism

The vision for the tourism sector is to “become a top ten long-haul tourist destination in the world that offers a high-value, diverse and distinctive visitor experience” (GOK, 2007a: 28). This will be achieved through a strong focus on the quality and diversity of tourism products in the country. Four key tourism products are envisioned:

- *The Coast product:* Aims at the development of segments along the coast that are currently underutilized, in addition to the expansion and improvement of quality in existing facilities.
- *The safari product:* Aims at improving the quality of premium safari parks and opening resorts in underutilized parks.
- *Niche products:* Aims at nurturing and expanding high-value niche products such as cultural tourism, eco-tourism, sports tourism and lake tourism.
- *Conference and business tourism product:* Aims at increasing revenue from conference and business tourism through investment in new and existing hotel facilities and upgrading of air travel facilities.

In addition to the four key areas, there will also be investment in training in high quality skills for the tourism sector and also in improving security. Gender aspects of the tourism focus are highlighted below.
Gender dimensions in the tourism sector

Integrating gender perspectives into the discussion of tourism is particularly important as the tourism industry is one of the major employers of women and also offers various opportunities for independent income-generating activities (Hemmati, 2000). The tourism sector provides various entry points for women’s employment and opportunities for creating self-employment in small and medium-sized income-generating activities, thus creating pathways towards the elimination of poverty of women and local communities.

Tourism is not yet captured as a stand-alone sector in national accounts; therefore it is not possible to ascertain its exact contribution to the Kenyan economy in terms of employment. Statistics indicate that women account for 28 per cent of total employment in trade, hotels and restaurants (GOK, 2008e). Tourism employs about 45,000 women in the formal sector (IFC, 2006). Many of the 360,000 people employed in the informal sector are women selling handicrafts such as weaving, beadwork and wooden carvings. As in many other sectors, there is a significant horizontal and vertical gender segregation of the labour market in tourism. Horizontally, women and men are placed in different occupations – women are employed as waitresses, chambermaids, cleaners, travel agency sales persons, flight attendants, etc., whereas men are employed as bartenders, gardeners, construction workers, drivers, pilots, etc. (Hemmati, 2000). Vertically, the typical “gender pyramid” is prevalent in the tourism sector – lower levels and occupations with few career development opportunities are dominated by women and key managerial positions are dominated by men.

In terms of creating opportunities, the various flagship projects, such as cultural tourism and the development of niche products, can offer accessible and suitable entry points for women into the sector. These activities help to create financial independence for women by promoting investment in income-generating activities. But even though women entrepreneurs have been able to profit from selling curios, handicrafts and clothes to tourists, they are much less visible in larger and more profitable businesses (IFC, 2006). Few women are hotel owners or tour operators, for example. Most women report that the high start-up capital needed for such ventures is too prohibitive for them, and as a result they remain largely confined to small-scale activities.

Gender constraints

Moreover, despite the opportunities generated in the sector, the tourism industry faces various negative concerns that also have gender implications. Among the collateral negative effects of tourism is the aggravation of social problems like prostitution, drug addiction and sexual exploitation of children. There is also a sexual objectification of women working in the tourism industry. Women are expected to dress in an “attractive” manner, to look beautiful and to “play along” with sexual harassment by customers. Stereotypical images of women are in many cases part of the tourism product.

4.4 Wholesale and Retail Trade

The vision for the wholesale and retail sectors is to ‘move towards a formal sector that is efficient, multi-tiered, diversified in product range, and innovative’ (GOK, 2007a: 59). This will be achieved by:

» Improving the efficiency in the supply chain: This will mainly entail reducing the number of players in the supply chain. Development of formal linkages between consumer outlets and local producer groups will be promoted through the aggregation of individual producers and the formation of new producer groups that will then supply goods directly to the market outlets.

» Extending small-operator retail markets: This will involve creation of organized market outlets for small-scale operators (mainly in high population density areas) who will graduate from the informal sector.

» Expanding formal market outreach: This will be achieved by strengthening the capacity of informal sector operators so that they can gradually be integrated into the formal sector and grow into sustainable small and medium-sized businesses. Essential ingredients here are security of tenure, training, research and development programmes, extension of credit, and linkages with international markets through the establishment of a duty-free port.

A summary of the gender dimensions of the flagship projects in the wholesale and retail trade sector is presented below.

Improving efficiency in the supply chain

Actions in this flagship area may have serious negative consequences for women. As indicated above, for example, efficiency is to be achieved by reducing the number of players within the supply chain. The implication of this strategy is the loss of opportunities for many small-scale operators in the supply chain. Women have been found to dominate
this sector mainly because of its low capital requirements (Githinji, 2000) and also because it acts a sponge for absorbing the unemployed. This sector is thus a major source of livelihood, especially for women, and reducing opportunities within the trade sector (especially informal) without appropriate measures to create alternative opportunities would adversely affect livelihoods, especially for women.

Moreover, most producer groups have traditionally been male dominated, mainly because males are the owners of the factors of production. Thus, strengthening these producer groups while reducing the number of small-scale players would undermine the role that women play in the supply chain.

**Creation of organized small operator retail markets**

It has been shown that women entrepreneurs, especially those involved in trade and services, are greatly constrained by the availability of workspaces. This has served as a source of constant tension between the operators and various local authorities and law enforcement agencies. Thus, creation of organized small operator retail markets would improve working conditions, especially for women who are largely in this sector.

**Expanding formal market outreach**

This entails formalization of informal sector activities. This project would greatly benefit women since they form a bigger percentage of those operating in the informal sector. The 1999 baseline survey of informal sector activities (in which trade accounts for the largest proportion) showed that the ownership of the informal sector enterprises is almost equally divided between male and females. (CBS et al., 1999). While men owned 52 per cent of the enterprises, women were close behind at a significant 48 per cent. Nevertheless, the fact that female-owned enterprises have been found to employ fewer workers and to have less capital compared with the male-owned ones limits the extent to which women can benefit from the informal sector (Atieno, 2009). Thus converting these enterprises into more sustainable and profitable entities would greatly benefit women.

### 4.5 Financial Services

The goal for the financial sector is to develop into a more efficient and competitive financial system that will drive savings and investments for sustainable, broad-based economic growth. There is need to increase access to financial services and products especially by the poor, low-income households and micro- and small-scale enterprises; to strengthen the stability of the financial system; and to create an enabling environment for different players in the financial system. The following are the objectives of the long-term strategy for the financial sector:

- **Expanding access to more affordable financial services and products**: Overall, success here requires the creation of an enabling macroeconomic environment. Among other things, this will entail institutional reforms in the commercial justice system and improvement of the system of collateral registration for better access to justice and also encouragement of credit rating of financial institutions. It will also involve provision of long-term finance through enhanced availability of medium- to long-term finance in the productive sectors, especially for supporting rural activities and enhancement of the capacity of the Capital Markets Authority and the Nairobi Stock Exchange.

- **Increasing the efficiency of the financial system**: A number of actions are envisaged here, among them reforming the commercial system to expedite the settlement of commercial disputes; improving registration of movable and immovable assets as collateral in order to increase their tangibility; and effecting the necessary legal reforms to encourage use of non-conventional collateral (e.g., warehousing and social capital) and strengthen the legal framework for effective functioning of the credit reference bureau. In addition, the strategy intends to strengthen actions to ensure that banks provide transparent and understandable information on charges made to clients; remove barriers to effective competition in the system and encourage entrance and exit; expedite the companies registry reforms to expand them to the districts; and encourage greater use of ICT in the financial sector.

- **Enhancing the stability in the financial sector**: Key here is the enhancement of the quality and supervision of banking and other financial institutions by strengthening supervisory bodies.

A summary of the gender dimensions of the flagship projects in financial services is given below.

**Expanding access to financial services**

Statistics indicate that access to credit (especially formal credit) by women is much lower than access by men. As indicated earlier, only 17.8 per cent of women had access to formal finance in 2009,
compared with 27.9 per cent of the males (FSD Kenya and CBK, 2009). Access to credit, especially for rural women, remains a great challenge, as most credit facilities demand title deeds and other productive assets as collateral. It has been shown that women have responded to this challenge by producing new options to access credit. These social capital-based assets are in the form of “merry-go-rounds” or *chamas* – informal rotating savings and credit groups. The key limitation of such credit is that it can advance only minimal loans, which are often too small to manage any meaningful sustainable enterprise venture.

In access to microfinance women are fairly well represented; they make up about 30–40 per cent of microfinance clients (AfDB, 2007). It is estimated that about 15.9 per cent of females made use of microfinance and other non-bank financial institutions in 2009, as compared with 20.2 per cent of the males (FSD Kenya and CBK, 2009). A larger percentage of women rely heavily on informal sources of finance. But microfinance, special funds organized for women such as the WEDF and informal sources of finance do not address the needs of women who want to expand beyond the microenterprise level. Women entrepreneurs who have outgrown microfinance loan limits have a hard time obtaining loans as small as Ksh1 million from commercial banks (AfDB, 2007; NALEP, 2009). Thus increasing access to formal financial services, especially in rural areas, will greatly benefit women, enabling them to graduate from small and medium-sized enterprise to larger entities.

**Increasing efficiency of the financial system**

A key measure proposed in the Vision is enhancing the efficiency of the financial system by increasing the use of non-conventional collateral for accessing credit. Survey data show that women still face constraints when accessing financial services, mainly because they lack tangible security/collateral (GOK, undated). This is generally attributed to the limited resource base and resource ownership and control patterns present in the households where ownership and control of assets, including the use of family income derived from women’s work, are skewed in favour of men. The implication is that women have to significantly rely on men to access credit, which requires collateral. Thus, the use of non-conventional collateral for accessing credit facilities would greatly benefit women.

**Enhancing stability of the financial system**

The financial sector has seen a mushrooming of unsustainable informal credit and investment schemes (including the infamous pyramid schemes that came to light in 2009). Even though statistics on the gender composition of membership of such schemes are not available, it can be deduced that women would have larger membership of such schemes than men, given that they make use of informal financing more than men, and would therefore be more likely to be adversely affected. Thus, extending supervision to and clarifying the regulatory framework for the informal sector would help ensure stability of such financial programmes and hence minimize losses, especially to the marginalized groups such as women.

**4.6 Business process out-sourcing (BPO)**

The business process outsourcing and offshoring sector is small and new in Kenya, contributing only 0.01 per cent of GDP and engaging about 1,000 employees. The vision of the BPO sector is to be the “top offshoring destination in Africa”. The sector is also expected to become the sector of choice for employment among the youth and young professionals. The goal of the BPO sector is to create at least 7,500 direct BPO jobs. To achieve this vision, four major strategies will be pursued:

> **Focusing BPO services along geographic areas,** industrial processes and different industry segments. One major BPO park will be established around Nairobi.

> **Building an IT supplier base of international repute** by encouraging world-class information technology (IT) suppliers to establish offices locally and also by improving infrastructure.

> **Attracting multinational company subsidiaries** and foreign BPO players to Kenya. This will be achieved through creation of several incentives aimed at improving the business environment such as ease of obtaining licenses and filling tax returns.

> **Building the capacity of local players** by supporting entrepreneurs who invest in Kenya. Such capacity building would involve targeted training programmes around primary processes (e.g., customer contact) and industry specifics (e.g., back office data entry within financial services) will be conducted to build the required quality and size of the
talent pool. (To note is that more emphasis on training programmes is covered in the social pillar.)

BPO challenges
Worldwide BPO experience indicates that the most common business process that gets outsourced is call centres. Calls centres and help desks of many multinational and Fortune 500 companies are being outsourced to low waged, English speaking countries such as the Philippines and India. Countries like India with vast IT human resources are also attracting outsourcing from American IT/technology companies to run their IT help desks. Many of these help desks are state of the art, with the latest help desk software and hardware, and technical IT graduates behind them answering questions. Thus, for Kenya to compete internationally for the BPO market, there is need to build a strong talent pool (mainly good customer service and competency in IT, especially at graduate training level) and also build the relevant infrastructure (mainly state of the art information technology hardware and software).

Gender dimensions in the BPO sector
The BPO sector has potential for employment and business opportunities. One caution is that the employment opportunities generated by the flagship project of creating a BPO park will be determined by the availability of the talent pool. As depicted by the disparities between males and females in terms of higher educational attainment, these jobs are likely to benefit more males than females given that men are more skilled than women. Thus, reducing the gender gap in higher education would help ensure that women are able to take advantage of employment opportunities that will be created in the BPO sector.

Opportunities will also be created in terms of investing in the sector. Here, too, men are more likely to benefit given their better access to the requisite knowledge, skills and experience and greater access to formal finance. Women can benefit from such opportunities if they have the required skills and also if they have access to the same financial resources.
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

This paper sought to analyse the extent to which gender equality is addressed within the economic pillar of Vision 2030. Even though Vision 2030 acknowledges that women are disadvantaged in accessing labour markets and productive resources, it does not reflect deliberate efforts to mainstream gender into the programmes and projects in the key productive sectors of the economic pillar. The greatest challenge has been the recognition of gender equality as a fundamental element in all sector policies, programmes and projects of the economic pillar. Rather, Vision 2030 regards gender issues as social concerns and essentially limits efforts to mainstream gender perspectives to the social pillar. It should be noted, however, that the economic pillar is not and cannot be gender neutral, given that investing in the key productive sectors of the economy will have different opportunities for and impacts on men and women.

5.1 Conclusions

From the analysis, the following key observations have emerged:

» Kenya’s national accounts still do not fully capture the role of women in national development. Attempts have been made to include subsistence work in national accounts, but unpaid work and the care economy are still left out of the SNA. As indicated, it has been estimated that only 60 per cent of female activities in Kenya are reflected in the national accounting system (World Bank, 2003b, as quoted by GOK, undated). There is need to capture fully the role of women in Kenya’s development.

» The pace of gender equality and mainstreaming has been slackened by inconsistencies in policies and policy priorities. There is no direct link between Vision 2030 and the various key policy documents on gender, and especially not with the National Policy on Gender and Development (2000) and Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 on Gender Equality and Development. There is need to align the sector plans with the various gender policy documents, especially the Action Plan and the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. This will ensure that the various activities being implemented by each sector mainstream gender concerns.

» Gender issues have not been captured under the core sectoral indicators and targets in Vision 2030. Gender is treated as a social aspect, even though the analysis has shown that there is no clear cut distinction between the social and economic aspects of the Vision. The link between the social and economic aspects of the Vision arises because economic policies do have implications for the social aspects of the economy, especially gender.

» There are no clear gender benchmarks and indicators within the implementation of the sectoral projects, which impedes monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of sectoral and national objectives and the pace of gender mainstreaming. Appropriate benchmarks need to be identified for the implementation of sectoral projects. This will entail identification of key indicators that relate to specific gender dimensions of every activity.

» The availability of sex-disaggregated data is inadequate. As proposed by AfDB (2007) and the Plan of Action (2008–2012) to Implement the National Policy on Gender and Development (GOK, 2008d), there is need for timely collection, analysis and dissemination of sex-disaggregated data (especially on time use). Efforts are also needed to build gender-aware macro models to enable policy makers to assess the gendered impact of policies (also as stipulated in GOK, 2008d).

» There is also need for increased awareness and capacity (technical and financial) within the various ministries to enable them to mainstream gender within their core activities.
5.2 Recommendations

To ensure gender equity within the economic pillar, gender must be mainstreamed into the entire policy design, planning and implementation process. This requires that:

- Vision 2030 be directly linked with the key gender policy documents.
- Adequate gender-disaggregated data be collected and analysed.
- All programmes within the key sectors be evaluated in terms of their gender implications and appropriate measures put in place to address existing gender disparities.
- Clear gendered monitoring and evaluation indicators be developed for each programme.

Key recommendations for engendering the activities of the sectors in the economic pillar include the following:

- **Agriculture**

  The major gender issues arising within the agriculture sector that were identified in the analysis were concerned with access to and control of productive assets (land, capital, inputs) by women; access to extension services; limited membership in producer organizations; and division of labour within the agricultural sector. To deal with these gender issues in the sector, there is need to:

  - **Improve women’s access to inputs, extension services and training:** This can be done by taking into consideration women’s specific needs through specific targeting and monitoring. For instance, if women do not access extension services because of time constraints, then there is need to offer extension services that are time-friendly to women. There is also need to increase female representation among extension workers, and to retool male extension workers on the importance of reaching out to women.

  - **Improve participation of women in cooperative societies:** Traditionally, membership of cooperative societies is mostly determined by ownership of productive resources, which disadvantages women. There is need to review such policies to allow for expanded membership of women, without necessarily owning the productive assets. Such measures could include creation of specialized cooperative societies to cater for the needs of women as suggested by GOK (2008a).

  - **Improve the participation of women in all activities along the agricultural value chain:** This requires that a detailed sector-specific situation analysis be carried out to determine the current status of both men and women in the value chain, identify the gaps, and provide specific measures for addressing the gaps. For example, if women are not involved in the value addition of agricultural products because they are not the owners of the productive assets, then there is need to put in place measures (mainly legislative) that are aimed at increasing access, ownership and control of the productive resources by women.

- **Manufacturing**

  The major gender issues highlighted within the manufacturing sector were poor employment terms, especially for women working in the EPZs, and also the constraints on women venturing into investments in the manufacturing sector. To address these concerns, there is need to:

  - **Improve working conditions of the jobs in the manufacturing sector:** Especially for the EPZs or special economic zones the action should be towards better pay, more permanent jobs with employment benefits, provision of special facilities for women (such as nursing rooms and other child care facilities), etc. This can be through creation of formal regulations through the Ministry of Labour, which will be aimed at setting minimum standards of employment.

  - **Encourage women to invest in the sector by improving access to finance and increasing women’s entrepreneurial skill levels:** Ensuring greater gender parity in higher education would greatly enhance women’s capacity in working and investing in the manufacturing sector. Greater access to formal finance by women would significantly enhance their participation in this sector.

- **Tourism**

  The major gender issues highlighted within the tourism sector are, first, the horizontal and vertical segregation of the labour market in tourism, with lower levels and occupations with few career development opportunities being dominated by women and key managerial positions being dominated by men. Second, the tourism sector
is faced with various negative concerns that also have gender implications, mainly the aggravation of social problems like prostitution, drug addiction and sexual exploitation of children and sexual objectification of women working in the industry. Finally, women are unable to take advantage of the investment opportunities created in the tourism industry mainly because they lack capital. Women are mostly found in small-scale ventures such as selling curios, handicrafts and clothes to tourists, but are less visible in larger and more profitable businesses. To address these concerns, there is need to:

» **Reduce the job segregation:** Offering more specialized training in the hospitality industry to women, who are lagging behind men, with greater focus on higher-end jobs, would be a first step.

» **Increase women’s access to formal finance:** Besides expanding access to credit, it is also important to educate women on the investment opportunities available in the sector.

» **Create awareness on the rights of women:** This must begin early – even at school level – to mitigate the negative concerns (such as sexual abuse and prostitution) that characterize the tourism sector.

### Wholesale and retail trade

The major gender issues highlighted in this sector are found in the objectives to reduce the number of players within the supply chain, which would greatly affect women, who form a large percentage of the operators; to strengthen the role of producer groups, which are mainly male-dominated; to create work-spaces, which would significantly improve working conditions, especially of women; and to increase formal market reach, which would be of considerable benefit to women, who mainly operate informally with fewer benefits. To address the key gender concerns, there is need to increase the participation of women in producer groups and also to ensure that they graduate from small-scale informal activities to more formal and sustainable livelihood options. This can be by addressing the constraints, key among them access to credit.

### Financial services

The major gender issues highlighted within the financial services sector are: expanding access to formal finance, which would be a boon to women as they have less access to credit than do men; using non-conventional collateral for accessing credit, which would open doors to women whose major constraint to credit access has been lack of collateral; and enhancing stability of the financial system, which would reduce losses incurred in informal credit systems. If well implemented, these measures would significantly improve women’s access to credit – and thus their capacity to work themselves into well-remunerated enterprises and out of poverty.

### Business process outsourcing

The key gender concerns arising in this sector are: possession of relevant skills to participate in the BPO job market, with women having fewer skills than men, and also the ability to invest in the sector, where women have less access than men to formal credit. Thus the policies of enhancing women’s skill levels through higher education and increasing access to credit would ensure better gender parity in this sector.
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Section 3

Vision 2030

Social Pillar Gender Analysis

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1. Introduction

Although the Government of Kenya regularly acknowledges in its documents the negative impacts of gender inequalities on development endeavours, its efforts to tackle the same have tended to lack a comprehensiveness and consistency, so that progress has been patchy and difficult to sustain. The launch of Vision 2030 – Kenya’s new, long-term development blueprint – in 2008\(^1\) provided a key opportunity to suggest ways of better conceptualizing and addressing these inequalities and bridge the gaps between males and females in society, for their own good and the good of development in the country.

Vision 2030 was launched on the heels of the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003–2007 (ERS; GOK, 2004), which is said to have successfully kick-started Kenya’s economy following two decades of poor growth performance. Also attributed to the ERS was an initial drop in overall poverty levels from 56 per cent in 2002, to 46 per cent in 2006 (GOK, 2007d: i; 2007a). The goal in developing the long-term Vision was to build on these gains and propel Kenya to higher levels of achievement. The aim of Vision 2030 is to see Kenya become a ‘newly-industrializing middle-income country, providing a high quality of life for all its citizens, in a safe, secure world’ (GOK, 2007d: vii). The Vision is being implemented through five-year medium-term rolling plans, with the support of a Vision Delivery Secretariat, under the guidance of a Vision 2030 Delivery Board.

Vision 2030’s goals are not exclusively about economic development, albeit there is a greater emphasis on achieving economic success as a way of facilitating progress in other areas of development. The Vision thus rests on three interlinked pillars: the economic pillar, the social pillar and the political pillar. And it does seek to address inequalities within the society; one of its goals being ‘enhanced equity and wealth creation opportunities for the poor’ (GOK, 2007d: viii). In fact, the Vision’s success has been described as contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Kenya. The Vision document therefore makes explicit reference to the need to increase the participation of women in the economic, social and political spheres. However, experience with past development planning documents indicates that it is important to examine how the Vision document locates the issue of gender inequalities within its goals and objectives, and whether this issue is seen as a determinant and therefore essential to the achievement of the Vision or whether it is merely incidental to the Vision’s attainment.

A quick review of the Vision document reveals a greater consideration of the issue of gender inequalities.\(^2\) Certainly the Vision states that it provides specific policy measures to correct glaring gender gaps in access to and control of resources and economic opportunities, as well as in power and political voice. This whole discussion and the related measures appear to be incorporated under the need to promote social cohesion as part of the overall development agenda. Less clear is whether these inequalities are seen as what they are – a hindrance to poverty eradication and to the achievement of education and health indicators, inclusive sustainable development, and growth. Of specific interest to this research is how gender inequalities are – or should be – factored into and addressed within the Vision.

It is important to determine how comprehensive (depth and breadth) and coordinated are the strategies that have been devised to tackle gender differences. It is also important to understand what kinds of strategies have been put in place towards this goal, and whether they suffice if progress is to be achieved. For example, what efforts were made to frame issues in a manner that takes cognisance of the gender-differentiated nature of some development challenges such as health and education? Also, are the performance indicators disaggregated by sex to ensure that progress towards greater gender equity and equality is part and parcel of the agenda?

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\(^{1}\) The Vision (and its first five-year Medium Term Plan 2008–2012) was officially launched by President Mwai Kibaki in the presence of Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka and Prime Minister Raila Odinga in June 2008.

\(^{2}\) At the very least, the word “gender” appears 48 times within the 168-page Vision 2030 document, compared with the ERS, where it appeared only once in that 33-page document, and “inequality” only five times.
The rationale of this audit is grounded in what is now a well-acknowledged fact, that gender inequalities can hinder development. Gender inequalities of the scale manifested today in many developing countries have been found to negatively affect development efforts and present a challenge to the sustainability of development gains at individual, household and country levels (World Bank, 2001, 2002). In the social, political and economic spheres of development, where such inequalities tend to be most pronounced in developing countries, they have been shown to hinder individuals’ abilities to realize their potential, to exacerbate the development challenges faced by the poor and to result in social injustices. Addressing gender inequalities has therefore become important to addressing the poverty levels in a society, the literacy levels, morbidity and mortality rates, and economic productivity. The time has come for development practice to fully embrace these understandings, if plans like Vision 2030 are to succeed.

In terms of the trends that exist in this regard, males and females have generally been found to have strikingly different levels of access to assets, and opportunities, in health, education, economic welfare and political agency (UNDP, 2003: 86). Women and girls have commonly been found to have poorer access than men and boys to human capital development opportunities, physical and financial capital, and employment and earnings (World Bank, 2001). Distinct disparities also exist between the sexes in terms of their political voices, access to opportunities for participating in political processes, and in their decision making capacity generally, both inside and outside the home. These differences have been seen to be mutually reinforcing, affecting the quality of life, welfare, vulnerability and capability, and overall wellbeing of males relative to females, with females commonly found to be the more disadvantaged. In this regard, the separation between Vision 2030’s economic, social and political pillars is artificial. It was informed by the need to promote clarity in understanding the economic and social differences affecting individual freedoms and productivity from a gender perspective for the purposes of realizing the Vision.

The tendency has been to seek to support women and girls, while ignoring the role of men and boys within efforts to promote women’s empowerment, gender equality and equity. Efforts towards gender equity and equality have focused on women and girls, and to a certain extent this bias does not necessarily contradict the agenda of greater equality and equity in a context in which women and girls are obviously more deprived in multiple ways. It is important to remember, however, that the promotion of gender equity and equality is about looking at the different roles and responsibilities of both sexes (within the public and private domains of their lives) in generating, reinforcing and perpetuating gender inequalities, and seeking to address these issues by deliberately challenging both sexes to change the ways they think and act relative to each other and to rationalize the distribution of resources between the genders. This is not possible when only one sex is the subject of these efforts, rather than both sexes. The process of translating these understandings into development practice for governments – the mainstreaming of gender issues – remains slow and consistently challenging. As a consequence, development plans and budgets have tended to be gender blind, failing to capture those who are marginalized by mainstream agendas and processes. Some of the challenges relate to the fact that understandings within key government sectors are still in their early stages, and this affects capacities to promote equity and equality in the conceptualization and practice of development work. For example, the Government of Kenya (GOK) has yet to prioritize investment in building such understandings among its senior and technical staff. Development processes are guided by political considerations, and women – as the more disadvantaged of the sexes – have yet to be seen as a critical constituency. Currently they lack the ability to influence the political agenda sufficiently to ensure that the disadvantages they face are addressed. Women are also still visibly under-represented in the institutions and processes in which critical development-related decisions are made.

The aim of the Vision 2030 social pillar is stated as: ‘a just and cohesive society that enjoys equitable social development in a clean and secure environment’ (GOK, 2007d: 93). In terms of scope, this audit is restricted to the social pillar as defined within Vision 2030. It is broken down into the following subsectors: 1) education and training; 2) health; 3) water and sanitation; 4) environment; 5) housing and urbanization; and 6) gender, youth, sports and culture. All of these subsectors are described as necessary to the realization of widespread prosperity in Kenyan society, and the audit discusses each of them in terms of their potential to contribute to the realization of Vision 2030.

1 It is important to acknowledge that even among women and girls there are many other forms of differences and inequalities that arise as a function of differences in income levels, religious, ethnic and racial backgrounds, age, (dis)ability, etc. While for the purposes of simplicity, this audit refers broadly to ‘women and girls’, it is important to remember that women cannot be treated as a homogenous group and that differences between them need to be recognized and responded to accordingly (Walby, 2005: 329–31).

2 For a discussion on the evolution of conceptual frameworks towards the attainment of women’s empowerment gender equality respectively (Wickramasinghe, 2000). Different conceptual frameworks exist under the broad banner of “gender and development”. Differences between these frameworks exist in their conceptualization of “gender”, in the depth of the institutional analysis and in the scope of their ramifications for the development agenda.
1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Audit

The objective of this audit is to contribute to enhancing gender mainstreaming in development planning and resource allocation towards gender equity and equality. The audit is intended to help sensitize and guide government actors engaged in development planning and resource allocations, and their partners in civil society and the private sector, on the impacts of gender inequalities in development performance. The audit applies a gender analysis to specific subsectors so as to highlight the specific challenges confronting women and girls as a function of their gender roles. Many such challenges are commonly underestimated or overlooked, even though they affect the wellbeing and productivity of women and girls. The audit therefore provides direction on how to factor gender-related issues, priority areas and challenges into development endeavours. It suggests ways of monitoring and evaluating the achievements of the Vision in a gender-responsive manner. And it intends to benefit the various actors engaged in the implementation of the Vision by presenting a range of recommendations for attaining the goal of greater gender equality and equity.

In its analysis of how the Vision captures and addresses gender issues the audit focuses solely on the Vision 2030 document. The reason for this is that Vision 2030 is now the mainstay of all government development planning and activities. All medium-term plans are to be generated on the basis of its contents. While the analysis provided here is more detailed than would ordinarily be contained within a document like Vision 2030, it aims to highlight why a gender analysis of development challenges (within the government sectors) is important, and why the omission of such an analysis can undermine the objectives of any development efforts, if not slow the pace of change.

The audit process mainly entailed a desktop review of the social pillar of Vision 2030, key government documents that have been developed to inform gender mainstreaming efforts by the government, government reports on specific subsectors of the social pillar and available statistical data generated by the government on these subsectors. Reference was also made to relevant research that has been undertaken around issues affecting the performance of these subsectors.

1.2 Structure of the audit

Section 2 considers the concept of gender mainstreaming, its objectives and desired outcomes. It then looks briefly at the Kenya government’s efforts to engender development processes and promote gender equity and equality. Section 3 contains a discussion on the methodology used for this audit. It explains how a gender analysis of development challenges is necessary to gender mainstreaming efforts and provides different frameworks for undertaking a gender analysis. From these frameworks the decision was made to combine aspects of the Harvard analytical framework and the Moser framework (Smythe et al., 1998) in the audit of Vision 2030’s social pillar. Section 4 considers the subsector of health and education, and Section 5 looks at environment, water and sanitation, population and housing. An analysis of the gender subsector is the preoccupation of Section 6; this involves gender, youth, sports and culture, which is where the Vision locates much of its efforts towards gender equity and equality. Each of these three sections on specific subsectors, briefly summarizes the situation analysis presented in the Vision document as a basis for further discussion. Section 7 presents the conclusions of the audit and proffers recommendations.

5 The economic pillar is discussed separately in Chapter 1 of this volume. Because of time and other constraints, the political pillar was not interrogated.

6 Such as the time poverty of women and girls, which is linked to the provision of energy and infrastructure, including the safe water and sanitation. Other issues are the structure of existing macroeconomic arrangements and budget making systems – and the considerations that inform the same.

7 The audit does not extend to the Medium-Term Plan for 2008–2012 (MTP). Rather, we focus on the Vision as the primary document, from which all medium-term plans are supposed to be generated.
2. Gender Mainstreaming for Development: Expectations and practice in Kenya

“Gender mainstreaming” was launched as a global strategy for achieving gender equity and reducing gender disparities during the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Since then it has been embraced by governments (Kenya being one of them) and development agencies seeking to address gender differences. Building on previous experiences around addressing the twin challenges of gender equality and women’s empowerment, it was seen as a strategy necessary for the advancement of efforts to promote equality and eliminate observed differences. It was also considered critical to supporting the agenda of equitable and sustainable human development. This section first looks at the concept and practice of gender mainstreaming, and then turns to a discussion of recent efforts by the Kenya government to engender its policies, programmes and activities.

2.1 Gender mainstreaming as a strategy for addressing gender inequality and achieving sustainable development

As an approach, gender mainstreaming rests on the premise that no development activity is gender-neutral. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN-ECOSOC) crafted a definition in terms of what this premise means to the development practitioner. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1997 (ECOSOC, 1997), the definition describes gender mainstreaming as:

… the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.

Therefore all activities must be examined for their potential gendered impacts before they can be implemented (Guenther, 2008; Hannan, 2000). The distinct impacts of specific development actions on the two sexes must be explored and understandings about this incorporated within development activities in order to ensure that such activities promote gender equity and equality.

Elements of this approach are summarized in Table 3.1. The approach makes gender equity and equality goals fundamental to mainstreaming development theory and practice (UNDP, 2000). Gender issues are taken out of the sidelines of development plans, activities and desired outcomes, and made central to the purpose and success of development efforts. In this respect, this approach has been described as “agenda-setting” (UNDP, 2000: 8, 21). It demands a rethinking and reorientation of mainstream ideas and practice around development, a change of decision making processes, and a prioritization of gender

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8 Under Article 202 of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), governments and other actors committed to promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes so that, before decisions are made, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively. Gender mainstreaming was not entirely new at that time. Prior to 1995, it had appeared in the text of documents during the Third World Conference on Women of 1985 held in Nairobi and thereafter in the work of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). It gained political legitimacy following the launch of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and has since been widely embraced by governments and development agencies as a way of realizing gender equity and equality (Hannan, 2000).


10 Gender mainstreaming has also been described variously as a theory, method, tool, strategy, concept, programme, mechanism (Guenther, 2008; Walby, 2005; GOK, 2000, 2008c).

11 A/Res/52/100.

12 This definition was taken from the Agreed Conclusions adopted by the ECOSOC Council at its 33rd meeting in July 1997, specifically A/52/3/Rev.1, chapter 4, para. 4.
equality objectives and development activity ends. This approach is therefore also a strategy or tool for transforming socio-cultural and institutional beliefs and practices that favour one sex over the other. In that sense it is a political course of action.

Table 3.1: Gender mainstreaming: Elements and features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Features</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>▪ Progress towards gender equity and equality in government programmes and general society</td>
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| Rationale      | ▪ Gender equality goals are translated into mainstream development ideas, i.e., theories and assumptions about social, political and economic issues  
▪ Gender equality goals are translated into mainstream development practices, i.e., decisions and actions on social, political and economic goals  
▪ Gender is regarded as an integral part of the mainstream agenda, rather than at the margins |
| Nature of strategies | ▪ Emphasis is on changing the mainstream understanding of development agendas,  
▪ It is not about adding activities that involve empowering women on the margins of development agendas  
▪ This includes development objectives, processes, how institutions operate, how resources are utilized and performance indicators  
▪ Strategies should not only seek to respond to gender differences, they should also seek to reduce them  
▪ Strategies are not about focusing only on women and girls; men and boys are also negatively affected by these differences and as such they have an equal and complementary role to play addressing gender issues |
| Requirements   | ▪ Integration of a gender perspective in all training programmes  
▪ Continuous gender training for all staff, especially at the highest levels  
▪ Ongoing availability of specialized gender training  
▪ Consistent gender analyses of development issues  
▪ Generation of sex-disaggregated statistics and indicators  
▪ Development and dissemination of gender sensitive public information, activities and materials |


The adoption of this approach has been identified with some concerns, however. In some cases, the mainstreaming approach has been observed to lead to a reduction in accountability towards gender equality. In cases where agencies claim to have “mainstreamed” gender concerns, it is difficult to identify tangible ways that they have done so and what resources they have committed to this agenda (Johnsson-Latham, 2004). Mainstreaming can become an excuse when both the political commitment and the resources are scarce (Sandler, 2004; Johnsson-Latham, 2004). How gender mainstreaming efforts are taking place, and what their objectives are, need to be identified as critical aspects of any development activity. Both the “what” and the “how” of gender mainstreaming objectives must be deliberately articulated and followed through in the operation of any development activity. The choice of methodology for gender mainstreaming can assist in this regard.

Another issue that has been raised with respect to gender mainstreaming practice has to do with the fact that it appears to be blind to other forms of social inequalities (Walby, 2005). Even within the broad category of “females” (and/or “males”) differences do exist, based on such factors as income level, ethnicity, race, religious background, age, (dis)ability, etc. Practitioners have therefore been called upon to interrogate the intersection between gender and other social inequalities. One approach that has been suggested is that discussions about other categories of social inequality should always be disaggregated by sex so as to understand what differences exist and how best to respond to them (Sayer, 2000).

For the purposes of this audit, however, we focus on one variable, the gender dimension in gender mainstreaming. It is also important to understand that the mainstreaming of gender issues is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means to an end – the end being the achievement of equity and equality between males and females in their enjoyment of their social, political and economic rights and opportunities.
2.1.1 Gender mainstreaming practice

In reality, gender mainstreaming is both a political and a technical process, and both processes have serious implications for how the concept of gender mainstreaming is defined, and the content and pace of efforts. On the political aspects of the process, it calls for a willingness to question the distribution of power, opportunities and resources, and a commitment to see these redistributed more equitably between the sexes. Different actors have adopted varied interpretations of the concepts – guided by how far they wish to go with these issues – and with varied implications for gender mainstreaming in operational terms. Some agencies (on the extreme end of this discussion) have reduced gender mainstreaming efforts to no more than a “technical fix” and a late entry add-on to their development activities (Sandler, 2004). Such efforts lack the necessary high level of political commitment.

On the technical aspects of the process, gender mainstreaming needs a consistent methodological approach across and within all development areas. Here again, there are different variations of the practice (i.e., the methodology) in existence today that may differ by the point of entry. Sector-specific toolkits also exist, for example to inform efforts in education, local governance, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, employment, the media, energy use, etc. Development practitioners can adopt a methodology that is best suited to their context, capacities and resources. Ultimately, however, the success of such efforts depends on high-level political commitment to the underlying rationale for gender mainstreaming and a clear agreement for what needs to be achieved in terms of gender equality and women’s empowerment. Most times, efforts are applied inconsistently and funded disparately between sectors, because governments are not fully committed and do not invest in purchasing and/or building the necessary technical expertise, or in generating sex-disaggregated data to inform such efforts (Walby, 2005).

2.1.2 Complementary approaches and alternatives to gender mainstreaming

Other approaches do exist for addressing gender inequalities that can be applied alongside gender mainstreaming strategies (ECOSOC, 2004). An example is initiatives targeted specifically at the empowerment of women and girls. This approach is sometimes presented as an alternative to gender mainstreaming, which is misleading (Sandler, 2004). Depending on the kinds of differences that exist, the two are in fact complementary, but gender mainstreaming has been observed to result in a significant reduction in the attention given to women-specific needs. Gender mainstreaming and women’s empowerment initiatives should be treated as symbiotic; both approaches must be seen as necessary to the realization of gender equity and equality.

Development planners can also opt to adopt a rights-based approach (RBA) to development, which is an example of an alternative, yet complementary approach to engendering development processes. RBAs seek to integrate international human rights standards and principles, drawing attention to the entitlements of individuals, and the obligations of individuals and states towards the enjoyment of people’s inherent human rights. Practitioners try to ensure that their development activities are compatible with the realization of individuals’ human rights, in addition to promoting empowerment and participation in decision making.

The complementarity of the rights agenda with that of gender equity and equality is mainly a function of the breadth of rights that RBAs embrace. RBAs focus on the socially marginalized, making women a natural constituency. Gender equality as an ideal is also embedded in RBAs because equality and non-discrimination are central to human rights conventions (Beall, 2007). RBAs are therefore able to incorporate the efforts towards women’s empowerment and gender equality. Additionally, given the range of rights championed under the two approaches, they do in fact accommodate the pursuit of other rights whose violations intersect with gender-related discrimination, thereby allowing for a more nuanced approach to addressing gender inequalities.

The strength of RBAs lies in the reference to claimable rights, the realization of which development actors can work to facilitate. The success of efforts can be measured in tangible ways, allowing for greater accountability. The same cannot be said of gender mainstreaming as an approach, in that progress and what is defined as success are often not clear-cut. There are no universal and clear benchmarks

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15 As stated within the definition, this approach can be applied in any stage of a development activity from the design and implementation to monitoring and evaluation, and to legislation, policies and programmes.
14 For more, go to: http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource-guides/gender/gender-mainstreaming/manuals-and-toolkits
12 Different approaches also exist under the banner of rights-based approaches to development.
16 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), all of which constitute the International Bill of Rights. Kenya has committed to uphold the rights enshrined within these human rights instruments.
for gender mainstreaming. Therefore, RBAs can and have in fact been used to enhance gender mainstreaming efforts in specific ways. Even here, however, the mainstreaming of gender issues needs to be deliberate. Like other development efforts, human rights interventions need to understand that unless gender issues are fully and systematically integrated into the analysis, planning and monitoring, the promotion of gender equality and elimination of gender-specific discrimination are not automatic.17

For the purposes of this audit, the decision was made to focus on the approach of gender mainstreaming, in line with the Kenya government’s reference to its practice within Vision 2030 and its expressed commitment to the same in various policy documents. The audit seeks to leverage the existing commitment to this approach so as to build understanding even as we acknowledge that there are ways in which we can borrow from RBAs (and other frameworks) to improve the objectives and outcomes of gender mainstreaming efforts.

2.2 Kenya’s efforts towards gender-responsive development planning and programming

Over the years, Kenya has expressed commitment to the engendering of its development agenda, processes and desired outcomes, and to gender mainstreaming in particular. Kenya is also a signatory to key international and regional conventions, human rights instruments and protocols, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW – 1979), the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies (NFLS – 1985), the African Platform for Action and the Dakar Declaration (1994), the Programme of Action from the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD – 1994), and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA), among others. Each of these documents speaks to the goals of gender equality and equity and gender mainstreaming, building on the principles of equality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and in line with this, the advancement of women and the elimination of gender-based discrimination.18

The documents point to the linkages between the challenges facing women and girls in society as a function of their location in society relative to men and boys, and the development challenges facing society. The Beijing Platform for Action (1995), for example, identified twelve areas of critical concern and their impacts on development generally:19

- The persistent and increasing burden of poverty on women;
- Unequal access to and inadequate educational opportunities;
- Inequalities in health status, inadequacies in and unequal access to health care services;
- Violence against women;
- Effects of armed or other kinds of conflict on women, including those living under foreign occupation;
- Inequality in economic structures and policies, in all forms of productive activities and in access to resources;
- Inequality between men and women in the sharing of power and decision making at all levels;
- Insufficient mechanisms at all levels to promote the advancement of women;
- Lack of respect for and inadequate promotion and protection of the human rights of women;
- Stereotyping of women and inequality in women’s access to and participation in all communication systems, especially in the media;
- Inequalities in the management of natural resources and in the safeguarding of the environment; and
- Persistent discrimination against and violation of the rights of the girl child.

Kenya committed to undertaking various strategic actions in all of these areas for addressing gender differences and inequalities to reach the goal of overall development. For example, under Article 19 of the Beijing Declaration (1995), Kenya (as a party to this document) recognized that it is essential to design, implement and monitor – with the full participation of women – effective, efficient and mutually reinforcing gender-sensitive policies and programmes, including development policies and programmes, at all levels that will foster the empowerment and advancement of women. The BPfA also referred to the need to develop gender-based methodologies and conduct research to address the feminization of poverty.20

It was indicated that the success of policies and measures aimed at supporting or strengthening the promotion of gender equality and the improvement of the status of women should be based on:

...the integration of the gender perspective in general

18 Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies (1985), Article 35.
19 Article 44.
policies relating to all spheres of society as well as the implementation of positive measures with adequate institutional and financial support at all levels.\textsuperscript{21}

The NFLS (1985)\textsuperscript{22} suggested measures for not only overcoming fundamental and operational obstacles, but also identifying those that are emerging. The strategies and measures presented therein were intended to serve as guidelines for a process of continuous adaptation to diverse and changing national situations, based on the needs of the particular development context. Kenyan law, however, lacks an automatic domestication clause that would pave the way for the ratification and implementation of the various commitments the government has made. Successive governments have instead chosen a piecemeal approach to these commitments and the measures proposed in them.

In 2000, a National Policy on Gender and Development (GOK, 2000) was produced by the Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services. This policy document was supposed to reflect the government’s position on the provisions of CEDAW (1979), the NFLS (1985) and the BFA (1995). It was to provide a coherent and comprehensive overall framework to guide different sectors’ and agencies’ involvement in development by addressing existing imbalances between the sexes and the advancement and empowerment of women. The policy recognized that traditional development theories had not facilitated women in strategic areas, as they were based on particular assumptions about the roles and responsibilities of women relative to men. It recognized the right of women and men, boys and girls, to participate in and benefit from development and identified a number of critical areas of concern, including education and training, health and population.

Parliament subsequently passed Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2006 on Gender Equality and Development (GOK, 2006). Reiterating the government’s commitment to addressing gender-related obstacles to development, this paper stated its overall objective as ensuring the mainstreaming of the needs and concerns of men, women, boys and girls in all sectors of development so that they participate in and benefit equally from development initiatives. Reference is made to the need to undertake a gender analysis of development issues, to realign policy instruments and budgets (resource application and distribution mechanisms), and to systematically collect sex-disaggregated data to ensure gender equity in the outputs, outcomes and impacts of development initiatives.

Eight years after the policy of 2000, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Services articulated the Plan of Action (2008–2012) to Implement the National Policy on Gender and Development (GOK, 2008c). This document recognizes some of the key challenges that persist to date, such as inadequate resources (human and financial), weak coordination and harmonization between actors at all levels, challenges in retaining technical staff because of transfers and deployments, misunderstandings about the concept of “gender” (and consequently the efforts needed to promote gender equality), and lack of resource allocations to activities supportive of this agenda (AfDB, 2007).

The plan of action was designed to provide a framework for harmonizing, coordinating, networking, monitoring and evaluating gender equality and equity initiatives among stakeholders at all levels. The areas of focus included:

- Removing hindrances to women’s equal access to economic and employment opportunities;
- Increasing women’s political participation and representation in decision making positions;
- Expanding women’s access to health, education and other basic services and to utilities such as water and energy;
- Enhancing women’s participation in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector; and
- Enhancing the sustainability of natural resource use and management, based on an understanding of the linkages between poverty and the environment, demography and development, and gender relations.

The plan of action proposes strategies for identifying roles that different actors can play (i.e., government at national and subnational levels and civil society), mobilizing and aligning the necessary resources for this work, and building capacity. It also provides guidance on how to make gender issues core to performance indicators and targets, in different areas of development.

The government also produced a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Gender Mainstreaming to track gender mainstreaming efforts within the country in 2009 (GOK, 2009e). A training manual on gender mainstreaming was finalized in 2008, for the coordination and harmonization of gender mainstreaming efforts by various government and non-government actors (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development, 2008).

Finally, the government has worked on developing institutions and processes in line with each of these policies. A National Commission on Gender and Development was established by an Act of Parliament in December 2003 to coordinate, implement

\textsuperscript{21} BPFA, Article 127.
\textsuperscript{22} Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies (1985), Article 41.
and facilitate gender mainstreaming in national development and to advise the government on gender concerns. Kenya also has a Ministry for Gender, Children and Social Development. The ministry’s strategic objectives include the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment through gender mainstreaming, and the domestication, dissemination and ensuring compliance with gender and social related regional and international commitments to which the Government of Kenya is signatory. The ministry has a Gender Secretary who reports directly to the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Services. The ministry also has a strategic plan for meeting its mandate.

The following are some of the achievements that have been attributed to the work of this ministry:

- **The establishment of gender focal points in all government ministries:** These officers are intended to facilitate mainstreaming of gender issues in all government ministries and departments. This initiative has also seen gender mainstreaming introduced as a performance indicator in performance contracts within the public sector in order to promote accountability by officers in the mainstreaming of gender issues within policies, programmes and budgets of the various ministries and other government agencies.

- **Biannual reports on affirmative action on employment and recruitment of women in the public sector:** This is in line with a Presidential Directive issued on 20 October 2006 to facilitate increased female representation within the public sector. The generation of such a report is critical to ensuring accountability to the Presidential Decree in that all government ministries and departments are compelled to show the progress made towards the recruitment and promotion of women where they are under-represented.

- **Compilation of a gender datasheet:** Begun in 2008, this contains various sex-disaggregated development-related data.

- **Training in gender-responsive budgeting:** Ministries are being trained on how to incorporate gender-responsive issues into their budgets (GOK, 2009h).

These achievements in the government’s quest to mainstream gender issues and promote gender equality and equity are significant, but important challenges remain. Foremost among the challenges is the inadequacy of resources to support these efforts. Gender machineries are notably plagued by serious financial constraints, as the government’s commitment to providing resources for such work has been slow in coming (AfDB, 2007). This has affected the availability of human resources and the building of technical capacities to support such efforts, which in turn affects their ability to fulfil their collective mandate. For example, although the ministry has departments in every district in the country, the resources available are insufficient for the work the ministry is meant to undertake (GOK, 2009h). Therefore the impetus, harmonization and coordination remain problematic. In terms of coordinating efforts across government sectors and ministries, differences exist in the scale to which various ministries have incorporated gender issues into their work. Furthermore, it has been observed that to the extent the appointment of gender officers within the ministries could have made a difference they have not been able to do so because they lack the ability to make an impact unless supported by the top management, because most gender officers are not in decision making positions (GOK, 2010b).

Sufficient political commitment is also lacking to see potentially transformative strategies through to fruition. On the efforts towards female representation in the public sector generally, and in decision making positions specifically, the 2010 report issued by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development observed the need for greater commitment by government agencies (GOK, 2010b). In this report, to which 36 out of 42 ministries contributed, women were found to constitute 32.1 per cent of the workforce of the surveyed public institutions, ministries and other government agencies (compared with 67.9 per cent men) as at 31 December 2009 (GOK, 2010b). As noted in both the 2009 and 2010 reports, however, most women continue to work in the lower cadres. As at June 2009, for example, 72 per cent of the women employed in the civil service worked in job groups H and below (GOK, 2009g). The 2010 report found this share unchanged at 71.9 per cent. Within the ministries, women held only 0.5 per cent of positions

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25 The Women’s Bureau was also elevated to a department on gender in 2004 but this decision was later revised and the department was made a division, having been merged with Social Services to become a department for Gender and Social Services.


27 Information for this survey for both the June 2009 and the January 2010 biannual reports was not submitted by the following: ministries of Medical Services; Public Health and Sanitation; Foreign Affairs; Education; and Nairobi Metropolitan Development.

28 Of the 36 ministries surveyed, 29 had achieved or surpassed the 30 per cent of the workforce. Six had women constituting over 45 per cent of the labour force: ministries of Justice, National Cohesion and Reconciliation (and State Law Office) (50.1 per cent); Gender, Children and Social Development (47.5 per cent); Transport (47.2 per cent); National Heritage and Culture (46.5 per cent); East African Community (45.6 per cent); and Forestry and Wildlife (45.3 per cent); as well as the office the Prime Minister in charge of Public Sector Reform and Performance Contracting (45.3 per cent) (GOK, 2010b).
in job groups P and above, while their representation in the top management of state corporations was estimated at 1.3 per cent. In local government, women employees were seen to constitute only 10.2 per cent of those in top management (GOK, 2010b).

The overall inconsistency in the efforts towards gender mainstreaming as a function of the political will accorded to this agenda – manifested in the availability of resources and insufficiency of technical capacities to undertake this work – has meant that such efforts still have a long way to go. As a result, the cost of gender inequalities and differences to the country’s development, to households and to individuals – especially women and girls – remains high. This audit was viewed as an opportunity to engage with government and push the agenda for gender mainstreaming forwards within the different sectors covered by the social pillar.

A gender analysis is the starting point for a development planner seeking to undertake gender mainstreaming, to first understand the ways in which resources, activities, power, representation and decision making vary between the sexes at a given time, and the factors (endogenous and exogenous to the household) behind this (Bolt and Bird, 2003). Once the gender differences and inequalities in a particular sector are understood, the development practitioner can more effectively conceptualize how gender issues factor into a particular development challenge. They then have a basis for the support of women’s empowerment and gender equality, and they can work on devising responses to these within their programmes and the programmes’ desired outcomes for the equitable, effective and efficient achievement of development objectives.
This section begins by explaining how a suitable gender analysis framework was identified for this audit. Such a “framework” can be defined as a comprehensive method of analysis that can be applied to a particular context with the purpose of identifying key issues contributing to gender inequality (Leach, 2003).

3.1 Gender analysis frameworks

A number of frameworks have been constructed to promote gender mainstreaming. Most reflect certain understandings. First, women play multiple roles within society – reproductive, productive and community maintenance – which translate into the kinds of strategic and practical needs that they have. Second, these frameworks are structured around the assumption that women are generally more disadvantaged than men. The frameworks vary, however, in the way they conceptualize the agenda of promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment, and what is needed to achieve these objectives.

At one end of the spectrum of existing frameworks are those that conceptualize the goal of gender equality in terms of the inefficiencies such disparities wreak on the development agenda. Others focus on the injustice that is perpetuated when such inequalities are allowed to persist. Some frameworks can be extended to incorporate multiple dimensions of disadvantage, others cannot (Leach, 2003). Frameworks also vary between those that employ participatory methodologies and those that do not. Overall, these frameworks try to provide some reflection of the reality of society. Their effectiveness is enhanced when used alongside other needs assessment tools to evaluate or strategize around the development challenges in a particular context (Leach, 2003).

Some well-known frameworks are described below. For the purposes of the gender analysis for our audit, aspects were borrowed from the Harvard analytical framework and the Moser framework (Smythe et al., 1998; UNDP, 2000).

3.1.1 Harvard analytical framework

This framework represents the earliest attempt to apply gender analysis in a structured way. First published in 1985, it was developed by the Harvard Institute for International Development in recognition of women’s roles in economic development, emphasizing the efficiency considerations in supporting women’s productive capacities. The framework is made up of four tools. The first tool is an activity profile tool to help planners map out the productive, reproductive and community maintenance activities undertaken by females and males, respectively. Second is the access and control profile tool, which looks at the respective resources available to males and females, who controls their use, and who controls the benefits arising from their use. The third tool tries to identify factors that influence the outcomes of the first two tools – economic and political factors, legal and...
institutional structures, social hierarchy, etc. Finally, there is a project analysis tool that consists of a series of questions aimed at helping a planner to assess how gender-sensitive and responsive a proposed project or intervention is, and at capturing the potential outcomes of a proposed project for females and males.

This framework presents a clear picture of who does what and who has access to resources. It distinguishes among access, control and abilities to benefit from resources. It makes clear demands on the kind of sex-disaggregated data required. It is also useful in mapping out different levels of challenges and constructing interventions.

Critics of the framework point out that it focuses solely on efficiency and the equitable distribution of resources, rather than balancing the interest with concerns about the ideal of gender equity, and empowerment (Smyth et al., 1998). Nor does the framework question the thinking and biases that define gender roles. Therefore, interventions need not seek to be transformational (of gender relations), for example changing the distribution of roles and responsibilities within the household, although they may open up opportunities for females to be integrated in the economy. Caution has also been called for in the use of this framework, as it can lead to an overly simplistic understanding of the reality of how different genders relate to each other. This is especially because it is not necessary that participatory methodologies be used in collecting data under this framework.

### 3.1.2 Moser framework

This tool was developed in the 1980s by Caroline Moser at the University of London’s Development Planning Unit to go beyond the efficiency argument, and tackle power relations between the sexes, towards equality, equity and empowerment. It distinguishes between practical and strategic needs of women and tries to challenge biases in the planning process. The framework is informed by the view that planning is not an ideologically neutral process: it is as much a political and technical process, and as such some conflict is likely to occur (Smyth et al., 1998).

The framework is made of six tools that can be broken down broadly into tools for diagnosing the presentation of inequalities and the factors behind them and tools for analysing the likely impact of proposed interventions. First among the former group of tools is a gender roles identification tool – mapping the division of labour activities by reproductive, productive and community maintenance undertaken by mainly low-income women. A second tool seeks to assess the needs of women, i.e., practical needs, based on the map of activities they undertake. The tool also tries to identify strategic needs in line with the drive to empower women, transform gender differences and reverse inequalities. The third tool tries to look within the household to determine the distribution of decision making power and resources, and how decisions are reached.

The next three sets of tools focus on the structure of a proposed intervention, looking at the linkages between the potential outcomes of proposed interventions and the long-term agenda of gender equity, equality and women’s empowerment. For example, the fourth tool is designed to interrogate a planned programme or intervention to evaluate whether it increases the burden on women or whether it allows them to achieve better balance in their responsibilities. The fifth tool tries to categorize the aims of the intervention in accordance with a typology that Moser developed (see Table 3.2), its purpose being how interventions can empower women and (concurrently) transform gender relations. The last tool is about inviting participation from the intended beneficiaries – gender and women’s rights actors – in the diagnosis of issues, the design of the objectives for interventions, and the interventions themselves.

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29 It is also useful in analysing economic development strategies, in that it provides a picture of the productive roles of different sexes and why, that is, what differences exist between the sexes in terms of access to resources, versus control and ability to benefit from their use.

30 Together with Caren Levy, Caroline Moser developed it into a gender policy and planning method.

31 Moser developed a system of categorizing different possible aims: welfare; equity; anti-poverty; efficiency and empowerment. It is not always possible to neatly categorize different interventions under these different headings, however, and interventions will sometimes be cross-cutting (see Table 3.2).
This tool is quite comprehensive yet reasonably straightforward to apply. It incorporates a stand-alone discussion on the distribution of power and seeks to respond specifically to this issue. It allows planners to revisit and question the potential outcomes of their interventions from different angles. Concerns have been raised about the framework’s emphasis on women, as the target beneficiaries of interventions because the approach forces women to shoulder a disproportionate burden of bringing about transformation in gender relations. The approach appears to be blind to the role that men can – and should – play in the process.

### 3.1.3 Social relations approach framework

This was developed by Naila Kabeer at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, in the 1990s (Leach, 2003). The framework is based on a number of assumptions. First, social relations create and reproduce systemic differences in the positioning of groups of people. Second, these relations are dynamic; they can be changed through legislation, policies, economic trends, crisis, etc. Third, institutions create and/or perpetuate social relations and therefore social inequalities, with institutions seen here as heavily influenced by particular gender ideologies. This framework focuses on the role of institutions, rather than individuals’ roles, activities and resources (Leach, 2003).

The social relations approach looks at four key institutions – state, market, community and family – and encourages analysis between and within these institutions in how social relations are created, sustained and transformed. It is useful as a way of examining and explaining the institutional construction and maintenance of roles (and how different institutions work together to perpetuate understandings about gender roles and relations).

Unlike the other frameworks, it has no tools as such. Instead, it asks some questions about the relevant institutions:

- What are the rules (formal and informal) that define institutional behaviour?
- What are the resources utilized by a particular institution (human, material, intangible) and what are the outcomes (care, food, shelter, information, land, money)?
- What is the hierarchical structure of the institution – and how is this affirmed in the

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32 Beyond this, the framework’s creator also argues that men and women are different and that there are differences between men and women (biological or socially constructed differences). Therefore, the aim should not be “formal” equality. Rather, it should be social justice (Leach, 2003).
distribution of resources and responsibilities?
» Who does what within the institution and what do they get for what they do (activities are categorized as productive, distributive and regenerative)?
» Who decides and whose interests are served within the institution?

Once this analysis is done, the idea is to develop interventions that seek to challenge and change social relations, with both the means and the ends being guided by gender equity considerations.

Although this is a useful framework for analysing the role of institutions (whether jointly or separately) and factoring in differences (between male and female roles), it seems to downplay the role of individual agency, placing some groups in the role of passive victim. In terms of its application, it is also a complex and demanding framework to apply.

3.1.4 Capacities and vulnerabilities
This framework was developed out of the International Relief and Development Project at Harvard University. Initially intended for use in humanitarian interventions and disaster preparedness, it has since been adapted to long-term planning agendas. The framework is based on the idea that people’s existing strengths (capacities) and weaknesses (vulnerabilities) determine the impact of a crisis upon them and how they respond. It aims to try to meet immediate needs while simultaneously building the strengths of people to achieve long-term social and economic development.

The framework is made up of two tools. The first uses a matrix system to categorize all vulnerabilities and capacities (broken down according to physical, social, organizational and attitudinal). The outcomes of the first tool are disaggregated by sex and then by other factors of differentiation such as income levels, religious or political backgrounds, age, etc. The use of a matrix system allows planners to see the intersection between different kinds of vulnerabilities and capacities, and the issues that generate, amplify or reduce them. The second tool tries to capture the complex reality of the identified vulnerabilities and capacities. It does not seek to simplify the realities on the ground, and it recognizes that other factors intersect with gender to define vulnerability (i.e., it is multi-dimensional). It also combines both a short- and a long-term perspective, for the reduction of vulnerabilities and increase of capacities, an approach that is very relevant to addressing gender differences and inequalities.

3.2 Audit approach
The approach taken for this audit, and the choice of framework, were informed, first, by how the social pillar is seen to contribute to Vision 2030 and, second, by the objective of this audit, which is to build understanding of how gender disparities affect development and how these challenges can be confronted. The way in which the social pillar has been conceptualized suggests that its main aim is to bolster the economic pillar – that is, the agenda for this pillar is driven mainly by the demands of the economic pillar.

Although some may question this way of conceptualizing the role of social development policies (Mkandawire, 2005), for the purposes of this audit it was regarded more useful to adopt (and adapt) a framework that leans heavily towards efficiency considerations, in line with the thinking implicit in Vision 2030, to look at how gender differences and inequalities factor into achievements under the social pillar. This is likely to be more useful for policy makers because it helps to develop an appreciation of the criticalness of such discussions. This is not to suggest a lesser sense of importance (or a derogation) of the agenda of social justice, which is inherent in discussions on gender equality, equity and women’s empowerment. In view of the objectives of this audit, it was considered important to first try to achieve a common understanding about the significance of gender issues to any development agenda, using a common framework of reference (in this case thinking around the efficiency of any development strategy) before bringing in other equally relevant aspects of development such as social justice and equality.

On this basis, then, the choice was made to combine aspects of two approaches, the Harvard analytical framework and the Moser framework. The two are compatible in their recognition of women’s triple burden and analysis of influencing factors such as the distribution of resources and decision making power. They do differ in their respective underlying rationales, however. Whereas the Harvard analytical framework is founded on efficiency concerns, with gender disparities as a constraint, Moser’s framework sees women’s empowerment and gender equality as ends in themselves. Nevertheless, both frameworks are fairly clear-cut.

Capacities here include people’s material, physical, and social resources, beliefs and attitudes. Vulnerabilities refer to long-term factors that make people vulnerable to disasters or drawn out emergencies and weaken their ability to cope (Bolt and Bird, 2003).
The choice of the Harvard analytical framework (HAF) was based on its premise of illustrating the relevance of gender equality to the efficiency of development efforts. As stated earlier, however, efficiency is not enough. Efficiency gains can in fact be made at the expense of widening gender disparities by shifting the burden of work and the cost of particular development agendas to women (and girls) (Action Aid, Undated). The agendas of women’s empowerment, gender equity and gender equality must be brought on board from the onset within development strategies or they can be easily over shadowed by other considerations.

We therefore borrow from the Moser framework (MF) to incorporate the agendas of women’s empowerment, gender equity and gender equality. Specifically we incorporate aspects of the fourth and fifth tools to evaluate the potential outcomes of the interventions proposed under the social pillar and to suggest both practical and strategic ways they can be bolstered.

In the next section, we review the different subsector strategies and targeted outcomes of the social pillar, using elements of the HAF and the MF. The audit first briefly reviews the respective agendas of the subsectors—education and training; health; water and sanitation; environment; housing and urbanization; and gender, youth, sports and culture. Then, using the selected frameworks and incorporating quantitative data, it looks at how gender differences and disparities contribute to the challenges facing each subsector, and relates these issues to the proposed strategies and targets. Additional strategies for engendering the Vision are suggested under each subsector. These suggestions are provocative rather than exhaustive, intending mainly to highlight ways in which the Vision could achieve its aims in a more gender-equitable manner.

The audit highlights where and to what extent a gender analysis of each subsector has taken place, and how undertaking such an analysis can bolster efforts towards the realization of Vision 2030. The depth of analysis was defined in part by the availability of sex-disaggregated data to proximate some gender-specific challenges. The analysis relied mainly on publicly accessible quantitative government data and qualitative data generated by both government and non-government actors.
Here we discuss separately the two subsectors that arguably contribute most directly to the development of human capital.

4.1 Education and training subsector

The vision for this subsector is a ‘globally competitive quality education, training and research for sustainable development’ (GOK, 2007d: 93). Education and training are considered key to the success of Vision 2030, as they provide the necessary knowledge and understanding to steer Kenyans to the economic and social goals of the Vision. The goals identified for this sector in terms of how it feeds into Vision 2030 are:

» Generate the human resources needed to meet the rapidly changing and diverse needs of Kenya’s economy;
» Ensure that as a sector it maintains high quality standards and remains relevant to the needs of the economy and society;
» Through education and training, create a cohesive society imbued with a culture of hard work and efficiency, one that values accountability and transparency; respect of the law, and concern for the environment;
» Rapidly raise the educational standards in the country’s regions that are lagging behind in (universal) enrolment; and
» Improve overall transition rates to the secondary and tertiary levels.

Redressing gender imbalances is seen as a likely outcome of this subsector’s plans, within the description of its objectives.34 The bridging of the existing gender gaps is presented as linked to the sector’s success, as opposed to forming the core of its objectives: It is states that gender issues will be mainstreamed into the education and training sector for the purposes of achieving parity.

4.1.1 Situation analysis

The Vision discusses enrolment and transition rates generally, with reference to the progress that has been achieved since independence, and more so after 2002 (until the Vision’s drafting). For example, primary to secondary school transition rates are said to have increased from 41.7 per cent to 60 per cent between 2002 and 2005. The analysis also draws attention to the fact that the government has invested substantially in this sector – an estimated 7.0 per cent of the country’s GDP, a higher rate than other more developed countries such as South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. Kenya is again seen to compare favourably when it comes to expenditure per pupil as a percentage of GDP (GOK, 2007d: 93–6.)

Certain challenges are said to persist, relating to access, equity, equality and relevance; increasing the overall efficiency of the system; and the need to bridge gaps between regions, income levels and sexes. A cross-country comparison of Kenya’s achievements (at different educational levels) in terms of literacy and enrolment rates, per pupil expenditure, and distribution of graduate specialization training are all provided. However, none of these comparisons explore the differences that exist between the sexes and the gender gap in all of these areas, an awareness that is critical to the mainstreaming of gender issues.35

The Vision’s education subsector chooses to focus on the following:

» Improving quality at primary school: The fact that facilities are stretched and overcrowded is raised as critical, and the corresponding inefficient teacher utilization and high teacher to pupil ratios.
» Raising levels of transition rates: This is considered critical to the economic agenda of the country. The cost of education is termed prohibitive and so too the limited participation of private

34 Together with youth-related issues and the obstacles facing other vulnerable groups.
35 The concern with gender gaps is limited to a discussion of the ASAL areas, which are presented here as the worst affected.
sector. It is stated that the government’s Secondary Education Bursary Fund (SEBF) may provide some relief, but more needs to be done to increase post-primary educational facilities.

- **Expanding access and equity:** This issue is seen as most acute in technical, vocational and entrepreneurship training at technical, industrial, vocational, educational, training institutions (TIVET) and universities. The need to invest in these institutions is again identified as one way of correcting these challenges.

- **Relevance:** This is linked to the demands of the market place, i.e., the need for the education system to provide people with knowledge and skills that are relevant to the requirements of the labour market and feed into the formal economy. Institutions are said to be ill-equipped. The recommendations include upgrading TIVET institutions to enable them to provide the requisite skills consistent with technological and other advances, establishing a national system of certification, and improving the accreditation system to include privately-owned TIVET providers.

- **Building a skills inventory for Kenya:** This was proposed to inform the country’s planning for the training needs of its population. Reference is made here to the changing demands of the market and the human resource gaps that exist in the distribution of trained persons.

These issues are all important to the overall performance of the subsector. When presented in such aggregate terms, however, it is difficult for development practitioners to appreciate the disparate challenges and inequalities that exist between the sexes.

### 4.1.2 A gender analysis of the education and training sector challenges

The HAF is used here to focus on the structures and practices within the education sector that have implications for the differences and inequalities existing in the sector, as well as for the performance of the sector as a whole (Smyth et al., 1998).

**Activity profile tool**

Ordinarily this tool would be used to profile the productive, reproductive and community-related activities of different genders. Here these roles are explored with reference to the composition of two categories of persons within the education sector: the staff in the parent ministries and teaching staff, and the students at primary, secondary, TIVET and university levels. The gender differences here could be said to be suggestive of expectations of the roles of the different sexes in society. Depending on where they exist, the gender gaps have translated into differences in access to resources decision making power, appropriate and adequate educational supplies, and differences in performance.

There are two education ministries, the Ministry of Basic Education and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, but at the time of this audit data on staff by sex were available only for the latter (GOK, 2009g, 2010b). The findings from this ministry as at 2009 showed a clear dominance of males in the top-level management: men occupied 81.4 per cent of positions in job group P and above (see Table 3.3). They also dominated middle-management positions, taking up 57.6 per cent of positions here. Women, on the other hand, dominated the lower-level positions (job groups H and below), but are visible at middle management level, where they occupy 42.4 per cent of positions. Decision making processes were therefore male-dominated.

**Table 3.3: Employment in the Ministry of Higher Education by job group and sex, 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job group</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P+</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-N</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H and below</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (2010b).

In lieu of information on the staff of the Ministry of Basic Education, data on the teaching staff at primary and secondary level for the period between 2000 and 2008 were looked at (GOK, 2009g). As shown in Table 3.4, primary level teaching staff are again male-dominated. The highest level of representation attained by women teachers was 46 per cent in 2008. A similar pattern emerges in the teaching staff at secondary school (Table 3.5), where the highest level of representation reached is 36.9 per cent. The gap is seen to widen, the higher up the education system they go.

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36 This can in certain instances be broken down to reflect the specific demands of different communities' lifestyles, of the differences within and between different genders by age, income level, etc.

37 The sector is also serviced by a minimum of nine semi-autonomous government agencies (SAGAs).
Table 3.4: Number of primary school teachers by sex, 2000–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>75,461</td>
<td>103,439</td>
<td>178,900</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>74,491</td>
<td>106,369</td>
<td>180,860</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>73,380</td>
<td>104,658</td>
<td>178,037</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>73,972</td>
<td>104,650</td>
<td>178,622</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>79,042</td>
<td>99,144</td>
<td>178,184</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>75,926</td>
<td>95,107</td>
<td>171,033</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>72,752</td>
<td>90,241</td>
<td>162,993</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>78,893</td>
<td>94,264</td>
<td>173,157</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>78,301</td>
<td>91,758</td>
<td>170,059</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (2009g).

Table 3.5: Number of secondary school teachers by sex, 2000–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>14,017</td>
<td>26,073</td>
<td>40,090</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15,711</td>
<td>29,144</td>
<td>44,855</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>16,077</td>
<td>28,924</td>
<td>44,901</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>17,361</td>
<td>29,674</td>
<td>47,035</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>16,390</td>
<td>31,194</td>
<td>47,584</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>16,478</td>
<td>30,957</td>
<td>47,435</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14,961</td>
<td>27,442</td>
<td>42,403</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>15,761</td>
<td>28,544</td>
<td>44,305</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>15,178</td>
<td>27,838</td>
<td>43,016</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (2009g).

The availability and location (or distribution) of female staff relative to male staff within the ministries and the teaching profession can be explained in part by reference to the issues affecting access to education for females relative to males. Another factor is the way employment opportunities are distributed between the sexes. These are discussed with reference to the “access and control tool” and under “influencing factors”, respectively, in the next sections.

Access and control profile tool

This tool looks at access to education by males and females. It also looks at control, i.e., who controls the resource and the benefits that derive from its application or use. A discussion on access needs to begin with a look at the data on enrolment at all levels – primary, secondary, TIVET and university institutions, and transition rates. These show what gender gaps exist and illustrate issues of access.

We begin with a look at net enrolment rates (NER)\(^{38}\) at primary school level, by sex (see Table 3.6 and Figure 3.1). Between 2002 and 2008, the overall NER increased from 77.3 per cent to 92.5 per cent, an improvement of 15.2 percentage points (GOK, 2009b: 5)\(^{39}\). In terms of the gap between male and female students at this level, however, the progress is mixed. Although there has been progress in the NER for both males and females over the years, there has been a lack of consistency on the narrowing of the gender gap. The outcomes have differed from year to year and between regions. In 2002, the gap was 1.5 per cent in favour of females, but by 2006, had narrowed to zero. The gap increased in 2007 and 2008, and was estimated at 5.1 per cent and 4.1 per cent, respectively, in favour of boys.

Variations in performance also exist by region. The gender gap has been more substantial in Coast, Nairobi and North Eastern provinces. In the case of both Coast and North Eastern provinces, where overall NER was found to be generally low (in terms of poor performance, they were outdone only by Nairobi Province), NER for males was found to have been consistently higher than that for females, and by notable percentages. The same trend was evident in Eastern, Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces, albeit the gap is narrower. The situation is reversed in Nairobi Province, where the NER for females has been higher than that for males with the exception of 2008. In Central Province, the female NER was higher than that of males in 2002, but dropped in 2005 and has since remained lower than the male NER.

Differences in enrolment rates begin earlier, however. Ministry of Education data on the national preschool gross enrolment rates (GER)\(^{40}\) for 2004–2008 show that the gender gap has remained consistent, ranging between 2 and 4 per cent. Participation in preschool education in Kenya remains low; it was estimated to be 60.2 per cent as at 2008 (61.6 per cent for boys and 58.7 per cent for girls) (GOK, 2009b: 2). The national GER for preschool is another issue. Between 2004 and 2008 it ranged from a low of 57.6 per cent in 2004 and to a high of 60.2 per cent 2008. It has been lower than the national GER for primary education, which for the same period was estimated at 104.8 per cent at its lowest (2004) and 109.8 per cent at its highest (2008). Enrolment for early childhood development and education (ECDE) services is important because children who access such services are more likely to succeed in primary school and beyond.

\(^{38}\) Which is defined as the number of students enrolled in a particular level of education that are of official school going-age for that level, as a percentage of the population of official school age for that level (UNDP, 2003).

\(^{39}\) 2008 figures are provisional.

\(^{40}\) Which differs from NER in that GER refers to: the proportion of those enrolled at a particular level of education, regardless of their age (and the official school age for this level), expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for that particular level of education.

\(^{89}\)
to enrol in primary schools at the right age (GOK, 2008a). Children who attend have also been found to perform better academically and to be less likely to drop out of school. ECDE is also critical to identifying any special health, education or other needs a child may have, and to connecting them and their parents to the appropriate services (GOK, 2005a, 2008a). The cost of ECDE is still an impediment to low income households, however, so many parents instead opt to keep their children at home until they reach the entitlement age for free primary education (FPE).

*Provisional figures

At secondary school level, the figures available refer to the GER. Here, Table 3.7 and Figure 3.2 show that there has again been a significant improvement, from 29.7 per cent to 42.5 per cent between 2002 and 2008. Significant variations are noted between regions, however, with the poorest performing regions, i.e., North Eastern and Nairobi, evidencing inconsistent gains from year to year. On the gender gap, the dominant trend across all of the regions is that of females lagging behind their male counterparts. As at 2008, with the exception of Coast Province where the GER for females exceeded that of males by 0.4 per cent, the gender gap between the remaining regions ranged between 5.7 per cent and 14.9 per cent. The progress in narrowing the gap has again been inconsistent, and differs from region to region; Nyanza and Western provinces show a continued widening in the gap until 2008 at 14.9 per cent for each.

These disparities suggest differences in access to appropriate education and training for a large number
of Kenyans especially if we look at the transition rates to university level (Table 3.8 and Figure 3.3). Regrettably, the information available from the Ministry of Education on this was not disaggregated by sex. However, from the GER at secondary level where females have lagged behind, it is likely that the trend carries over into admission rates at TIVET and universities.

The transition rates (Table 3.8) need to be viewed in light of the already low GER at secondary level. As at 2007, the transition rate to TIVET and university institutions was estimated at 15.5 per cent (a drop from the previous year’s 20.2 per cent). Postsecondary level education is critical to building the kind of skills inventory that is relevant to the ambitions of the Vision. At its highest, the share of students who qualified for admission at TIVET and university institutions between 2002 and 2007 was estimated at 27 per cent (in 2007).

The government has tried to address the transition rates of females into public universities, for example by lowering the cut-off admission points for female candidates by 1–1.5 points. This has translated into an increase in female enrolment; 462 female candidates were admitted at the six public universities in 2002/03 because of this policy measure (Bunyi, 2003). But because of their poor performance in mathematics, science and other technical subjects, those wishing to do so were still unable to secure admission into competitive science, mathematics and technology-based degree programmes offered at public universities (Ngethe et al., 2005).

Table 3.7: Secondary gross enrolment rates (GER) (%) by province and sex, 2002–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National GER by sex</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Provisional figures

Figure 3.2: Secondary GER (%) by province and sex, 2002–2008
Table 3.8: Secondary to tertiary/university transition rates, 2002/03–2007/08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KCSE</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates registered</td>
<td>198,356</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>207,730</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>222,676</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. qualified for admission (C+ and above)</td>
<td>42,158</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>49,870</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>58,240</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission to public universities</td>
<td>11,046</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission to TIVET</td>
<td>22,707</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>23,505</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>23,772</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher training colleges</td>
<td>9,423</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9,898</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9,886</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total admission to TIVET and university institutions</td>
<td>43,130</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>44,403</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>49,608</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At TIVET institutions (Table 3.9 and Figure 3.3), the enrolment trend confirms that transition rates for females are lower than those of males, who dominate the national polytechnics, technical training institutions and institutes of technology. Females have however tended to dominate the youth polytechnics, albeit this advantage has reduced marginally over time, with a sharp increase in enrolment rates among male students in 2008 (from 9,528 to 12,154). The numbers of female enrolled students have been increasing steadily.

Enrolment figures for Kenya’s public universities for the period 2003/04–2008/09 show that males have dominated by a substantial margin (Table 3.10), although the margin fell slightly in 2008/09. At private accredited universities, on the other hand, the data show that female enrolment often surpassed that of males. By 2008/09, however, the gender gap had narrowed from its 2003/04 level. Males were found to lead in admissions at private unaccredited universities by a small margin.

Overall, enrolment at private universities represents a fraction of total student enrolment at university level. In 2003/04, public universities represented 88 per cent of total student enrolment for all universities. Public universities also generally offer a greater variety of educational programmes and specializations. It is important that this subsector seek to capture and include those Kenyans who are unable to benefit from meaningful education and training because of their sex and their income levels.

Table 3.9: Student enrolment in TIVET institutions by sex, 2003–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National polytechnics</td>
<td>12,845</td>
<td>7,358</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>11,963</td>
<td>7,163</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical training institutes</td>
<td>7,436</td>
<td>5,648</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>9,653</td>
<td>8,350</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutes of technology</td>
<td>4,799</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>4,715</td>
<td>3,755</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth polytechnics</td>
<td>7,171</td>
<td>13,255</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>8,605</td>
<td>13,918</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.3: Student enrolment in TIVET institutions by sex, 2003–2008

Table 3.10: Student enrolment in universities by sex, 2003/04–2008/09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public accredited universities</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>% F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>% F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public accredited universities</td>
<td>47,088</td>
<td>25,462</td>
<td>35.10</td>
<td>53,394</td>
<td>28,097</td>
<td>34.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private accredited universities</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>54.49</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>4,546</td>
<td>54.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private unaccredited universities</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>49.80</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>53.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 3.4: Student enrolment in universities by sex, 2003/04–2008/09
Access

A number of issues related to access to education were identified within the Vision’s education subsector. Here we discuss the challenges that face females. The statistics on enrolment and transition rates make it clear that they have been the more disadvantaged of the sexes. Improving their trends in enrolment, retention and transition would therefore be critical to the performance of this subsector.

Access and affordability. This issue is mentioned within this sector’s situation analysis. For male and female children from disadvantaged homes, the decision to pursue one’s education and training can be perceived as inimical to the immediate needs of the family, especially when family needs are compared with the attendant costs of an education – school fees, fees for extra (holiday) tuition, uniforms, books, transport and food (Bedi et al., 2002). The cost also increases as the student progresses up the education system. The impact of cost-reducing policies on both GER and gender parity became evident when FPE was introduced in 2003. Primary GER leaped from a national average of 88.2 per cent to 102.8 per cent between 2002 and 2003 and all regions (with the exception North Eastern Province) came close to achieving full gender parity (GOK, 2009a; Wainaina, 2006). The enrolment rate for girls increased by 7.2 per cent between 2002 and 2006, while that for boys increased by 6.0 per cent (GOK, 2007b).

At secondary school level, there is a need to interrogate whether the introduction of the SEBF has led to increased representation generally among those social groups such as girls from poor families, for whom cost is a major impediment. Concerns have been raised about the fact that public secondary schools levy fees for items such as school renovations and buildings, boarding equipment, sports fees, school meals, uniforms, textbooks, etc., despite directives against this by the government. Data from the Ministry of Education suggest that progress is being made. There has been a significant improvement in female transition rates to secondary level, from 58.5 per cent in 2008 to 67.3 per cent in 2009 – a difference of 8.8 per cent compared with males’ transition rates, which were 61.1 per cent in 2008 and 61.3 per cent in 2009 (a difference of 0.2 per cent). This leap coincides with the first anniversary of subsidized secondary education (when parents saw that “free” secondary education was in place, following its introduction in 2008). The greater leap in enrolment rates for girls compared with boys indicates the greater sensitivity of female enrolment rates to the cost of education at this level compared with that of male students.

Access as a function of insufficient spaces for enrolment and/or inadequately equipped educational facilities. The availability of secondary schools is mentioned in the sectoral analysis of the social pillar, and in the first Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP I – 2005–2010). Following the introduction of FPE, the inadequacy of the educational infrastructure (facilities, equipment, teachers) to absorb students became even more acute (GOK, 2005a). One of the proposals is to increase both the number of schools, especially for post-primary education, and the quality of teaching at all levels. Noteworthy as these are, a gender lens is required to fully understand the challenges.

Chege and Sifuna (2006) found the challenges to be more acute for girls. First, girls have fewer opportunities for placement in public schools simply because there are fewer publicly funded girls’ schools. Second, the report stated that even where educational facilities for girls exist, girls’ schools were more likely than boys’ to lack learning resources and physical facilities to enable them to perform well in the sciences. This challenge was confirmed by the Ministry of Education in KESSP I (GOK, 2005a: 225). Coupled with evidence of biases in the teachers’ expectations about female versus male competencies in mathematics and sciences, these issues are said to be behind the differences in overall performance between male and female students in the sciences and other technological subjects (Twolo, 1986; Thuo 1986). Data on the examination performance for the final examinations at primary level between 2003 and 2007, for example, show that for the period in reference girls consistently scored higher than boys in the languages (English and Kiswahili), albeit by a small margin, but they consistently scored lower than boys in mathematics, science, and geography, history and Christian religious education (GHC) by a larger margin, with their raw mean score for all of the years in question averaging below the 50 per cent pass mark (see Table 3.11).

41 Girls from poor families face the added challenge of monthly interruptions to their schooling because of their menses and their inability to purchase sanitary pads (GOK, 2005a: 228, 230). This is despite the fact that in the 2005/06 Budget the government took the initiative to zero-rate sanitary pad imports. In the 2009/10 Budget proposals, the government inserted an additional proposal to remit all import duty on raw materials for the manufacture of sanitary towels to make them cheaper and available locally. Also, since May 2009, the Ministry of Education has partnered with Proctor and Gamble (K) Limited to provide 130 public schools and 20,000 girls (per term) with sanitary pads.

42 Public facilities tend to be cheaper than the private options, however, making them the target of economically challenged individuals.

43 Variations exist between regions, depending upon how economically developed the region was.
Added to this, water and sanitation facilities within schools, have generally been found to be inadequate, making the learning environment even more unfriendly to girl students (GOK, 2005a: 224–8). Together, these issues have negatively affected attendance and performance rates at secondary level and in post-secondary transition rates.

Access to education as a function of socio-cultural beliefs and norms. Generally, the trends in education dropout, completion and transition rates again show that boys fare marginally better than girls for a number of socio-cultural reasons. There remains the perception that boys are intellectually stronger, thus the returns on educational investments are likely to be better for a boy child relative to a girl child (Chege and Sifuna, 2006). There is also a commonly-held cultural expectation that girls will eventually be married off (i.e., that their main role in society is to be a housewife and mother). Accordingly, any investments made towards the girl child is seen as a waste; the benefits will at best accrue to the family she marries into (Chege and Sifuna, 2006). For girls from poor families, the challenge of remaining in school is exacerbated by the fact that the rising cost of their education tends to coincide with their growing physical maturity. The persistence of such practices as bride price, early marriage and polygamy has meant that girls of a particular age have economic value and that they have become an important source of additional household income, to the detriment of their continued education (Cammish and Brock, 1994; Muganda-Onyando and Omondi, 2008).

Time. Availability of time – to attend classes, to study, to revise – is a significant aspect of an individual’s ability to take advantage of and benefit from education and training opportunities. If children are otherwise engaged in productive and reproductive activities, making them unable to attend school or to give sufficient attention to their educational needs, they either fail to attend school (non-attendance) or fail to advance higher in the education system (dropout), or they complete their studies, but their time poverty is reflected in their education performance (repetition or low achievement levels) (World Bank 2001, 2002; UNICEF, 2007). The availability of time is a common problem to both boys and girls from disadvantaged homes. Nonetheless, the work and time demands on girls remain higher than those on boy children, as a function of societal expectations, which require that girls assist their mothers with household chores and share the burden of reproductive activities including caring for the sick and for younger children, fetching water, and collecting cooking fuel (Chege and Sifuna, 2006; Bedi et al., 2002). This reality has affected the ability of girls to attend school, as well as their overall performance in the education system, and it needs to be factored into policy and other responses towards improve the overall performance of the education sector. The poor representation of women within the teaching profession at secondary level has been attributed in part to the relatively weaker educational performance of females (UNICEF, 2007).

Other factors. The ministry of education has also been grappling with the challenges of keeping girls in school, once they attain adolescence and begin menstruating. Gender disparities in participation, achievement and attainment have been shown to worsen at adolescence, one of the reasons being the onset of menstruation. Poor girls lack the

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**Table 3.11: KCPE raw mean score by sex and subject, 2003–2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiswahili</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHC</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>49.49</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GHC = Geography, history and Christian religious education
ability to purchase underwear and sanitary wear, causing them to withdraw from school during their menstrual cycle or to drop out entirely (Wango, personal communication, 9 February 2010). Also, not all schools have water and sanitary facilities to cater to the needs of these adolescent girls.

Sexual and physical harassment of students (males and females) in the school environment (from teaching and administrative personnel) is another issue that has affected enrolment. According to a report released by Kenya’s Teachers’ Service Commission in 2009, between 2003 and 2007 approximately 12,660 girls were sexually abused at school (Siringi, 2009). Both sexes are vulnerable, but female students tend to be more vulnerable to such abuse, making schools unsafe environments for them (AfDB, 2007).

Finally, concerns have been raised about the dropout rate for girls attributable to teenage pregnancies. According to the 2003 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), the rate stood at 20 per cent, with Nyanza (27 per cent), Western (21 per cent), Coast (29 per cent), Rift Valley (31 per cent) and North Eastern (29 per cent) provinces registering the highest teenage pregnancy rates. In contrast, Eastern and Central provinces both had rates of 15 per cent. (CBS et al., 2004; Muganda-Onyando and Omondi, 2008). The Ministry of Education did lift the restriction on pregnant girls/young mothers attending school and it has been working to assist student mothers in ensuring that they continue with their education (GOK, 2005a: 226). But the stigma and the additional burden of motherhood affect these students’ performance and continuation in school (Muganda-Onyando and Omondi, 2008).

This myriad of issues has had a negative impact on Kenya’s education sector in terms of enrolment, completion, transition and performance at all levels of the education system, thus undermining the overall development of critical human resources within the country and compromising their productivity in the longer term. Gender differences are an important dynamic in the challenge of improving access, equity, transition rates and the skills inventory, and the situation analysis needs to take cognisance of this and deliberately tailor responses to address these challenges.

**Control**

The control tool looks at differences between the sexes in their control of this resource (education) and the benefits that derive from it. The discussion above would suggest that the control of the resource appears to be based on ability to meet the cost of education, on time available for education, on the availability of sufficient school places, and on socio-cultural beliefs and norms. Females tend to be more disadvantaged than males in all these aspects.

In considering the control of the benefits that derive from the resource, we used one proxy to represent the benefit derived from education – income earning ability. The 2003 KDHS asked women (only) about control over their earnings. One in ten women reported that the decision on how to use their money was made by someone other than themselves, while 23 per cent made the decision jointly with another. Those less likely to exercise control over their earnings were those with a primary level education and below. The focus of questions of autonomy (women) illustrates the difference between the sexes. Women tend to possess a lower degree of autonomy than males over their own resources because of the patriarchal nature of most societies. In contrast, where women are able to exercise autonomy and use their education to their advantage, the benefits are not only theirs, but the society’s in general.

In Kenya, studies have shown that educated women are more likely to have the knowledge, capacity and confidence to make decisions and/or be proactive about issues affecting their autonomy, productivity and other aspects of their wellbeing. The Preliminary Report of the 2008–2009 KDHS, for example, identified positive correlations between the level of education of a woman and her exposure to physical or sexual violence, with the prevalence of violence declining with the increased level of a woman’s education. The report also indicates that educated women are more likely to have taken measures to mitigate the risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) than non-educated women (GOK, 2010a).

Educated and working women have also been found to significantly increase household consumption of food, schooling, health care and other necessities. Research undertaken in Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire and Bangladesh found that within households, women were more likely than men to use their incomes on household essentials, thereby making the case for investment in women’s education and participation in productive activities (World Bank, 2002). With their earnings, educated women have been found to be more likely to take the initiative to immunize their children and to take better care of the children’s nutritional and other general health and hygiene needs, with the result that there were drops in child morbidity and mortality rates (World Bank, 2001).

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45 Other consequences include unsafe abortions, and notable infant and maternal morbidity and mortality rates.

46 The media have reported cases of examination finalists taking their national exams from the maternity ward.

47 With variations, depending on their regional, ethnic and religious backgrounds, their ages, races and income levels.
Such women were also more likely to control their fertility, leading to reduced maternal morbidity and mortality rates. In addition, they were more likely to have higher aspirations for their children and therefore to be willing to support the education of both their male and female children (World Bank, 2001: 5–6). All of these benefits can promote Vision 2030’s political, social and economic agendas.

Influencing factors

The third tool tries to identify factors that influence the outcomes of the first two tools, e.g., economic and political factors, legal and institutional structures, social hierarchy, etc.

Socio-cultural factors. We have seen that socio-cultural beliefs and norms affect the individual male or female’s access to education and how far up the system they can progress. Within communities, there is a relatively high level of ambivalence when it comes to investing in the education of their female children (Chege and Sifuna, 2006). The curricula of teacher training facilities and schools have failed to challenge existing socio-cultural norms and beliefs about females and males. Females therefore do not receive the same level of encouragement to excel that males do, and this has translated into their educational achievement and attainment levels.

Socio-cultural beliefs and norms also account for the lack of information – and the disinformation – that characterizes discussion around the physical changes that take place at the onset of adolescence and the challenges of teenage sexuality (Gichaga, undated). The lack of openness between adults and teenagers on these issues, especially within the family, means that these children find it hard to cope with the changes they are undergoing; they suffer increased anxiety, and are vulnerable to abuse, early pregnancies, and the resultant challenges to their health and educational performance.

Poverty. Poverty is a major issue. As long as families are struggling to meet basic needs and children are required to pay tuition fees and other costs of pursuing an education, the tendency has been to withdraw the children – and more so girl children – from school. Sometimes the withdrawal is temporary, but at other times it is permanent (Hunt, 2008). Children who are considered big enough and strong enough to engage in productive activities and contribute to the income of the household are also withdrawn.⁶⁴ Poverty is also a factor in the challenges poor adolescent girls face in managing their menses (Gichaga, undated).

Educational support institutions. The institutions that support education in Kenya have been defined by the social hierarchy as well. The ministries that parent this sector are male-dominated in both absolute terms and in decision making positions. Male dominance is also seen among teaching staff at primary and secondary school levels. On the latter level of education, a study by UNICEF (2007) undertaken in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Malawi found that gender disparities exist among secondary school teachers because fewer women than men were able to achieve the necessary qualification for teaching at this level. Moreover, sometimes the opportunities for women teachers in secondary schools are just limited, even where they qualify. It was opined that unless gender sensitive or affirmative action policies are undertaken to ensure greater female representation within the teaching profession, this trend will not change.

Learning environment. Differences also exist in the challenges that individuals face in the learning environment. Although the education ministries have tried to address some of these issues, obstacles persist. Female students are challenged by the absence of basic sanitation facilities in schools. They fall victim to abuse and sexual harassment from their teachers. On the cost element of education, which is an issue that further exacerbates the challenges faced by female students, the distribution of government-provided educational bursaries is currently not informed by the need to bridge gender disparities in the education system.

4.1.3 An analysis of the education and training strategies and goals using the Moser framework

This section looks at the proposed goals and strategies for the subsector as outlined in the Vision and compares them with Moser’s framework, which emphasizes empowerment, gender equity and equality. The goals for the subsector are:

» Raising transition rates: The aim here is to improve net primary enrolment (gross enrolment rates in early childhood development education) by 50 per cent; raise primary to secondary transition rates from 60 per cent to 75 per cent; and increase post-secondary transition to TIVET and universities from 8 per cent to 15 per cent. None of the targets is disaggregated by sex, so it is unclear whether performance will be gauged (even in part) by whether the gender gap is being narrowed.

» Raising the quality of education: The goal here is to improve the learning environment by

⁶⁴ According to government statistics as at 2005, of the total population of child labourers (aged 5–17 years), whereas marginally more males were out of school (i.e., 257,311 compared with 255,492 females), it was found that of the child labourers said to be in school, females were fewer at 105,542 compared with males at 149,270. A significantly higher number of females were said to be of ‘unknown’ schooling status, i.e., 4,503 females compared with 1,067 males (GOK, 2009a).
reducing pupil to teacher ratios; increasing textbook to pupil ratios; and improving teachers’ knowledge and skills. Differences in the quality of education received by the different sexes, as reflected in their relative performances and transition rates, are not acknowledged here.

Addressing inequalities: The goals here relate to gender, socio-economic and regional disparities, and to addressing the education of learners with special needs. With respect to gender, reference is made only to attaining gender parity at secondary school level; no targets are given. Also, gender is not seen as cutting across all categories of marginalization.

The strategies provided under this subsector include the following:

- **Access**: The strategies here are framed in gender-neutral terms and include: constructing 560 additional secondary schools; providing additional financial support for secondary schooling (bursaries and tuition waivers); increasing enrolment in public universities by de-linking admission from bed-spaces and encouraging private sector actors to invest in building such facilities; and introducing distance learning and other alternatives for delivering education.

- **Improving the quality of education**: Strategies here include recruiting more teachers; gradually phasing out teachers without diplomas at primary level; building consistency and continuity in the school curricula; improving textbook-to-pupil ratios; and linking early childhood education with primary education. All of these are in gender-neutral terms.

- **Promoting equity in access to education**: Here the four areas of concern are tailoring the provision of education to respond to the needs of children from pastoralist communities in ASAL areas (boarding and mobile schools); increasing the provision of financial support for education to poor children (e.g., grants or vouchers); addressing socio-cultural impediments to the pursuit of an education; and integrating special needs children within the mainstream education system. The need to be sensitive to gender differences even among those who are otherwise marginalized is not raised.

- **Enhancing productivity through science, technology and innovation (ST&I)**: Reference is made here to the role of the education and training sector in enhancing productivity of the micro-economy through ST&I. Reference is also made to the effective use of knowledge and the need to provide more training in these areas, to generate momentum for the priority sectors in the economic pillar and boost the economy as a whole. The strategies therefore include incorporating ST&I into education curricula for teacher training and students alike, and encouraging and rewarding innovation (for business, agriculture, etc.). However, this discussion is devoid of any references to gender disparities in the area of ST&I and in educational performance between the sexes, and the implications of these for enhancing productivity.

From the standpoint of Moser’s framework, then, gender differences do not stand out as a cross-cutting concern. They are captured only under the goal of addressing inequalities, and as an issue of equity rather than of productivity, which could help meet the human resource needs of Vision 2030. Even then, no targets are given. No strategy is articulated either, notwithstanding their impact on all of the subsector’s objectives. This appears to contradict the ongoing efforts by the ministries of education to boost educational and training outcomes among females, in light of the increased knowledge and understanding of the implications of gender disparities within this subsector for individual and national development.

The approach taken by the Vision here appears to be welfarist (refer back to Table 3.1 on Moser’s typology of interventions). Welfarist approaches have been criticized for being limited in their understandings of development challenges. They tend to be piecemeal as a consequence, and incapable of challenging systemic inequalities and the processes that transmit them. Questions that need to be asked of these strategies include: In what specific ways do the proposed strategies meet the strategic and practical needs of females in the education system? Given the objective to improve educational performance, are the proposed strategies likely to be effective when it comes to females who are currently under-represented and/or performing poorly? If it is unlikely that there will be changes in the current pattern of disadvantage, what will this mean for the agenda of Vision 2030?

### 4.1.4 Recommendations

The following are some additional strategies that could have been included within the Vision.

**Raising transition rates and performance**

Critical work has been undertaken at the ministerial levels, but this is not reflected in the strategies...
proposed for this subsector. While such proposed measures as increasing financial support to poor students, improving quality, and increasing spaces for admission to secondary and university levels will likely benefit disadvantaged students, there is a need to link these initiatives explicitly to the disparities that exist by sex. In the immediate to medium term, the subsector should target female students from poor families across all regions so as to increase enrolment, retention and completion (post-primary and post-secondary), and transition. The distribution of financial assistance should be aimed at narrowing the gender gap, and intra- and inter-regional targets should be set for the medium to longer term.

The subsector could also seek to increase enrolment for girls – at secondary school level especially – by increasing the number of girls’ schools, both day and boarding schools. Also, they should boost the existing facilities and their staff capacities, with respect to the sciences and technological subjects, to improve girls’ performance at secondary and tertiary levels. To contain costs, the education ministry can seek to collaborate more effectively with the different devolved funding mechanisms (SEBF, Constituencies Development Fund [CDF] and Local Authorities Transfer Fund [LATF]) to address this issue by working out a disbursement strategy that is informed by existing gender disparities in different regions, i.e., differences in enrolment, retention, performance, transition and available infrastructure.

Policy makers also need to work with communities to tackle the issue of girls’ multiple gender roles. The responsibilities that girls have (especially those living in the rural areas) relative to their male counterparts leaves them with less time to dedicate to their educational performance. This has contributed to their lower performance and it needs to be addressed as part of overall efforts to improve girls’ educational achievement (UNICEF, 2007).

**Improving the learning environment**

The agenda to promote women within the various spheres of society should also be reflected in the teaching and training given to teachers and facility administrators, as well as in the curricula pursued by students at all levels of education. Stereotypes and vulnerabilities must be challenged in the teaching and student environment.

The Ministry of Education should also seek to adapt the education curriculum to equip children to better manage the changes they undergo as they reach adolescence. Children should be taught how to understand and manage their sexuality, to avoid such issues as teenage pregnancies. Teaching staff should be facilitated to provide support to students, especially girls from poor families. An aware teaching staff should be able to work actively within the school system to support students and address the challenges students face, for the purposes of enhancing retention, performance and completion rates among girls. Currently the Ministry of Education is distributing sanitary pads free to schools, but they face challenges meeting the demand. The ministry needs to explore the option of working with the private sector to provide access to re-usable pads to girls, as one way of addressing the cost element of sanitary wear.

The TSC has recently announced tough new sanctions against teachers who sexually harass or abuse their students. Both the TSC and the ministries should act firmly to ensure the enforcement of the regulations to make the learning environment safe for children, their sex notwithstanding, by acting promptly and effectively when such cases are reported. There should be an easily understood reporting system in place at schools that ensures the protection of at-risk children. Finally, the ministries should also ensure that both single-sex and mixed schools have adequate sanitation facilities for both males and females.

**Achieving gender parity in institutions**

There is need to work towards gender parity in the management of the education system, as this may be one way of transforming perceptions of the rights and abilities of females relative to males. There is also a need to improve female representation in education and training through recruitment practices, mentorship programmes and training schemes. Such efforts will encourage females in the education system to aspire to greater accomplishments; they will prompt communities to challenge existing stereotypes; and they can also result in the effective integration of gender-sensitive approaches into the education system.

**Interrogating the roles of different TIVET institutions in line with Vision 2030’s needs**

Another strategy for the immediate term would be to address the clear difference in representation between the sexes at the tertiary level. Unless greater efforts are made to encourage and support females in science and technology subjects, their abilities to participate in the reorientation of the economy will be limited indeed, and this will undermine the desired impact of the Vision. The substantially increased enrolment at youth polytechnics since 2005 – surpassing enrolment in national polytechnics – and the fact that women are highly represented in these
institutions, suggest that the polytechnics should be regarded as important elements of the government’s efforts to increase participation of Kenya’s youth – particularly women – in economic development efforts.

Youth polytechnics should be used to provide the minimum skills required to drive an innovative, knowledge-based economy. They should be seen as incubation zones for nurturing technological innovation and entrepreneurship, especially among those who are marginalized as a function of their gender or economic status. These facilities should be appropriately equipped (infrastructure and technology), and their staff capacities built and curricula developed, in line with the Vision’s objectives. There is potential for significant private sector cooperation here, so as to ensure that these facilities do in fact turn out appropriately skilled individuals who are able to engage successfully with the economy. Private sector actors could also provide apprenticeship opportunities for further learning and awareness building among students of their capabilities. These are all important to the sector’s ability to fuel Vision 2030, and to equipping ordinarily disadvantaged groups participate in its realization.

4.2 Health care delivery

The vision for this subsector is given as providing ‘equitable and affordable health care at the highest affordable standard’ for Kenya’s citizens’ (GOK 2007d: 104). Kenya’s disease burden is discussed in terms of its cost implications and its negative impacts on efficiency and productivity at both household and individual levels. The various ways ill health affects the national development agenda are also identified, e.g., working hours lost to absenteeism; increasing cost of production related to medical bills and retraining; higher dependency ratios; reduced levels of foreign direct investment and tourism, etc.

4.2.1 Situation analysis

Kenya’s disease burden is said to be dominated by HIV/AIDS, acute respiratory infections (ARIs) and malaria. Other health challenges include diarrhoea, measles, malnutrition and anaemia.49 The situation analysis looks at indicators to do with infant and under-five mortality, including child immunization rates, weight and prevalence of stunting. It also looks at HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis prevalence rates and life expectancy in Kenya and compares Kenya’s performance with other countries (Malaysia, Indonesia and South Africa). With the exception of HIV/AIDS prevalence, where South Africa was found to have the highest rates, Kenya is seen to lag behind the other countries.

None of these indicators is disaggregated by sex, a fact that obfuscates a critical aspect of performance in this area, i.e., the gender dimensions of care (of children), access to and affordability of health services, and exposure to risk of particular illnesses. An earlier analysis by the government of the challenges of meeting the MDGs highlighted the gender aspects of improving performance in goals to do with malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, water-borne diseases, and child morbidity and mortality generally.50 Within the Vision, however, Kenya’s burden of disease is attributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, poverty and a general decline in economic wellbeing.51 The high rate of maternal deaths is attributed to substandard health care delivery services and the lack of necessary medical supplies (GOK, 2007d: 106). The analysis also refers to the inadequate staffing levels within the health subsector, the inequitable distribution of existing personnel (which is currently skewed in favour of urban areas) and a poor work ethic among health care personnel.

The Vision therefore describes a plan to restructure the subsector for the medium term. Elements of this plan include: shifting the emphasis to promotive care (from curative care) to lower the nation’s disease burden; addressing environmental threats to health; undertaking research that targets the specific medical needs of communities in their particular circumstances; and mounting public education programmes aimed at promoting behavioural change. Towards the goal of improving access and equity in the availability of essential healthcare, improvements are proposed to the health infrastructure – particularly in rural and severely deprived areas and communities and the additional recruitment of health care personnel. In order to boost the effective management of health care services, the Vision proposes a system of devolved management and funding to district hospitals and clinics in which empowered local communities will be invited to participate in decisions to do with improving their health (GOK 2007d: 105). The key focus areas are listed in Table 3.12.

The role of the private sector in health care provisioning is brought out, and the fact that the government will seek to partner with them in improving on the delivery of health services. The

51 This is despite the economic progress that took place and the corresponding decline in national poverty levels (within the Vision’s introductory chapter).
government states that although it has tried to invest in health care services, it is unable to meet the needs of the population. The Vision states that Kenya was a long way from meeting the MDGs on health and reaching the standards of any middle-income country (GOK, 2007d: 104). Kenya’s performance on maternal and child mortality and life expectancy at birth are highlighted here.

Table 3.12: Key focus areas in the health sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus area</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>• Geographical access &lt;br&gt; • Financial access &lt;br&gt; • Socio-cultural barriers</td>
<td>• Affordability &lt;br&gt; • Availability &lt;br&gt; • Accessibility (distance to facility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>• Regional disparities &lt;br&gt; • Socio-economic factors &lt;br&gt; • Gender and vulnerable groups &lt;br&gt; • Physically challenged</td>
<td>• Access by gender &lt;br&gt; • Access indicators across regions &lt;br&gt; • Specific information on the vulnerable and physically challenged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>• Service delivery &lt;br&gt; • Research &lt;br&gt; • Efficiency</td>
<td>• Appropriateness &lt;br&gt; • Level of delivery &lt;br&gt; • Service range &lt;br&gt; • Quality and quantity of personnel &lt;br&gt; • Continuity &lt;br&gt; • Effectiveness &lt;br&gt; • Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>• Service delivery systems &lt;br&gt; • Health care inputs &lt;br&gt; • Partnerships &lt;br&gt; • Health care financing &lt;br&gt; • Research</td>
<td>• Procedure (safety) &lt;br&gt; • Capacity development (healthcare personnel) &lt;br&gt; • Resources &lt;br&gt; • Health system (curative vs. preventive) &lt;br&gt; • Utilization of health care systems &lt;br&gt; • Equitable allocation of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional framework</td>
<td>• Health care policy &lt;br&gt; • Level and type of autonomy/integration &lt;br&gt; • Incentive structure &lt;br&gt; • Stakeholder involvement/collaboration</td>
<td>• Level and type of integration &lt;br&gt; • Stakeholder involvement in policy formulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The schematic in Table 3.12 captures the major challenges facing this sector. Gender issues are captured under the discussion on equity, and somewhat hinted at under access to services. However, differences between the sexes in their health priorities – and the responsiveness of the health care system to their health care challenges – are not raised. Also, differences between the sexes in the roles that they play within the health care system in both the management of the system and the delivery of services are not referenced.

The analysis that follows tries to illuminate issues that are not mentioned. Focusing on the health challenges raised in the Vision, i.e., child and maternal health issues, HIV/AIDS and longevity, and the role of gender differences, the analysis looks at certain gender-related issues, including differences between males and females in their respective levels of autonomy over their health.

4.2.2 A gender analysis of the health sector challenges

The HAF is used here to identify gender issues within the health sector.

Activity profile tool

Beginning again with the activity profile, this tool enables a mapping for the roles of different actors within the health subsector, by sex, as a way of understanding the performance of the subsector. Beginning with the household, expectations about the roles that males and females play flow out of perceptions about the different sexes, based on certain behavioural and physiological characteristics that attribute certain roles as “natural” for women and others for men. In most societies, women typically play the lead role in caring for the members of the household preparing food, collecting water, maintaining hygiene standards, and caring for the young and infirm. Men, on the other hand, are seen as responsible for supplying the necessary resources to meet the needs of the household, i.e., the goods and services, and for making decisions that have to do with the household’s welfare. These differences suggest complex challenges for health care outcomes at the household level, in that to the extent that women are primarily responsible for day-to-day activities, their influence over health outcomes is
limited by the decision making and economic powers of men (Kaur, 2005).

Certain factors can either exacerbate or mitigate the balance of powers and distribution of responsibilities between the sexes within the household. These include their respective education levels; access to employment or other income-generating opportunities; income levels; ages; and religious, ethnic and racial identities. The health care system also has a role to play, depending on how responsive the system is to such differences in decision making and access to resources, and whether it seeks to be accessible and affordable, to ensure that specific services (based on differences in the responsibilities, needs and priorities of the different sexes) are within reach of the bulk of the population, and to ensure that these services are good quality.

On the roles played by the different sexes in the administration and delivery of health care services, we looked at the gender profiles of different cadres of staff within the parent ministries in the health sector, The Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation (MOPHS) and the Ministry of Medical Services (MOMS). The staff profiles for these ministries were not available in the 2009 and 2010 biannual reports on affirmative action generated by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development (GOK, 2009g, 2010b). However, an analysis of the ministries undertaken in 2008 provided in their draft National Human Resources for Health Strategic Plan 2009–2012 (GOK, 2009f) showed that between the two ministries, women made up 51 per cent of those in lower cadre jobs (groups A to E) compared with men who made up 49 per cent of the workforce in this category. On the other hand, men made up 76 per cent of those in higher job groups (N to T), compared with women at 24 per cent (see Figure 3.5).

Women made up approximately 47 per cent of the total workforce (see Figure 3.6). They constituted the bulk of those in nursing: 84 per cent of enrolled nurses and 69 per cent of nursing officers. Among the medical officers, however, they represented only 33 per cent, while males made up 67 per cent. Among public health officers/technicians, women were found to make up approximately 27 per cent, compared with men at 73 per cent.

Although the MOPHS is currently headed by a woman, the poor representation of women in decision making processes and among medical officers translates into the absence of women’s voices, as stakeholders in the services that are provided (Standing, 2000). Health information, services and training are less likely to be designed to be gender-sensitive ways. Investments in the health care system are also less likely to reflect an understanding of the specific health needs of women, gender relations and the ways in which women may be disadvantaged in their access to health care services (Standing, 2000).

Figure 3.6: Female Ministry of Health employees (%), 2008

Source: GOK (2009f).

On the supply side of staff at the health ministries, a breakdown of the students enrolled in undergraduate and postgraduate medical degree programmes shows clear gaps between males and females when it comes to medicine and surgery, dental surgery, pharmacy, and postgraduate studies (Table 3.13). This challenge remains despite the lowering of the cut-off admission point for female candidates seeking admission at public universities. The gap is less pronounced for the degree programmes on environmental health and biochemistry. In all cases, males surpass females, except in nursing where the...
numbers of enrolled females surpassed the number of enrolled males.

**Table 3.13: Number of undergraduate and post graduate medical students by course and sex, 2003/04–2007/08**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Undergraduate medical degree courses</th>
<th>2003/04 Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>2004/05 Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>2005/06 Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>2006/07 Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>2007/08 Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine and surgery</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental surgery</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental health</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biochemistry</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>2,059</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>2,783</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td>1,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate studies</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>2,259</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>1,883</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (2009a).

**Access and control profile tool**

This tool looks at the availability of health care services to males and females. It also looks at the benefits of this resource from the perspective of who can access them and who controls them. The analysis relies on both quantitative and qualitative data.

**Access.** Impediments to health care access may be geographical, financial, or about the availability of facilities and quality of services. The gender dimensions of access come out of the division of roles and responsibilities at the household level. This division is critical to the achievement of the targets set for this subsector.

The import of these differences for the Vision’s objectives is better understood alongside the data on health performance by sex. However, understanding differences between the sexes in health outcomes is complex, and various tools have been developed to determine the role of gender and how it interacts with other challenges to health performance (WHO, 2002). Disparities that can be attributable to biological differences can be exacerbated by differences in the relationships of women and men to resources – access to and control over information, decision making, bargaining power, educational opportunities, time, income and other economic resources – as well as self-esteem and confidence and social norms that value ethnic, religious and/or racial background and the household’s or individual’s income levels also have a role to play.

Differences also exist in the respective health-seeking behaviours of men and women, an important factor in that it can play a role in reducing or widening disparities in health. Because of their reproductive needs, women are more likely to require and seek medical attention. Women are also, as a function of their roles and responsibilities within the home, more likely to visit health facilities as part of the process of caring for the young, sick and old within the household. Finally, women have been found to be more likely than men to report illness (GOK 2009d).

Such frequent interaction with the health care system has not yet translated into better health outcomes in Kenya. Taking the case of life expectancy at birth in Kenya, although globally women are expected to live longer than men (partly as a function of biological differences), data from the UNDP Kenya Human Development Reports of 2002–2007 (Table 3.14) show that in 2003 and 2004 the life expectancy at birth of females was below that of males. In 2006, their respective life expectancies were equal.

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A survey undertaken in 2007 in Kenya on the utilization of inpatient health care services found that females were hospitalized more often than males, i.e., 33 admissions per 1,000 population, compared with 19.8 per 1,000 population (for females and males, respectively). About half of the differences were determined to be due to childbirth and other reproductive health services (GOK, 2009d). See also Demery and Gaddis (2009), Onysango (2001), and Kaur (2005).
Table 3.14: Life expectancy at birth by sex, 2002–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>55.24</td>
<td>55.31</td>
<td>55.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Where women and men have had the same life expectancy, or in some years when men are expected to live longer than women, such patterns are considered to reflect deprivation and/or discrimination against women (World Bank, 2001). In Kenya, the drop in life expectancy has generally been attributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, with women more affected, partly as a function of their biological make-up but also because of other factors.53

The question here is whether the current health care system is able to provide access to relevant, good quality health care services in a manner that is responsive to the gender-related challenges that are raised above. A look at some of the demand and supply side factors that affect access may shed some light on this question.

Demand side factors. Attendant costs of accessing medical services include the fees charged at facility level (which may be authorized or unauthorized) for health services and medication, transportation (and other related expenses such as accommodation and upkeep of any family members accompanying the sick person), the opportunity cost of accessing services, etc. On the issue of affordability, the 2007 Kenya Household Health Expenditure and Utilization Survey Report (GOK, 2009d) showed a strong correlation between wealth index and the use of services based on how much was spent on these services. Although the imposition of user fees at the facility level is one way of mobilizing much-needed financial resources for improving the health subsector, it is now acknowledged that where exemption mechanisms do not function effectively this practice can marginalize the poorest (GOK, Undated-b). Women face greater challenges than men in this regard, as a function of their poor access to income-generating opportunities54 and imbalances in the distribution of household resources and decision making power. A study of the impact of out-of-pocket expenses on maternity services using data collected in Kenya in 2003 and 2006 showed that women who delivered at a home were significantly poorer than those who delivered at a facility (Perkins et al., 2009). The 2005/06 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) found that only 39.1 per cent of women (with children aged five years and below) had delivered in health facilities (i.e., hospitals, health centres, dispensaries) (GOK, 2007c). Of the children born at home, it was said the proportions did not differ from those found in the 1994 Household Welfare Monitoring Survey (GOK, 2007c: 75).

The removal or reduction of fees has therefore been used by the Kenya government as a way of promoting the uptake of family planning, maternal health services especially delivery services, and childcare services. Challenges of implementing such initiatives remain, however. Cost-sharing officially ended for maternity services in 2005, but women still reported paying medical costs for delivery care, albeit smaller amounts relative to what they were previously charged (NCAPD et al., 2005). Similarly, despite a system of waivers and exemptions to cover TB treatment, malaria drugs and HIV/AIDS treatment, health care seekers may still be confronted with fees at the facility level. A combination of factors is responsible for this, including the fact that government facilities rely on user fees to bridge financing gaps and meet some operational expenses, and that these schemes are not well-defined in terms of the qualification criteria, making them complicated to administer. All told, the schemes have had limited impact (GOK, 2009i).

For example, a 2004 survey of government facilities found that these facilities were still charging a registration fee as well as some form of user fee for family planning services, when government-supplied contraceptives are supposed to be administered free of charge (NCAPD et al., 2005).

Supply-side factors: Health service characteristics. Vision 2030 recognizes the need to improve the quality of services and the capacity of the health care system. Research has shown that the removal of user fees alone is not sufficient to ensure the sustained uptake of critical services, so as to translate into improved health outcomes, if the quality of services and the health infrastructure are not addressed concurrently (WHO, 2008). According to the findings of the 2004 Service Provision Assessment Survey, and specifically the basic services and available

53 Although females are more vulnerable physiologically to infection, Kenya’s female to male ratio (as at 2003 of 1.9: 1) was found to be higher than those in most population-based studies in Africa, suggesting a higher level of vulnerability. Among generalized epidemics worldwide, Kenya has in fact been found to register one of the highest disparities in HIV prevalence between males and females. The disease is said to be behind the higher rates of mortality among women (CBS et al., 2004: 235).

54 Which translates into the higher rate of poverty among females in society. As at 2005/06, the poverty head-count ratio for female-headed households were found to be higher than those of males by 1.2 per cent in rural areas, and a notable 16.2 per cent in urban areas, according to the Basic Report on Well-being in Kenya 2005/06 (GOK, 2007a).
infrastructure to support service delivery, only 34 per cent of hospitals, 31 per cent of maternities and 9 per cent of health centres offered the basic components to support 24-hour emergency services (i.e., at least two qualified providers assigned to the facility, staff available or on call 24 hours, overnight beds, patient latrine), and regular water and electricity supplies (NCAFD, 2005).

Only 7 per cent of these facilities were government-managed.

Staffing – or the lack thereof – as a characteristic of the health care system is a major issue in Kenya. Currently, along with the poor staffing levels, the distribution of doctors is skewed towards hospitals, facilities that are favoured less by the poor (among whom women dominate), compared with health centres (see tables 3.15 and 3.16). District and subdistrict hospitals receive the larger share of doctors, despite the fact that the 2005/06 KIHBS showed that primary facilities – health centres and dispensaries – received the largest share of visits: 34,590,478 compared with 13,946,650 at provincial and district hospitals, and 2,640,742 at referral hospitals. Registered and enrolled nurses were also heavily distributed among district and subdistrict hospitals, suggesting challenges for the staff remaining in primary health care facilities in terms of their abilities to handle their share of health care visits.

Health care staff are skewed towards hospitals (collectively, provincial and district hospitals are estimated to gain more from government resources than the two referral hospitals, compared with primary health care facilities (Demery and Gaddis, 2009). Therefore poor individuals have to contend with poorly staffed facilities that are ill-equipped to cope with the high levels of demand. The poor therefore receive a smaller share of the government subsidy compared with the non-poor who are more likely to visit hospitals. A benefit incidence analysis undertaken by Demery and Gaddis (2009) of health spending for the fiscal year 2005/06, for example, found that the richest quintile benefited from 27 per cent of the health recurrent budget, while the poorest quintile benefited from 14.3 per cent of the same. The per capita health subsidy for those in the richest quintile was estimated at Ksh754; for those in the poorest quintile it was estimated at Ksh397.

Addressing specific health challenges also calls for packaging key services in a manner that encourages uptake and results. The provision of good quality family planning, maternal and child health, and HIV/AIDS prevention, care and management services are all particularly urgent. HIV/AIDS, the low life expectancy of Kenya’s population

Table 3.15: Total numbers and distribution by percentage of medical staff, by facility type, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Provincial hospital</th>
<th>District/subdistrict hospital</th>
<th>Health centre</th>
<th>Dispensary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of facilities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>1,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinical officers</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Nurses</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled Nurses</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All nurses</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>2,295</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All staff</td>
<td>2,615</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>2,622</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (Undated-a).

Table 3.16: Population catchments of dispensaries, health centres and district hospitals, by province, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Min. of Health norms</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Coast</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>North Eastern</th>
<th>Nyanza</th>
<th>Rift Valley</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health centre</td>
<td>50,000-70,000</td>
<td>68,746</td>
<td>86,686</td>
<td>89,312</td>
<td>205,932</td>
<td>60,850</td>
<td>59,393</td>
<td>63,775</td>
<td>332,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>10,000-15,000</td>
<td>19,114</td>
<td>19,866</td>
<td>15,939</td>
<td>28,734</td>
<td>27,044</td>
<td>14,958</td>
<td>48,815</td>
<td>147,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District hospital</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>326,545</td>
<td>260,005</td>
<td>199,236</td>
<td>123,559</td>
<td>202,834</td>
<td>386,444</td>
<td>304,160</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (Undated-a).

55 This includes clinics, dispensaries and stand-alone voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) facilities.

56 Kenya has 6,600 doctors and nurses, i.e., 17 doctors per 100,000 population and 122 nurses per 100,000 population, for a population of close to 38 million (GOK, undated-a: 3). (The draft National Human Resources for Health Strategic Plan 2009–2012 has slightly different figures; it reports 18 doctors per 100,000 population and 128 nurses per 100,000 population (GOK, 2009f: 12)).
and maternal mortality were some of the concerns highlighted within the Vision. Females continue to be disadvantaged in all of these cases (see Table 3.17).

Table 3.17: Prevalence of HIV, HSV-2 and syphilis among women and men aged 15–64 years, 2003, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HIV/AIDS prevalence (%) among age groups</th>
<th>Female 2003</th>
<th>Male 2003</th>
<th>Female 2007</th>
<th>Male 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–44</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–49</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–54</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–59</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60–64</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herpes simplex virus type 2 (HSV-2) (%)*</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syphilis (%)*</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of assisted deliveries by trained medical personnel**</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of deliveries assisted by trained and untrained traditional birth attendants (TBAs)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of deliveries assisted by relatives and friends or no one</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* HSV-2 and syphilis infection are known to increase the risk of acquisition and transmission of HIV.
** Doctors, nurses, midwives.

The availability of family planning services is critical to reducing the incidence of maternal morbidity and mortality rates. The 2004 Kenya Service Provision Assessment (KSPA) survey found that by 2004, the proportion of facilities offering any form of temporary modern methods of family planning had declined to 75 per cent – from 88 per cent in 1999 (NCAPD et al., 2005). According to the KSPA, 87 per cent of deliveries assisted by trained and untrained traditional birth attendants (TBAs) and 66 per cent of clinics and 68 per cent of dispensaries offered some form of modern method of family planning.\(^{58}\) Further, only 41 per cent of maternities, 18 per cent of clinics and 24 per cent of dispensaries offered ANC\(^{59}\) including tetanus toxoid vaccine and postnatal care. Only 38 per cent of these were government managed facilities.

Just over two-thirds (68 per cent) of maternities had the capacity to offer ANC and normal delivery services. More common was the separation of available services between ANC and normal delivery services, with maternalities more likely to offer the latter, but not the former, forcing potential mothers to have to organize themselves in ways that may not be convenient. Caesarean sections were offered in only 7 per cent of eligible facilities (76 per cent of these were hospitals)\(^{58}\). Only 3 per cent of facilities offering the full range, i.e., ANC, normal delivery services and caesarean sections, were government managed, which reflects a decline from 15 per cent in 1999. In terms of facilities with the capacity to provide emergency transport for maternity emergencies, among all surveyed facilities only 27 per cent had some form of emergency transportation; only 16 per cent of these were government-managed.

Providing services such as maternal health care, family planning, child care and disease control services under one roof has been suggested as one key way in which to reduce the inconvenience and increase the uptake and consequently the health status of women and their children (Perkins et al., 2009). Integrating certain services (such as services related to the detection and management of STIs and HIV/AIDS) can also reduce the stigma related to accessing these services. On the latter issue, only 25 per cent of hospitals, 54 per cent of health clinics, 52 per cent of maternities, 59 per cent of clinics and 55 per cent of dispensaries offered integrated STI and family planning services. Of those that combined these services with ANC and outpatient services for children, only 18 per cent of hospitals, 37 per cent

\(^{57}\) It was found that dispensaries were less likely to offer a wide range of methods; only 59 per cent offered at least four methods.

\(^{58}\) Which is supposed to promote health behaviours and preparedness during pregnancy, childbirth and after delivery.

\(^{59}\) This is partly attributable to MOH staffing norms for different heath facilities.
of health centres, 48 per cent of maternities, and 33 per cent of clinics and 51 per cent of dispensaries met this criterion. Of these facilities, 53 per cent were government-managed.

With respect to facilities offering services for the control and management of HIV/AIDS and the reduction of prevalence rates, only one-fourth of facilities offered services for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT). Of these, only 35 per cent of maternities and 12 per cent of dispensaries did so, compared with 74 per cent of hospitals. Anti-retroviral therapy (ART) services were only available at 7 per cent of facilities. Again, the bulk of these services was offered in hospitals, i.e., 52 per cent of hospitals, compared with 12 per cent of health centres and 6 per cent of clinics and dispensaries. Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) for medical personnel was found to be available at only 13 per cent of facilities.

The foregoing government statistics highlight the challenges faced by individuals seeking access to different but related services such as maternal health (including ANC and postnatal care), childcare services, and/or HIV/AIDS and STI-related services. The manner in which the system is structured is costly to poor households in terms of the time and money required to commute between facilities (of different levels) for different essential services. Initiatives to improve the affordability of services at health facilities remain challenged. The health infrastructure is also poor, and the availability and distribution of staff is prejudicial to disadvantaged members of the population.

**Control**

Differences in control of access to health, and over individuals’ health outcomes, as stated above, derive from socio-cultural beliefs and norms, gender-based decision making power, and access to financial resources. The 2003 KDHS found that 42.9 per cent of currently married women, or those cohabiting with their partner, said that their husbands or partners make health-related decisions for them, on their own.

Women also face challenges in taking measures to mitigate the risk of HIV infection. Although degrees of vulnerability differ among women (based on such factors as income and/or education levels, marital status, age, religious, ethnic and/or racial backgrounds), it has been observed that strategies emphasizing fidelity or the use of condoms, without at the same time seeking to address women’s powerlessness vis-à-vis their male partners, have sometimes instead further victimized these women (GOOD, 2000).

In terms of differences between the sexes in their control of health benefits, as in the case of education, it is important to distinguish between individual returns and external returns. At the individual level, such benefits are understood here to include wellbeing, increased life expectancy at birth, savings, reduced expenditure and time spent on health concerns, and increased economic productivity. At the household level, the health of a mother is strongly linked to that of her children. HIV/AIDS, HSV-2 and syphilis, for example, can be transmitted by pregnant women to their foetuses, and this has implications for infant morbidity and mortality rates. HSV-2 has been linked to an infant mortality rate in excess of 50 per cent despite treatment (GOK, 2008b).

For women, as the ones who bear the children and who are currently the primary caregivers in the home, good health benefits the children and enables them to be productive individuals (for themselves and their households).

**Influencing factors**

The influencing factors with respect to health can be distinguished as follows:

- **Socio-cultural determinants:** These arise as a function of the inequalities within the household in economic power and political voice, and the resultant legal and social hierarchy both of which buttress these differences. To the extent that women can safeguard their health by making informed decisions about their health and seeking the relevant services, the combination of socio-cultural issues has served to hinder them, leaving them with very limited autonomy when it comes to their health.

- **Institutions:** The current institutions responsible for the structure and functioning of the health care system mirror the existing social hierarchy and thus the provision of health care services. Currently the system is very limited in its abilities to help women bridge their social and biological disadvantages. Key related services and staff are provided in a dispersed manner that is highly inconvenient and costly (financially and time-wise). The quality of services and of the health infrastructure remains poor, as a result of insufficient funding to the sector. Where critical services are provided, they assume the non-involvement of men, yet require a certain level of autonomy.

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60 And also seeking to engage their male partners in changing their risky behaviour.
that women are still (largely) incapable of exercising over their bodies and households.

4.2.3 An analysis of the health subsector strategies and goals using the Moser framework

Vision 2030 has three main objectives for the health sector. As described in more detail below, these are:
- Revitalize the health care infrastructure.
- Strengthen health care service delivery.
- Develop equitable health care financing mechanisms.

Revitalizing the health infrastructure

The aim of this strategy is to provide efficient, affordable and high quality health care and a functional health care delivery infrastructure. This will be achieved by increasing access to health facilities; strengthening the Kenya Medical Supplies Agency (KEMSA); establishing health care facility–community linkages; and building the capacity of community extension workers and community-owned resource persons. Reference is made here to the rehabilitation of community-level health care centres and dispensaries towards the promotion of preventive care, but also towards curative care at the community level. Additional efforts will be made to strengthen the flow of health-related information to the community.

The main purposes of these strategies are to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources channelled to this sector; to mobilize additional financing for health care services; and to develop targeted programmes designed to ensure access to services by disadvantaged persons.

Strengthening health service delivery

It is suggested that the strengthening of health service delivery will be achieved through the decentralization of health care management and financing to the facility level; the introduction of qualified health care facility managers; a separation of the regulatory and service delivery functions within the health sector; and the development of a policy on public–private partnerships (PPPs) in health. It is envisaged that these efforts will make Kenya regionally attractive for those seeking health services.

The Vision is also proposing to de-link the ministries of health from service delivery to focus on regulation and supervision; and to provide operational autonomy to district, provincial and national hospitals. The Vision is also proposing to integrate the community into health care management and to incorporate community health workers and resource persons who would be trained for these purposes, in service delivery. On developing equitable financing mechanisms, proposed measures include: emphasizing preventative healthcare financing (and health care financing generally); creating fiscal space through efficient use of resources; and expanding the health insurance schemes.

Developing equitable health care financing mechanisms

Some issues are identified within the Vision as cross-cutting, i.e., not necessarily located within this subsector, but relevant to health outcomes. The Vision proposes to address these through enhanced collaboration and cooperation with government agencies and other stakeholders, with devolved funds, and through PPPs. The issues include literacy rates, cultural practices and attitudes, and population growth rates. Gender disparities do not feature within this list. Overall, none of the strategies refer to the gender disparities and dimensions of many of the health challenges, and what will be done to respond to them. The vision for this sector would have benefited from greater specificity, especially given the indicators on maternal health and sexual and reproductive health issues including HIV/AIDS and other STIs.

4.2.4 Recommendations

The health sector objectives under the Vision’s first Medium-Term Plan (2008–2012) are listed as follows:
- Reduce under-five mortality from 120 to 33 per 1,000 live births;
- Reduce the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) from 410 to 147 per 100,000 live births;
- Increase the proportion of deliveries by skilled personnel from the current 42 per cent to 90 per cent;
- Increase the proportion of immunized children below one year from 71 per cent to 95 per cent;
- Reduce the number of cases of TB from 888 to 444 per 100,000 persons;
- Reduce the proportion of inpatient malaria fatality to 3 per cent; and
- Reduce the national adult HIV prevalence rate to less than 2 per cent.

Two of these goals relate directly to women – maternal mortality and safe delivery. None of the non-maternal health goals are disaggregated by sex. No gender-specific goals are proffered either. The health subsector therefore performs even more poorly than the education subsector in so far as the Moser framework is concerned. The framing of the
concern as being one of equity (see Table 3.11) would suggest a welfarist approach. However, even here no strategy is provided as to what kinds of disparities in access will be addressed, and how. Altogether, a reading of this subsector would suggest that gender disparities are seen to have very little to do with any of the health outcomes, including the targets on maternal mortality and safe delivery. Yet within the ministries, health sector policies, structure and services have undergone extensive reforms in the last five years, with the adoption of the second National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2005–2010 and the Kenya Essential Package for Health, which together highlight some of the gender issues raised under this subsector, marking a paradigm shift in the approach to health care in the country. Unfortunately, these changes are not acknowledged within the Vision. In fact, much of the work done at ministerial level, and the advances that have been made (or are being made), seem to have been omitted. Redressing this situation could begin with the recommendations given below.

**Acknowledging the role of gender disparities**

First, there is an urgent need for the subsector to begin factoring in the centrality of gender disparities in health care performance, and for this to be seen in the aims, strategies and targets of the subsector. This process can be facilitated by the provision of training in “gender sensitivity” for health service planners, administrators, providers and trainers of health personnel. Improving the health and welfare of males and females calls for the integration of both an awareness of the social determinants of good health, even as the biological aspects are addressed; gender-responsive tool kits exist to facilitate such efforts. Health institutions, i.e., the management, infrastructure and delivery of services, also need to be structured so as to be gender-responsive, seeking to capture and respond to differences in access to services, in needs and/or priorities, and working towards addressing certain accepted norms such as the limited role that men currently play in promotive and preventative interventions. There is an urgent need to target men for the purposes of building their awareness on their role in family health care. Finally, there is a need for a medium- and long-term strategy for redressing the imbalance in female representation in decision making positions, and the current gender profile in service delivery.

**Bundling essential services**

For strategic reasons, certain services need to be targeted, among the most critical are the full range of maternal and child health care services (including ANC and postnatal care), family planning services, HIV/AIDS and STI-related services. This is necessary to reduce the current inconveniences of accessing such services from different providers, and will likely lead to increased uptake of these key services – especially by women. The bundling of these services under one roof can also reduce the stigma associated with some of these services. All of these can lead to significant improvements in certain areas that are of concern to the Vision: household savings and income levels, economic productivity, HIV/AIDS and STI prevalence rates, maternal and child mortality rates, and life expectancy generally.

**Fine-tuning facility levels and functions**

It is important that efforts be made to provide certain critical services at primary health care centres to reduce cost-related inconveniences and increase the uptake of services – and consequently the health status of women and their children (Ringheim et al., 2009). This means investing in the infrastructure of primary health care facilities and rethinking the distribution of staff (and the kinds of incentive structures that can ensure staff retention and quality services at these levels). This is should be aspired to within the medium term of Vision 2030, if Kenya is to see a drastic change in the prevalence of major infectious diseases, in maternal (and child) morbidity and mortality, and in life-expectancy, especially if targeting the poor and marginalized.

**Rethinking the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)**

The basis of NHIF membership needs to be reconsidered and the coverage of services extended, to reflect the reality of the challenges of Kenya’s employment situation, the country’s disease burden, and the high direct and indirect costs of health services. Currently, NHIF medical insurance is available only to formal sector salaried employees and their dependents (who are compulsory insured), and voluntary subscribers from the informal sector, all of whom must make monthly statutory contributions. It provides cover only for the boarding component of inpatient stays (with claimable amounts set at the rates charged at government-managed facilities, which usually amount to only a portion of the rates charged at private healthcare facilities). Membership is therefore tied to income-earning ability – and even then it covers only certain costs: i.e., it does not cover outpatient services or the costs of treatment, diagnosis and drugs for inpatient care.

If there are to be improvements in health and wellbeing in Kenya, the least able women and men must have access to a basic minimum package of good quality health care services. Between 2004
and 2005 attempts were made to revise the current system but this failed because of a lack of political consensus, lack of proper costing and the absence of a suitable institutional structure. The review of the NHIF needs to be considered alongside poorly functioning waiver/exemption systems and the potential for NHIF contributions to be revised so that they are progressive (similar to the income tax system), enabling more capable members of society to contribute more (in line with abilities) towards improving access and the quality of health care services for the poor. Unless efforts are made to reduce the out-of-pocket costs of health care services at the facility level, uptake of essential services will remain low.

**Nurturing cross-collaborations**

Finally, the Vision identified certain issues that call for cross collaboration. A key partner here is the education subsector, which can facilitate gender-sensitive medical training, as well as encourage men to take a promotive role in health care. Additionally, the education subsector can collaborate with the health subsector to support an increase in the numbers of women pursuing medical degrees – beyond nursing – so as to increase female representation among the technical and medical officers, doctors, hospital administrators, etc.
5. A Gender Analysis of the Social Pillar of Kenya’s Vision 2030 – Environment, water and sanitation, housing and population

Our environment can be divided into the natural environment and the environment created by humans and their activities. The natural environment comprises the biological, chemical and physical components and processes, with interactions between and among them that influence life forms and together constitute an ecological balance or ecosystem. The natural environment also produces what can be referred to as ecosystem services, which are not only vital for maintaining the ecological balance, but have also been manipulated through human activity to produce benefits and harness development. The created environment, on the other hand, refers to both physical and intellectual activities (construction works, technology, laws, policies, etc.) that adjust or manipulate the surroundings and interactions of humans and influence the natural environment (UNCED, 1992). This chapter considers the natural environment including the availability of water, as well as aspects of the created environment that relate to sanitation, housing and population.

5.1 Situation analysis: Environment subsector

Individuals have an inseparable relationship with their environment, both deliberately and involuntarily, and regardless of their gender. It is for this reason that environmental issues gained consideration in the human development discourse. Natural resources as a product of the natural environment are identified as vital production inputs, and environmental quality is considered a welfare determinant. Environmental considerations are thus not considered as limits to growth (Meadows et al., 1972). Rather, they are fundamental in reducing poverty and improving human development (UNCED, 1992). This has resulted in what some authors have referred to as a Sustainable Human Development Paradigm, which can be defined as development that enhances the capabilities of the present generation, without compromising the capabilities of the future generation (Sen, 2000).

It is in considering how environmental sustainability interacts with human development that brings gender into the equation, as human beings are not a homogenous group. Men and women the world over perceive their environmental surroundings according to their productive and reproductive gender roles in their respective community or country. In undertaking their productive roles, men and women use environmental resources as factors of production, rely on environmental factors for endeavours like agriculture, and are involved in both the exploitation and the management of these resources. In doing so they acquire unique knowledge about these resources they interact with and share this knowledge mostly through informal channels. Women and men alike are both agents and beneficiaries of sustainable development and as such their involvement in the whole process is essential. Sustainable development embraces the principles of social equity and empowering communities, ensuring that both men and women have a say in the utilization of natural resources, that the benefits from the economic exploitation of these resources accrue

Ecosystem services include soil fertility, which ensures crop sustenance; the hydrological cycle, which produces rainfall for crops; forests acting as water catchment areas; wetlands acting as water purifiers; mangrove forests serving as fish nurseries; etc.
to all, and that all costs are effectively internalized within the prevailing market model. Empirical
evidence reveals that where women are involved in decision making there is better performance in
terms of environmental management indicators (Agarwal, 2008). On the other hand, the extraction of
environmental goods, if undertaken indiscriminately, can result in degrading effects on the natural
environment. As such, policy and development programmes need to take gender dimensions into
consideration, and in particular the distinct roles of

Moreover, access to land is administered through customary norms and procedures (World Bank, 2007).
Land traditionally was communally owned and passed down through the male member of the household. As such women
customarily have only user rights over land, not

Various global instruments have endorsed several plans of action and conventions for the full, equal
and beneficial integration of women into all development activities. The 1995 Nairobi Forward-
Looking Strategies (NFLS), for example, emphasized women’s participation in national and international ecosystem management and control of environmental
degradation. Several conventions, including CEDAW and some International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNESCO agreements, have also been adopted to

A discussion on the environment cannot avoid a parallel discussion on land, the prevailing land

Thus, for their households generates an opportunity cost as it is a trade-off between time spent on these activities and time that could be devoted to productive work

Women as a result own just 1–5 per cent of titled land in Kenya (World Bank, 2007).
This property relationship between men and women is further compounded by marital arrangements. In rural areas, where this land question is particularly
difficult, data reveal that 30.9 per cent of households are female-headed (CBS, 2006), which may have

The 1882 Married Women’s Property Act gives married women equal rights to own property and the Law of Succession Act (1981) gives women inheritance rights. However, the constitution exempts from its non-discrimination provisions “members of a particular race or tribe” with respect to the application of their customary law. Kenya has made some inroads into the issue of women’s access to

Thus, the Vision recognizes the important role of natural resource-based sectors. The promotion of these has a direct link with the protection and enhancement of the environment and its resources. The Vision recognizes that for the country’s economy to grow at the projected 10 per cent per annum there will be a considerable strain on the environment by the depletion of resources and production of pollutants and waste. Some 60 per cent of the population is projected to live in towns and cities over the life of the Vision, thus causing an urbanization challenge that will have to be tackled creatively and deliberately (and early). Accelerated economic growth, although beneficial for development, does not guarantee a quality life for all. Situations of further marginalization and inequality may result from a framework of rapid economic growth that ignores the social, political

There are both forwards and backwards linkages between poverty and environmental degradation.

Poverty results in situations of environmental stress through over-use, misuse and abuse and the resultant environmental degradation exacerbates

The Vision does not incorporate gender dimensions into the environment subsector, whether in the understanding of the problem or the framing of solutions and strategies. The subsector is seen as an interacting of natural, physical, chemical and biological indicators, where human influences is neutral. The Vision therefore outlines the environmental situation
in terms of six areas: sustainable management of natural resources; demand for farmland and forest products; wild animals in their natural habitat; medication and hazardous waste; climate change and desertification; and harnessing of strategic natural resources. In each of the subsections we identify some of the issues that should be taken into consideration and gender dimensions within them.

5.1.1 Sustainable management of natural resources
The Vision recognizes that Kenya’s water towers – the country’s five main forests – have been seriously degraded by encroachment and destruction to allow agricultural expansion. This has left the water situation threatened, as well as exposing flood plains to the devastating effects of recurring floods. Another major aspect of the destruction of the forests has been illegal logging for timber production to service the construction industry. Managing the forest for the benefit of all poses the typical challenges related to common pool resources, in this case managed by a super agency (the government). The incentives to conserve the forest are not that obvious, as the benefits possess public good characteristics. This results in what Olson (1965) referred to as the free-rider problem.

The literature suggests that the best way to avoid the “tragedy of commons”,44 which plays out in such situations, is to encourage cooperative behaviour among the users of the resource (Ostrom, 1999). The Forest Act (2007) recognizes this and proposes the creation of Community Forest Associations as a co-management effort between the government through the Kenya Forest Service and the local community living in the forest area. For cooperative behaviour to evolve, however, certain dynamics within the group(s) need to be addressed. Some literature looks into this by discussing how the heterogeneity of the group can undermine cooperation; these factors include race, class and – of particular relevance to this discussion – gender. A framework within which social capital can be built internally as bonding social capital and with other bodies as bridging social capital is an imperative (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Pretty and Ward, 2001). Women’s involvement in the forest management committees is thus an important factor in the effectiveness of the committees.

5.1.2 Demand for farmland and forest products
The Vision acknowledges the rich ecosystems and biodiversity available in Kenya, identifying them as sources of social, economic and cultural benefits. A lack of policy is seen as a major problem for effective exploitation and benefit sharing over the proceeds from these resources. No mention is made of the vast amount of knowledge resident in informal systems, a lot of which is known by women who interact and use their natural environment for their everyday purposes.

5.1.3 Wild animals in their natural habitat
The main challenges identified here are poaching, human–wildlife conflict, habitat destruction and change in land-use patterns. The disruption of wildlife habitats stemming from lack of enforcement of land-use control and regional planning has resulted in the conflict with wildlife. This threatens not only the lives of individuals but also their sustenance, through destruction of crops and animals, hence further exacerbating poverty in some areas along these wildlife corridors.

5.1.4 Medication/hazardous waste
The challenge of disposing of hazardous waste safely is recognized, and identified mainly as a capacity constraint as there are only two incinerators, both of which are in Nairobi. Market-based solutions are seen as a way to solve the waste management dilemma. Householder waste management is the role of women, but once this waste leaves the home it ends in dumping sites where men are engaged; here they are exposed to various risks from hazardous waste. Resolving the challenge of waste management will require much more than a waste handling and disposal strategy. It will also require changes in consumer habits to ensure that less waste is generated and the principles of recycle, reuse and reduce waste are applied. Women are involved in many household consumption decisions and as such play a central role in this shift.

The vulnerability and exposure to environmental risks, hazards and pollution are also influenced by the roles and responsibilities noted earlier. Men are mostly engaged in outdoor tasks and when employed work mainly in factories and industries. A look into the 2008 provisional employment statistics in Kenya illustrates this. According to the Economic Survey of 2009, males in wage employment in the agriculture and forestry industry were estimated to represent 74.3 per cent of total employment and females 25.6 per cent (GOK, 2009a: 74). In such capacities they are exposed to elements the weather and any hazardous conditions in the workplace. A policy aimed at ensuring that standards of workplace environmental

44 This phrase has been associated with situations in which environmental mismanagement and eventual degradation result when natural resources are owned in open access of common pool resources regimes. (This was following an article written by Garrett Hardin in 1968.)
compliance are maintained would thus benefit men and women differently depending on the extent of their participation in industrial workplaces. Indoor household pollution, too, has a distinctly gendered characteristic as women are primarily the ones involved in cooking and indoor activities that expose them more to the pollution caused by the use of firewood and other biomass fuel. The precautionary principle should be used in addressing these particular vulnerabilities faced by women, especially in situations where development programmes and industrial programmes generate specified risks.

5.1.5 Climate change and desertification
The Vision notes that the economy is heavily dependent on sectors that are climate sensitive, with a weak framework for coping with climatic risks occasioned by natural disasters such as drought. The response so far has been aimed at disaster response rather than disaster risk reduction. Vulnerabilities to risks associated with natural disasters are not neutral; they are influenced by spatial factors, poverty levels, access to information and gender. Women and men prepare for and respond to disasters on the basis of their access to information, their decision making flexibility and their roles. As such, climate change adaptation measures will have to take cognisance of these differences and work at ensuring that women and men are integrated into, informed about and involved in the determination of the problem and mitigation options.

5.1.6 Harnessing strategic natural resources
The potential for Kenya to develop bio-resources for medicinal, industrial and other products is recognized. The need to invest in research and the commercialization of knowledge and adoption of new technologies is also highlighted. The Vision here fails to recognize Kenya’s vast energy sources including geothermal, wind, solar and ocean waves as strategic natural resources that could be harnessed for economic growth as well as addressing the energy poverty experienced in the country, which puts particular strain on women’s time as they search for biomass options.

The energy sector in Kenya is highly dominated by imported petroleum for the urban/industrial sector and wood fuel for the rural and urban poor. In terms of electricity, the dominant source is hydropower generation at 51.2 per cent; thermal oil contributes 30.8 per cent and geothermal only 17.7 per cent (GOK 2007d: 17. This means that the country’s electricity supply is highly dependent on climatic factors and therefore faces considerable vulnerabilities related to climate change, with recurrent drought-induced power crises presenting a major challenge. The worst case situation is when the power crisis is coupled with high oil prices, as we witnessed in 2007. The need for a strategic approach to the adoption of renewable energy as an integrated arrangement is thus imperative. The geothermal option alone is expected to account for a quarter of total power installed capacity by 2020, up from the current 11 per cent. In the long-term, geothermal can meet all of Kenya’s capacity expansion requirements for the next 15 years with a current known potential of 3,000 megawatts (Carekezi et al., 2009).

The gender dimensions of energy are particularly glaring in those sections of the economy that are not served by the electricity grid – which is most of the country since the last KDHS found barely 10 per cent of the population had access to electricity. In these situations, household energy sourcing and use are primarily the responsibility of the women within the household. In rural areas, 90 per cent of households as well as farmers, fishers and foresters rely on traditional fuels like wood, charcoal, straw and dung, for cooking, heating and lighting. They generally burn these fuels using simple technologies characterized by low energy efficiency and harmful emissions. Human energy is used for household work (fetching water, washing clothes, gathering and preparing biomass for fuel), and human and animal power for agriculture, transportation and small-scale productive activities. The time it takes in rural areas to collect firewood can range from one to five hours per day and much more time is expended undertaking other mechanical processes. According to the KIHBS 2005/06 report, 63.8 per cent of households in Kenya use firewood and 13.3 per cent use charcoal as their primary source of cooking energy, while 44.6 per cent of urban dwellers use paraffin (kerosene) for cooking. Only 8 per cent have a chimney in the kitchen, 76 per cent use a traditional three-stone fire, and 12.5 per cent use improved stoves (GOK, 2007c). In terms of lighting, 75 per cent of households use paraffin, 15.6 per cent use electricity and 1.6 per cent use solar options. Lighting has a strong correlation with education outcomes as it affects the ability of children to study while at home.

The high reliance on biomass fuel has grave implications for efforts to conserve forests. Much of the large-scale charcoal production is undertaken illegally, causing destruction of the forests. Using biomass for fuel also means that it is not available for composting to enrich the soil for agriculture.

Cooking daily with wood, crop residues, dung and charcoal exposes women and children to indoor air pollution. Women and children are involved in kindling biomass for fuel also means that it is not available for composting to enrich the soil for agriculture.
pollution, linked to ARIs, chronic obstructive lung diseases, low birth weights, sinus headaches, lung cancer and eye problems. Other occupational health hazards for women involved in energy use and production include bone fractures, repetitive strain injuries, sprains, back disorders and miscarriages from lugging heavy loads of fuel wood, exposure to burns and smoke, as well as skin diseases (ENERGIA, 2004). In rural areas where girls are involved in traditional women’s chores from an early age, long hours spent collecting fuel and water leave little time or opportunity for education.

Efforts to promote fuel efficient technologies and alternative renewable energy options would likely be welcomed by women, who are the primary users of fuel in the household. A cost-benefit study of improved cook stoves, for example, showed that users saved 3–20 hours weekly on gathering fuel wood, or 40–50 per cent of the cost of purchased fuel, while smoke emissions were reduced by a factor of 2.6. Household energy programmes also produce additional income opportunities for craftspeople (ENERGIA, 2004). Promoting access to modern energy services would be even more valuable as a means for increasing women’s productivity and economic power. The ongoing rural electrification programme should be of great benefit to both households and small businesses in rural areas.

5.1.7 Summary

Overall, the Vision aspires to a nation living in a clean, secure and sustainable environment. To realize this vision, the focus will be on conserving natural resources including forests, water towers, wildlife sanctuaries and marine ecosystems; reducing the generation of environmental pollution and waste through the adoption of sound environmental policies and practices; insulating development from natural disasters; building institutional capacity in environmental planning; and improving the impact of environmental governance. Although progressive in many respects as far as environmental management and promotion of sustainable development are concerned, the Vision does not identify the inter-linkages of gender within the problem or in the pursuit of outcomes. As such it misses out on fundamental aspects relating to human agency and environmental management—the roles played by both men and women as users of natural resources and beneficiaries of sustainable development. Without this understanding, the programmatic proposals are likely to be devoid of the critical analysis that would influence the design of environmental management interventions.

5.2 Situation analysis: Water and sanitation subsector

Closely linked to the environment is the water and sanitation subsector. Access to clean water and sanitation is a fundamental human right and critical for human development. Providing access to safe and adequate water remains a key developmental challenge for governments, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. This has implications for many other human development indicators, including health, education and food security. Outbreaks of cholera, a major cause of death from water-borne diseases, present a case in point (GOK, 2005b). Addressing the prevalence of cholera requires addressing the challenges of accessing safe water and proper sanitation. Furthermore, accessibility of water has a direct bearing on educational outcomes, particularly for girls. In rural areas where water access poses the greatest challenge, women and girls have to travel very long distances to fetch water, compromising the time spent on studying, thus having a negative impact on the performance of girls in these areas. However, ensuring access to water and sanitation will have to take into consideration the needs of the users. Water access means different things to different people. Certain communities have rules that govern access to water points. For a water access initiative to be effective, the users of the resource need to be consulted and involved in the management not only of water points but also of water catchment areas.

The importance of involving both women and men in the management of water and sanitation has been recognized at the global level since the 1977 United Nations Water Conference at Mar del Plata and during the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981–1990). Among the guiding principles adopted at the 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment held in Dublin, principle 3 explicitly recognizes the pivotal role of women as providers and users of water and guardians of the living environment. At the same time, it acknowledges that this pivotal role has seldom been reflected in institutional arrangements for the development and management of water resources (ICWE, 1992). The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, further outlined approaches to the management and use of water resources and referred to the participation, capacity building, education and mobilization of women as decision makers and managers of water resources and sanitation. In the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), governments agreed to support capacity building for water and sanitation infrastructure and services
development, ensuring that such infrastructure and services meet the needs of the poor and are gender-sensitive (UN, 2002: para. 25a).

Kenya is a water scarce country, with readily available fresh water per capita of 647 cubic meters (m$^3$), against the recommended 1,000 m$^3$ (Katuku, 2006). The vision of the water and sanitation subsector is to ensure that clean water and improved sanitation are available and accessible to all by 2030. Improved access to water is seen as useful for economic growth as well as promoting good health, reducing health costs and saving time. This is important as it acknowledges the time burden of looking for adequate, safe water for use. What the Vision does not state is that this time burden is not borne equally between men and women, as most of it rests squarely on women, and that addressing this time burden would go a long way in addressing the gender disparities in education and economic performance.

Overall, the Vision’s analysis of this subsector shows a lack of consideration of gender issues in this area. The Vision notes that Kenya’s abstraction rate is well below its potential; this rate could be increased with the right technology. The Vision also notes that over 84.7 per cent of water used is derived from surface sources, rather than safe water sources. Other challenges noted are population pressure and regional imbalances (see Table 3.18).

Table 3.18: Percentage of households with access to safe drinking water, 2005/06

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% of households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (2007c).

The Vision concedes that water and sanitation infrastructure coverage is still very low; it will need to be increased from the current 60 per cent urban and 40 per cent rural coverage for water and 55 per cent urban and 50 per cent rural coverage for sewerage. In addition, there is need to rehabilitate the existing infrastructure. Moreover, increased commercial farming, rapid industrialization and laxity in law enforcement have resulted in the discharge of raw effluent into water bodies, hence degrading water quality. Sprawling informal settlements are another challenge to the provision of safe water (GOK, 2007d). As for institutional capacity, it is noted that water monitoring currently covers only 30 per cent of the total estimated available supply and this is mainly due to insufficient staff and hydro-metrological stations. The question of human resource capacity is pertinent, and should be addressed from the training level. In doing so, both male and female students should be encouraged and both assured of equal opportunity in employment.

The KIHBS of 2005/06 reveals that only 57 per cent of households have access to safe drinking water in Kenya: these constitute 83 per cent of urban households versus a mere 43 per cent of rural households. Further, about 4.4 per cent of households take an hour to access safe drinking water; this one hour is predominantly woman-hours used, as women in most societies in Kenya are charged with seeking water (GOK, 2007c).

Women and girls who must spend time searching for water for household use are most affected by the opportunity cost of time that could otherwise be allocated for educational attainment or economic productivity, thus limiting their potential. In addition, caring for household members exposed to various water-borne diseases adds to the burden women face, and further lowers overall productivity. Water shortages, thus threatening water security. To address these challenges, the Vision proposes that appropriate infrastructure for irrigation and water supply be identified alongside promoting water harvesting to improve food security in the ASALs. It is proposed to increase the amount of land under irrigation by 1.3 million hectares so as to enhance water production. This is important for commercial

65 The water abstraction rate refers to the rate at which water is extracted from surface or underground sources. When compared with the availability of surface (and/or underground) water sources, the rate is helpful in understanding the water stress issues facing a country. The concept of water stress refers to a situation in which there is not enough water for all uses, whether agricultural, industrial or domestic.

66 Safe water is defined as water that is piped or from boreholes or protected springs and/or wells.
farming purposes, for subsistence farming and for domestic use. To ensure that small-scale farmers and domestic users of water are not crowded out, however, it is important to educate and facilitate both sexes in the adoption of technologies for micro-water harvesting and small-scale irrigation schemes.

Access to sanitation facilities is another important requirement for hygiene and public health. Some highly communicable diseases like cholera and typhoid can be addressed and controlled through proper hygiene and effective, sufficient sanitation facilities available to all. While 84 per cent of Kenya’s households have adequate access to sanitation facilities such as toilets and pit latrines (GOK, 2007c), 50 per cent of households in ASAL districts and in the Coast region were found to lack toilet facilities altogether. This has implications not only for the environment but for disease control. When sanitation facilities are lacking, women bear the burden of improvising alternative means for themselves and their households, and alter natural patterns of relieving themselves to accommodate the risks involved. Furthermore, lack of water and sanitation facilities presents women with the continuing challenge of ensuring hygienic conditions during their menstruation.

5.2.1 A gender analysis of the environment, water and sanitation sectors using the Harvard analytical framework

The three sectors discussed above should obviously be addressed with due consideration to their gender implications. The following discussion aims to bring forth the gender realities that characterize these sectors. Using the Harvard analytical framework, it serves to wrap together the gender situation analysis that influences outcomes in environment, water and sanitation.

Activity profile

The activity profile matrix is modified so that rather than look at the time spent by men and women in the different categories of activities, we look at a general distribution of tasks and how the different roles of men and women are reflected in the categorisation of productive, reproductive and community roles. We further look at the employment statistics in the public service in the line ministries responsible for the different aspects of the three sectors.

As shown in Table 3.19, there is clear dominance of male activities in the productive sector with income earning potential, while females dominate the reproductive sector. In the water and sanitation sector, for example, women are tasked with the provision of household water. They face the greatest social and economic costs, where water supply is insufficient and benefit most from sufficient, accessible, affordable and quality water provision schemes. Even where male activities comprise community roles, they undertake tasks that attract remuneration. In the environment sector therefore it is evident that women and men face different challenges and vulnerabilities posed by environmental risks and hazards including pollution and climate change, based on their areas of daily work. As such, a sector-wide approach looking at all the interlinking elements of the environment should be pursued so as not to leave out issues that may have distinctly gendered elements.

Table 3.19: Modified activity profile matrix environment, water and sanitation sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Productive</th>
<th>Reproductive</th>
<th>Community maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Hunting/ poaching</td>
<td>Large domestic animal husbandry</td>
<td>Community medicine men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community dispute resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Logging/Lumbering</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community development committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community soil conservation works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment in electricity generating plants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial farming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Charcoal production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial/ commercial waste disposal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment in factories (e.g., textiles)</td>
<td>Collecting firewood</td>
<td>Community soil conservation works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment in commercial horticultural farms</td>
<td>Cooking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weaving, pottery, basketry</td>
<td>Small domestic animal husbandry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Household waste disposal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Purchase of daily use household commodities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.20 shows the distribution of women in administration of the relevant sector line ministries. Representation within institutions is an issue that must be looked at because it speaks to the roles of the different sexes in the issues being referred to here, and the extent to which processes and outcomes can be engendered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Productive</th>
<th>Reproductive</th>
<th>Community maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>• Digging pit latrines</td>
<td>• Digging water holes and latrines</td>
<td>• Community water holes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>• Construction of water and sanitation infrastructure</td>
<td>• Finding water for animals</td>
<td>• Information sharing on where water holes are available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Septic tanks extraction services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Putting up water harvesting and storage equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cleaning the household</td>
<td>• Fetching water for community events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Fetching water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Collecting and disposing of human waste where sanitation facilities are lacking (men also do this in some communities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy and Mineral Resources</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment and Mineral Resources</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Irrigation</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The data in this table make it clear that female representation in decision making is an issue. The Ministry of Lands was found to fare best among the four ministries at 30.3 per cent female representation of those in job group P and above – including the position of Permanent Secretary. The Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources scored the lowest at 4.3 per cent, followed by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (i.e., 7.1 per cent), which is currently headed by a woman minister. On the issue of female representation in mid-level management, again these two ministries scored the lowest, with female representation in job groups J–N found to be only 19.5 per cent in the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources and 13.5 per cent Ministry of Water and Irrigation. Across all of these ministries, men also dominate the lower cadres. Of all of these ministries, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, a critical ministry for women, demonstrates the poorest female representation.

Table 3.20: Employment statistics in the ministries of Energy, Lands, Environment and Mineral Resources, and Water and Irrigation, by job group and sex, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job group / Ministry</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>P+</th>
<th>J–N</th>
<th>H and below</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and Mineral Resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Irrigation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (2010b).

It would have been useful to determine female representation in water and environmental management boards, community land boards, and other organs of decision making (from the community to national levels). Such information was not readily available, but it is important if gender equity and equality are both to be addressed in the institutions, processes and outcomes of these sectors.

**Access and control profile tool**

Resource access and control are crucial elements of the gender equation. In this subsector they include the following:

- **Land**: As stated earlier, existing data on land ownership reveal that women own approximately 1–5 per cent of registered and titled land in Kenya. More generally women have access rights to work the land for subsistence purposes. According to the labour force analytical survey they constitute the majority of those engaged in farming in rural and urban areas, but they have very limited control over land, the titling rights to which are held by men, hence they are limited in their powers to make decisions on the management and use of the land. This despite their actual involvement in the management of the...
Although women are tasked with the provision of household water supply, they are seldom involved in the management and decision making over access and control of water points, especially when these are community owned. Men generally control water points, but women need to be involved as well in the management of these resources and in making decisions about access, availability and even technological options.

**Energy:** Women remain the main providers of traditional household energy. However, when energy supply moves into the modern sector this role is taken over by men, who are involved in negotiating electrification programmes at the community level. Access to different energy sources is also influenced by the economic status of women.

**Natural resources:** Women have access to surface-level natural resources, but have limited access to resources below the surface including minerals. As such their ability to convert these resources into income potential is limited. According to the Economic Survey of 2009, men are more involved in the extractive industry and thus have greater access to these resources.

**Time:** Women face what is referred to as time poverty, characterized by long working hours with most of this work being non-monetized (Blackden and Wodon, 2006). They thus continuously face the challenge of allocating their time between reproductive and productive work and community work. This could limit their position at the decision making table.

**Financial resources:** Provision of a safe, secure and clean environment with sufficient supply of safe and adequate water and sanitation facilities will require considerable financial investment. Being mainly engaged in the reproductive non-remunerated sector, women may find it difficult to meet some of these costs. This may delay realization of these goods or deny them the opportunity of ever enjoying these benefits.

**Information:** Both scientific and regularly updated information as well as indigenous knowledge are resident amongst the community. Women often possess useful knowledge and information that can be used to improve environmental management, but this information is confined to informal systems. As such, controlling this knowledge and protecting it from being utilized without due respect for intellectual property are difficult.

**Influencing factors**

Various factors influencing environmental management and control (including access to safe water and sanitation) include the socio-cultural norms that allocate gender roles and determine allocation of resources within households and in the community. Poor women are more seriously affected by environmental degradation than their counterparts of more secure economic standing. Political will can play a critical role in ensuring that women and men are represented in decision making organs and that decisions reflect the preferences of men and women as both users and managers of environmental and water resources and the supporting infrastructure.

Accordingly, it is important that the Vision seek to be gender sensitive and responsive, if the goals of these subsectors are to be realized. The first step is to look to what international instruments and commitments provide for in terms of gender and environment. The National Convention on Environment and Development in its emergent document, Agenda 21, made specific proposals on which national governments agreed to take action to ensure that the role of women is recognized and integrated and that their interests and vulnerabilities are addressed. Amongst many others these proposals included the following:

- Ensure opportunities for women, including indigenous women, to participate in environmental decision making at all levels – as managers, designers and planners, and as implementers and evaluators of environmental and water projects.
- Facilitate and increase women’s access to information and education, including in the areas of science, technology and economics, thus enhancing their knowledge, skills and opportunities for participation in environmental, water and sanitation decisions.
- Subject to national legislation and consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity, encourage the effective protection and use of the knowledge, innovations and practices of women of indigenous and local communities, including those relating to traditional medicines, biodiversity and indigenous technologies, endeavour to ensure that these are respected, maintained, promoted and preserved in an ecologically sustainable manner, and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge. In addition, safeguard existing intellectual property rights of these women as protected under national and international law.
Work actively, where necessary, to find additional ways and means for the effective protection and use of indigenous knowledge, innovations and practices and, subject to national legislation and consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity and relevant international law, encourage fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovation and practices.

Take appropriate measures to reduce risks to women from identified environmental hazards at home, at work and in other environments, including appropriate application of clean technologies, taking into account the precautionary approach agreed to in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

Take measures to integrate a gender perspective in the design and implementation of, among other things, environmentally sound and sustainable resource management mechanisms, production techniques, and infrastructure development in rural and urban areas.

Take measures to empower women as producers and consumers so that they can take effective environmental actions, along with men, in their homes, communities and workplaces.

Support the development of women’s equal access to housing infrastructure, safe water, and sustainable and affordable energy technologies such as wind, solar, biomass and other renewable sources, through participatory needs assessments, energy planning and policy formulation at the local and national levels.

Ensure that clean water is available and accessible to all by the year 2000 and that environmental protection and conservation plans are designed and implemented to restore polluted water systems and rebuild damaged watersheds.

Identify and promote environmentally sound technologies that have been designed, developed and improved in consultation with women and that are appropriate to both women and men (UNCED, 1992: Chapter 34, para. 14c).

In terms of institutional capacities, governments are tasked with ensuring equal participation of women in decision making on resource management and the development of policies and programmes for sustainable development and preventing environmental degradation. Research and information is seen as key in identifying impacts of programmes from a gender perspective. The role of women in food production, soil management, irrigation, watershed management, sanitation, coastal zone and marine resource management, integrated pest management, land-use planning, forest conservation and community forestry, fisheries, natural disaster prevention, and new and renewable sources of energy needs to be well documented and understood. Literature on adoption of new ideas and even technologies, for example, points out that women are actually better adopters and as such any discussion on climate change adaptation and the shift that communities need to make needs to be aware of this fact (Feder et al., 1985). This may contradict arguments put across on the decision making powers of women within households even in households characterized as female-headed, as it is has been documented that in rural female-headed households decisions on land adjustments are still made by the often absentee male figures associated with the homestead (World Bank, 2007).

A system of integrated economic and environmental accounting would enhance the integration of economic and social issues in economic accounting. Understanding the gendered division of labour in the use and management of natural resources would be very useful within this system. A first step therefore would be to ensure the availability of systematic sex-disaggregated data on access to and use of environmental goods and services.

5.2.2 An analysis of the environment, water and sanitation subsector strategies and goals using the Moser framework

Generally, the flagship programmes in the environment and water and sanitation subsectors, like the situation analyses of these subsectors, are quiet on gender issues. This section therefore identifies some of the gender-related issues that need to be taken into consideration in the planning and implementation of the flagship projects. Among these are:

- **Rehabilitation and protection of indigenous forests in the five water towers:** Some of the gender issues that will arise from this programme will involve an understanding of the demographic structure of the illegal settlers. Evictions should be sensitive to the fact that women and children could be left most vulnerable and as such a mitigation strategy needs to be in place to resolve this.

- **Secure wildlife corridors and migratory routes:** In securing wildlife corridors and migratory routes, attention should be paid to the existing human–wildlife conflict that has resulted because of human settlement encroaching
on wildlife habitats and migration routes. An integrated wildlife management system involving communities should be brought to the table and the participation of both women and men in the decision making framework ensured.

» Preparation of a national spatial plan: The spatial plan should be able to highlight some of the socio-economic geographies, including gender issues on ownership of property; access to natural resources as factors of production; access to environmental goods and services; settlement patterns; and economic activity, including indigenous knowledge on land forms and natural resources. National spatial plans should also include community spatial plans, which would be useful in bringing out sociological tensions existent in a community and community organizing patterns.

» Waste management systems: Waste management remains one of the single biggest challenges in managing rapid population growth. A comprehensive waste management programme should go beyond just dealing with the waste to the adoption of the re-use/reduce/recycle principles in consumptive behaviour. Women play a pivotal role in societal behaviour change, mainly because of their reproductive roles. The shift away from plastic bags, for example, can be best carried through a strategy that targets sensitizing women and empowering community women’s groups to produce alternative environmentally friendly packaging material.

» Rehabilitation, regeneration and restoration of the Nairobi River: The riparian reserve of the Nairobi River, consisting of the Ngong, Nairobi and Mathare rivers, is dotted with informal settlements that do not have adequate sewage and waste disposal systems. In addition, most of these settlements rely directly on the river for some of their water uses. Efforts to rehabilitate the river should ensure that riparian uses of the river are considered. To be able to do this and to balance industrial and household use interests, stakeholder engagement – with equal participation of women in the programme – will be required to ensure that a comprehensive integrated arrangement is designed that addresses the challenges faced by the residents of the informal settlements.

» Water resource information management: Stakeholder participation in the development of the water catchment management strategies must include women representation.

» Water harvesting and storage programmes: Kenya is a water scarce country, with an average annual rainfall volume of 322.77 billion m$^3$ and annual run-off of 20 million m$^3$; the total abstraction rate is approximately 193 million m$^3$. A more comprehensive strategy on rainwater harvesting is thus an imperative, for example as an architectural requirement for both commercial and residential buildings, along with a broad-based programme of small dams in rural areas. Women can play a pivotal role in adopting rainwater harvesting and storage technologies. Through government and private sector support, these small dams can also be harnessed for small hydropower projects that could spark local entrepreneurship by supplying energy for local mechanical uses, like grain grinding. These activities can be undertaken by women groups.

» National water supply and sanitation: In view of the statistics on water access and the time required to access water, this programme’s water supply access points should be devised to ease women’s time burden. To achieve this, a clear mapping of settlements is needed to ensure that water supply is achieved not only for commercial use, but also for household amenity purposes.

» Irrigation and drainage: Kenya’s over-dependence on rain-fed agriculture continues to leave communities vulnerable to climate change, making the move towards expanding irrigation programmes very important. Strategic environmental assessments should be undertaken to ensure that the development or rehabilitation of irrigation schemes can deliver on the desired objectives of increasing food production without unduly undermining the ecosystems of the areas. The creation of large dams in some of these schemes will require flooding of large areas of physical space, which will likely result in the displacement of people. A comprehensive socio-economic assessment including a resettlement plan should ensure that gender considerations are taken into account and women are integrated as stakeholders in decision making.

Overall, the strategies proposed for environment, water and sanitation interventions appear to be gender blind, as opposed to gender neutral. They do not directly address the gender dimensions of the challenges of these subsectors, or the differences in the burdens and responsibilities of the different sexes and the roles that each can play in the success of the subsector goals, or the vision as a whole. The Moser framework assumes some level of engagement with gender differences, which the strategies do not meet.
5.3 Housing and urbanization

Kenya’s cities and towns are important centres of employment, innovation and alternative livelihoods. Kenya is in fact considered to have one of the most rapidly growing urban populations in the region, with an urbanization growth rate of 4.4 per cent (UN-Habitat, 2006). Currently urban areas are occupied by about 40 per cent of the population and generate over 65 per cent of GDP. Much as this growth is the result of population growth and high fertility levels in urban areas, there is still a substantial element that is due to the rural–urban migration mainly caused by the income differential between urban and rural areas.

Historically, most of this migration was undertaken by young men, who left their wives and children in rural areas – a likely reason for the high number of female-headed households in rural areas. This situation has had mixed impacts on marital relations, including high HIV/AIDS prevalence amongst the migrant populations who then infect their wives at home. On the flip side, however, the growth of self-help and women’s groups may have been facilitated by the ability of women to organize at the community level, as a result of their status as household heads with some level of autonomy.

The challenge of urbanization can be looked at from the effects on rural livelihoods and the status of women, as well as the escalation of urban poverty exacerbated by the informality that characterizes this rapid growth in an unresponsive planning system. Borrowing from Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen’s thinking on poverty, urbanization can be understood in the sense in which it causes vulnerability; undermines entitlements and creates social exclusion (Sen, 2000). For women left behind, the vulnerabilities result from the fact that they mainly have access to but not control rights over land and household resources, while their low literacy levels and lack of income diversity leave them exposed to shocks and risks that further exacerbate poverty. In the case of urban poor women, the situation is even more complex; urban settlements undermine social cohesion because of their metropolitan characteristics and the lack of cultural constraints resulting from relative anonymity.

In urban areas 23 per cent of households are headed by women (GOK, 2007c), but urban women face insecure property tenure, limited access to other forms of assets and exposure to violence. They are generally more vulnerable to unemployment and income poverty than their rural counterparts (GOK 2007a). They are also less likely to own their homes. Information available on homeownership in Kenya indicates that in Nairobi, where households headed by women were found to be 24 per cent, only 26 per cent owned their homes (Syagga, 2006). According to the 2005/06 (GOK 2007c), 66 per cent of Kenyan householders own their own home, while 24 per cent pay rent. In urban areas, however, 75.4 per cent of households were found to be renting.

In all the discussions around urbanization and poverty, what has remained a constant issue is the question of settlements including adequate and dignified living. The second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (1996) issued the Habitat Agenda through which governments reaffirmed their commitment to gender equality in human settlement development, and to incorporating gender perspectives into human settlements-related legislation, policies and programmes. This commitment stressed the need for formulating and strengthening policies and practices to promote the full and equal participation of women in human settlements planning and decision making. Acting on the commitment required undertaking legislative and administrative reforms to give women full and equal access to economic resources, including the right to inheritance and the ownership of land and other property (UN-Habitat, 1996: para. 40).

A discussion on human settlements can therefore not ignore the structure and existing land tenure regime. In Resolution 2002/49 of the Commission for Human Rights on “Women’s equal ownership of access to and control over land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing”, the Commission entrusted the Special Rapporteur with the task of reporting specifically on women and adequate housing. The Special Rapporteur found that there is still a need for states to strengthen national legal and policy frameworks for protecting women’s rights to adequate housing, land and inheritance, and for providing avenues for redress where violations occur. The report further noted the need to bridge the gap between legal and policy recognition of women’s right to adequate housing and the implementation by states of national programmes to execute the legal and policy framework (OHCHR, 2003). The real challenge therefore lies in enacting legislation ensuring that women’s access to and control of land and their right to housing are protected, as well as moving a step further and guaranteeing the provision and actualization of those rights.

According to the 2005/06 KIHBS, 77 per cent of households live in dwellings with corrugated iron roofs and 14.5 per cent have grass or thatched roofs. Earth, mud, dung and sand are the flooring materials...
used by 59.2 per cent of households and only 34 per cent used cement (GOK, 2007c). There is a great demand for housing in the country, a demand that is not being met, particularly for the middle to lower income segments. Some efforts are being undertaken to address the housing problems and improve the lives of slum dwellers through the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), a collaborative endeavour by the government and UN-Habitat.

The Vision recognizes the need for housing and aims to provide the country’s population with adequate and decent housing in a sustainable environment. Urbanization is seen positively as it eases the pressure on agricultural land by creating non-agricultural employment, though if not handled well, brings about problems like congestion, unemployment, environmental degradation, high crime rates, poor infrastructure services and proliferation of informal settlements with extremely poor living standards.

5.3.1 Situation analysis

The Vision acknowledges that urban areas have grown haphazardly and are characterized by a planning system that reacts to development rather than directing it. Only 30 per cent of urban towns are planned. Out of the 175 local authorities, only four have planning units. There is therefore a need for strategies to create functional, vibrant and efficient urban centres.

According to the Vision, the housing sector is characterized by inadequacy of affordable and decent housing, low level of urban home ownership, and extensive and inappropriate dwelling units including slums and squatter settlements. It adds that the constraints to the housing sector include under-investment in low and middle cost housing by both the private and public sectors; an outdated legal and regulatory framework, which affects the amounts of serviced land available to developers; poor governance; and inadequate financing.

Some of the challenges are stated as:

- **Inadequate capacity for urban and regional planning**: To address this, the Vision recognizes the need to recruit urban and regional planners and deploy them to local authorities. The Vision could have gone further to identify that inadequate, or total lack of, planning has resulted in settlements that undermine the quality of life for all. Children lack playing grounds, health centres and other important social amenities are not provided for, and sanitation and other infrastructure are congested to a point of dysfunction. In many neighbourhoods in Nairobi the trees that contribute to the city’s salubrious climate are felled in order to make room for fence-to-fence condominium or townhouse complexes that lack even a bit of green space. Women bear the brunt of poor living conditions, as they must walk long distances to access schools and health facilities and cope with amenity services that are unreliable because the systems are so congested.

- **Insufficient serviced land**: Here the Vision proposes to pursue PPP-based investments in developing the infrastructure for housing. Another partnership option to ensure that housing investment responds to the current core need for low income housing is social/community collaboration that gives incentives to groups willing to invest in social housing construction and maintenance. Urban poor women would benefit most from these arrangements. The Jamii Bora Trust example provides a good example of how workable this can be.

- **Concentration of property development in the high income category**: The concentration occurs mainly because of the availability of mortgage financing for this category. This is coupled with outdated building codes and standards that insist on expensive building materials, hence limiting investments in low and middle income options. The two factors indicate a need for affordable and secure finance for mortgages and property development, on the one hand, and a fresh look at building codes and standards, on the other, so as to allow lower cost but reliable materials.

- **Legal and administrative reforms**: The Vision recognizes the requirements for a comprehensive housing sector legal framework and reduction in the multiple approval procedures faced by developers. Other challenges include the inaccuracies of land registries and fraudulence in issuance of title deeds. The land reform process should
recognize the skewed nature of land ownership in Kenya, with a deliberate move to provide for measures aimed at increasing women’s ownership and control of land. *Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on the National Land Policy* is a major step in this direction.

» Lack of adequate construction capacity: Much of the construction of housing is undertaken by the informal sector. There is need to support the emergence of competitive national construction companies through training, research and development, and start-up finance. Women participating in this sector will require support, especially in terms of accessing capital and technological know-how.

While the Vision recognizes the need for provision of housing, a gender analysis of housing needs reveals not just the inadequacy of housing infrastructure, but a need to provide complementary services and infrastructure that facilitate both men and women as they go about their daily lives. Housing programmes should therefore ensure that they make provisions for health, education and other social amenities. Access to markets is a key consideration, as are the provision for green areas for children and adults alike to play and relax; social halls for community meetings; and access to public transport. These measures transform houses from just dwelling units to places where communities live.

The location of housing projects is critical not just for the provision of environmental amenities, but also crucial to avoid land-use conflicts. Areas designated for industrial sites, for example, should not be transformed into residential areas without proper consideration of the environmental implications. Proximity to power lines is another consideration. Women face particular risks in this regard, as the siting of dwellings beneath major electricity power lines has been associated with birthing problems for women and various birth defects in their children. The same is the case with women living near major polluting industries. Land use control will therefore have to be taken seriously to avoid some of these problems.

Closely tied with housing is the provision of adequate water and sanitation infrastructure; much of this discussion has already been covered in the previous section.

### 5.3.2 A gender analysis of the housing and urbanization subsector using the Harvard analytical framework

Here again we highlight the different roles played by men and women as users and actors in the housing sector and the categorizations of the same.

#### Activity profile

Table 3.21 helps to identify the need for practical living conditions by women, where housing facilitates them to nurture their families in a safe and secure environment while according them the opportunity to pursue their social roles within the community to build a community around their lives. Men, on the other hand, based on their roles, require accessible houses along public transport routes as most of their activities are not within the home.

**Table 3.21: Activity profile matrix – Urbanization and housing sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Productive</th>
<th>Reproductive</th>
<th>Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Construction installation and maintenance</td>
<td>Construction in some communities</td>
<td>Construction of community facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mining of building material including ballast, sand, stones, clay, amongst others</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of community security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Vending food at construction sites</td>
<td>Maintaining the house</td>
<td>Entertaining guests in the home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working for pay within households</td>
<td>Transforming the house from a dwelling unit to a living environment</td>
<td>Cleaning the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bearing and raising children and caring for the family in the home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of sector management, employment statistics from the Ministry of Housing show that females represent 30.2 per cent of the total workforce (Table 3.22). Women also constitute over 30 per cent of senior management, although they fall under the 30 per cent threshold of those in mid-level management. Still, the significant presence of women does suggest that there is opportunity for them to contribute to decision making and influencing housing policy.
Table 3.22: Employment in the Ministry of Housing disaggregated by sex and job group (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job group</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P+</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-N</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H and below</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK (2010b).

Access and control profile

In terms of access and control, the critical resources in the housing sector are mainly land and capital. Our earlier discussion determined that women constitute a very low percentage of landowners. This is in part a function of their limited access to financial resources. In a negative spiral, women’s lack of ownership of land and other capital assets has had the effect of limiting their access to and control of credit, which requires collateral, usually in the form of land and other capital assets. These challenges are grounded in socio-cultural norms and practices, which favour males at the expense of females in the distribution of resources. Transforming women into key players in this sector thus requires substantive changes in the land tenure regime as it relates to women. Addressing the hurdles that women face in accessing land should be seen by the Vision’s implementers as one critical way of encouraging investment in housing, of reducing poverty and of responding to the dearth on affordable housing.

Influencing factors

The main influencing factor for this situation has been a land tenure regime that has tended not to favour women as landowners in their own right. Cultural and other barriers have propagated this situation. Additionally, women are disadvantaged when it comes to access to financial resources to enable them to purchase their own homes. Access to loans and income-generating opportunities, and opportunities to take advantage of schemes for affordable housing, all tend to be gender blind, that is, they are uninformed by an understanding of how socio-cultural perceptions of the rights of women vis-à-vis men bias against women’s access to resources. Such gender blindness therefore perpetuates the skewed nature of land and homeownership. The situation has been compounded by the fact that the majority of housing, land and related financing is provided by the private sector, which is motivated mainly by profit.

5.3.3 An analysis of the urbanization and housing subsector strategies and goals using the Moser framework

In light of this scenario, we look at what the Vision proposes as its flagship programmes in the housing sector and seek to bring out the gender considerations that need to be in place within these proposals so as to address the challenges raised above. The flagship programmes are:

» Preparing and implementing strategic development and investment plans in six metropolitan regions: Strategic planning for this flagship should be guided by stakeholder participation and women should be involved effectively. It will be important to understand the strategic needs of men and women, boys and girls, in these areas and plan in a manner that will facilitate the growth and development of the locals and enhance their quality of life. This should be coupled with a plan to stimulate investment by private and social actors in these areas to bring the plans to fruition.

» Positioning the city of Nairobi as an all-round globally competitive city in business and tourism, providing a high quality life for its residents, and turning Nairobi into a 24-hour city: The social implications of this transformation should be clearly understood. Besides providing more employment opportunities, the city may be much more expensive to live in, forcing poorer people to live further in the outskirts. Women, like men, will have to travel long distances to get to work thus affecting their presence in the home. Deliberate effort will thus have to be made to provide social housing that is affordable, convenient and sufficient. The proposals should be coupled with strong measures to promote women’s education to ensure that they benefit from the developments and also protect them from exploitation.

» Preparing a national land-use plan in order to facilitate better urban planning: Urban planning should be systematic, but dynamic, cognisant of the rapidly changing face and lifestyles of urban dwellers. For urban mothers, childcare services, access to medical services, convenient shopping and amusement centres for children are a critical need, and the ready accessibility of these facilities needs to be factored into the planning process. A participatory land-use planning process is preferred in which women are involved as key decision makers in articulating their lifestyle needs.

» Installing physical and social infrastructure in slums in 20 urban areas to make them formal
settlements, permit construction of permanent houses and attract private investments: This will go a long way in addressing the needs of women, particularly women in the slums who are faced with the daily challenges of providing these amenities to their households. Efforts could be harnessed to convert some of the tenants in slums into owners of permanent houses constructed in the same neighbourhoods. Any initiatives to support home ownership should be informed by the objective of bridging gender disparities in homeownership, by seeking to respond to the specific challenges that women currently face.

- Producing 200,000 housing units annually by 2012 through public–private partnerships and other initiatives: A percentage of these houses can be specifically be set aside for women who are household heads.

- Establishing housing technology centres in each constituency to increase access to decent housing by promoting location-specific building materials and low-cost housing: As noted in the Vision, high cost materials contribute to the choice of investment in high cost houses. The shift to lower cost materials can go a long way in lowering the cost of houses. Women should be facilitated through these technology centres to develop new technologies and to access low cost building material – some of which they can produce within their groups. The Women’s Enterprise Development Fund, for example, can facilitate this industry specific capacity building.

» Establishing a secondary mortgage finance corporation to increase access to housing finance: This secondary mortgage finance scheme should have an understanding of the factors that hinder women’s access to mainstream credit. Not only are existing credit instruments very expensive in relative terms, but also most women lack the security of formal employment that would allow them to qualify for these instruments. Any products emerging from this corporation should be practical and responsive to these challenges.

» Enacting the Housing Bill (2006) to legislate for a one-stop housing development approvals mechanism, to track approval of housing plans and reduce the time cost of construction: Reducing red tape is beneficial for all. It may translate into increased supplies of affordable housing as more individuals and institutions look to invest in housing. The ability of women to benefit, however, will depend on the availability of affordable credit to allow them to take advantage of such initiatives. Until such time, the benefits will be skewed towards those who are already advantaged.

Again, with reference to the Moser framework, although many of the proposed flagship projects will likely benefit women indirectly, none of them seeks to address the wide gap in home ownership between the sexes, or the gap in land ownership. Proposals to provide alternative mortgage financing are also gender blind. Even in terms of welfare or efficiency concerns, therefore, no provisions were factored into the housing subsector to address gender differences or inequalities.
A Gender Analysis of the Social Pillar of Kenya’s Vision 2030 – Gender subsector

Gender issues are sprinkled throughout the Vision 2030 document, but it is here that the Vision focuses and expounds on the issue. Under this subsector we look at the scope of the proposed strategies, and compare that with the outcomes anticipated of planning and programming under gender mainstreaming.

6.1 Gender, youth and vulnerable groups

The choice made by the government for the handling of gender issues was to locate gender issues under one subsector under the social pillar and combine them with issues related to other vulnerable groups. This approach may be easier, but it is also problematic in that it tends to assume that gender issues do not factor into how other subsectors function. It also goes against the philosophy of gender mainstreaming in that interventions that seek to promote gender equity and equality are presented as add-ons rather than being a part of the conceptualization of the development challenges in question and the articulation of the desired objectives and outcomes of interventions. Here we review how this subsector addresses gender issues. The review does not follow the format of the reviews of the other subsectors, to avoid a repetition of the issues raised within the subsector reviews. The intention is mainly to look at the main thrust of the Vision’s efforts to address gender disparities and to build on them.

6.1.1 Situation analysis

This subsector begins with the assertion that Vision 2030 mainstreams gender equity in all aspects of society, and identifies four areas of concern to be addressed by making fundamental changes: opportunity, empowerment, capabilities and vulnerabilities (GOK, 2007d: 133). The Vision refers to the fact that women are disadvantaged in their access to productive resources and labour markets, disempowered at the household, community and national levels, and under-represented in social and political leadership. It states that women have not realized their full capabilities because of their limited access to capital, education, training and health care. Furthermore, women continue to be particularly vulnerable to civil and domestic violence, economic shocks, and environmental hazards. The Vision states that it will provide specific policy measures to correct the glaring gender gaps in access to and control of resources, economic opportunities, and power and political voice (GOK, 2007d).

The situation analysis for the subsector looks at specific indicators of these disparities:

- Representation of Kenyan women in decision making positions in the public sector: Only 16 per cent of top positions (job groups Q, R, S, T and U) are occupied by women, according to the Vision, compared with 78 per cent of jobs in the lower job groups (A, B, C, E and F). Here the Vision appears to suggest that socio-cultural biases are the main hindrance; it states that gender differences in education, work experience or job characteristics do not sufficiently explain the poor representation of women in top positions of government.
- Poverty levels: Disparities are noted in the poverty levels of female-headed households, relative to male-headed households.
- Health issues: Contraceptive prevalence (39 per cent in 2005 compared with 55 per cent in Malaysia and 56 per cent in South Africa), numbers of births attended by skilled personnel (43 per cent, compared with Malaysia at 97 per cent and South Africa at 84 per cent), and violence against women are singled out here. Disparities in condom usage between males and females are also noted: 47 per cent for males compared with females at 25 per cent (in Tanzania the rate of condom usage for women was estimated at 42 per cent and in Uganda at 53 per cent).
The strategies identified under Vision 2030 are: framework strategies and goals using the Moser decision making power. who have control over the necessary resources and moderated and facilitated by their male relations, for females, access to social services tends to be example, a common challenge may be the fact that are also interlinked. In education and health, for development issue to development issue), but they are not linked these disparities to the performance of the relevant subsectors to show why gender equity is important to the Vision’s achievement. The way in which the discussion is currently framed suggests that this issue is mainly about fairness and justice, when the impacts of gender disparities extend to the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions, and therefore overall performance. Linking these issues within the discussions of the different sectors would provide a clearer picture of the utility value of gender equity and equality for the realization of sector goals.

Moreover, the factors behind these differences, i.e., how the differences are generated and reproduced, are not stated clearly. These understandings are necessary for informing interventions for addressing structural issues, even as they tackle the way these inequalities present in society. It is therefore useful to have the factors, expressed clearly. Usually the factors will differ from subsector to subsector (or development issue to development issue), but they are also interlinked. In education and health, for example, a common challenge may be the fact that for females, access to social services tends to be moderated and facilitated by their male relations, who have control over the necessary resources and decision making power.

6.1.2 An analysis of the gender subsector strategies and goals using the Moser framework

The strategies identified under Vision 2030 are:

- Providing financial support to women to raise their incomes and reduce the gender gap in earnings: Here, the proposal is to increase funds and training available to women entrepreneurs.
- Increasing female representation in Parliament.
- Instituting affirmative action towards a target of 30 per cent female representation in the public sector: There is also a proposal to increase female representation at the executive level of the private sector, in line with best practice in middle-income countries.
- Doubling the number of births attended by a skilled attendant to 84 per cent, up from 42 per cent.
- Increasing adult literacy rates from 64 per cent and 59 per cent (for males and females, respectively), to 70 per cent for both.
- Reducing gender-based violence.
- Increasing condom usage for males and females from 47 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively, to 70 per cent for both.
- Reducing the male and female population below the poverty line to 25 per cent.
- Mainstreaming gender into government policies, plans, budgets and programmes.

The strategies and goals are vague, however, in that it is not stated how they will be achieved, unlike in the case of the other subsectors. For example, the goal on reducing male and female poverty is provided but it is not clear whether the goal of 25 per cent is an average for both males and females and what will be done to address the gap between the two sexes. No reference is made to addressing the socioeconomic determinants of these inequalities within the institutions of society (households, the labour market, political institutions, etc.). On health, there is no reference to the gender gap in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and how this gap will be addressed. The goal on increasing condom usage for women especially is not looked at, and how these challenges will be addressed. On the goal of gender mainstreaming of policies, budgets and programmes, no reference is made to a support framework to ensure that this is in fact done. No reference is made to the Plan of Action to Implement the National Policy on Gender and Development (2008–2012), which provides direction on how to mainstream gender into the different subsectors of the country’s development agenda and ways of tracking progress under each subsector. In line with this, there is no reference to the generation of appropriate sex-disaggregated data to this effort, within the Vision document.

6.2 Challenges to gender mainstreaming

A critical challenge of the gender mainstreaming approach taken by Vision 2030 is that it is difficult to generate a comprehensive picture of the impact of gender issues on a development blueprint such as Vision 2030. Real gender mainstreaming requires that gender differences be identified within the analysis of sectors (and sectoral issues). It also requires that sectoral strategies be designed with the intention of
bridging the disparities to the extent possible, on the basis of an appreciation of the ideals of gender equity and equality and an understanding that the promotion of these two ideals will contribute critically to the objectives of the sector. This approach places more demands on development practitioners because they are forced to factor gender issues into their sectoral analyses and see how to merge the concerns of this subsector with gender-related concerns in the other subsectors. Therefore, instead of contributing to an understanding of sectoral issues, gender concerns are added in later, rather superficially and most likely inconsistently across sectors.

Overall, however, this mix of strategies and goals is oriented towards achieving greater equity and empowerment among women. The mix also has the potential to address women’s poverty, i.e., their challenges in accessing financial resources. Questions remain about the deliverability of these strategies and goals, given the lack of clarity on the factors behind the existing disparities. The disparities identified here cut across all subsectors. Thus the isolation of the initiatives in this subsector from those in other subsectors suggests challenges for the realization of the Vision’s goals. The isolation is perpetuated by the gender blind way in which other subsector goals are expected to be achieved. The strength of gender mainstreaming, on the other hand, is that at the outset raises questions about the gender dimensions of each development area, with the idea of identifying how such differences are likely to affect the way subsector goals are realized. This seems not to have been the approach taken here, hence the weak linkage between the objectives and strategies of this subsector, and those of other subsectors.
7. Conclusions and Recommendations

In this audit we sought to review the social pillar of Vision 2030 from a gender perspective, so as to assess the extent to which gender issues had been mainstreamed within the different subsectors of the social pillar – education and training, health, environment, water and sanitation, and housing and urbanization, plus a specific subsector focus on gender itself. The scope of the audit required an understanding of the concept of gender mainstreaming and what it entails for policy and planning. It also needed a consistent methodological approach across and within the planning processes of all development areas; for this we applied the Harvard analytical framework and the Moser framework to our investigation. Beginning from how the development issues were conceptualized within each subsector of the social pillar, to the strategies and targets that were set for each subsector, the audit looked at whether gender issues were factored in. In doing so we have found a lack of consideration in the planning process for the specific needs of women, and significant disparities in the opportunities and resources available to women compared with men in nearly all the sectors. These findings inform our conclusions and the recommendations we have articulated to ensure gender issues are fully addressed.

7.1 Conclusions

A review of key government documents and the strategic objectives of the government’s Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development found that the government has embraced gender mainstreaming as a strategy for achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment. Important challenges endure, however, the inadequacy of financial and technical resources being foremost among them. Also, the political push to make gender equity and equality a reality remains inconsistent. Therefore, the harmonization and coordination of gender-responsive efforts across government sectors and ministries remain problematic.

In terms of overall conclusions, differences were found to exist in the extent to which the different subsectors attempt to integrate some gender analysis within them. The education and training subsector and the health subsector exhibit significant gender inequalities. Only the education and training subsector, however, went to the extent of including sex-disaggregated target indicators, specifically for promoting equity in access to education. In the health subsector, two indicators are specific to females, while all others are non-disaggregated. The environment, water and sanitation, and housing and urbanization subsectors, for their part, are generally gender blind in their approach to the strategies.

The bulk of the social pillar’s concern with gender issues is reserved for the subsector on gender, youth and vulnerable groups. Specific gender issues are identified here – areas of inequalities in the social, economic and political arenas. Specific strategies and targets are articulated, including gender mainstreaming and gender responsive budgeting. With respect to the latter, however, it is not clear how this will be undertaken under the Vision. No institutional or process mechanisms are given to indicate how the government’s plans will ensure that gender issues are mainstreamed across each of the broad areas where inequalities have been identified.

Generally, it is clear that efforts at gender mainstreaming were limited. Across all of the subsectors there was no apparent vision for addressing gender relations, inequalities and differences from the outset. The impression that comes out is that while these issues do have a place, they are not regarded as central to an understanding of the development challenges facing Kenya. Not surprisingly, then, achieving gender equality and equity does not appear to have been considered as an important element in achieving the Vision’s objectives.

The conclusion that can be drawn, therefore, is that the Vision falls short when it comes to gender
mainstreaming within the different subsectors of the social pillar. Gender mainstreaming requires that a gender analysis be undertaken of any development issue, to first identify the differences and inequalities that exist around the specific issue, and then determine the extent to which these contribute to the challenges of the development subsector. The outcomes of such analysis can then be used to articulate gender-specific objectives for the subsector. Both the “how” and the “what” of gender mainstreaming objectives must be articulated within the operation of development activities and in the statement of the desired outcomes, i.e., the monitoring and evaluation indicators. None of the above appears to have been done for most of the Vision’s social pillar, and needs to be addressed if the country is to reduce the inequalities and inequities that hinder development progress.

As stated earlier, the government must be willing to question the distribution of power, opportunities and resources, and to see that these are redistributed equitably between the sexes. Tools do exist for such analysis to take place across all development sectors, to draw out the issues that need to be addressed in a methodical manner. Applying the tools requires continuous research and analysis, including supporting the KNBS in disaggregating existing statistical data (where possible) and in generating additional sex-disaggregated data to support gender mainstreaming in all areas of development activity. Building the capacities of planners, budget officers, monitoring and evaluation officers, and gender officers within all government ministries in gender-responsive planning, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation is necessary to support gender mainstreaming efforts. It is also important that the national gender machineries have the necessary political and financial backing to enable them to effectively fulfil their coordinating roles.

### 7.2 Recommendations

Gender mainstreaming begins with the understanding that the promotion of gender equity and equality is central to every development agenda, in terms of both process and outcomes. In this regard, the Government of Kenya is to be commended for referring to the goal of gender equity in Vision 2030 and for indicating that it will adopt a gender mainstreaming approach in its policies, plans, programmes and budgets (GOK, 2007d: 133). However, the Vision contradicts itself by restricting the bulk of the proposals that have to do gender mainstreaming to a subsector specifically on gender. As a strategy, gender mainstreaming is only effective when the promotion of gender equity and equality is seen as essential to the development agenda, and if efforts are made to address gender concerns in all aspects of the development blueprint. The following are some recommendations for the mainstreaming of gender issues into the processes and outcomes of the Vision.

#### 7.2.1 Make a gender analysis of issues a prerequisite to any situation analysis

This recommendation speaks to the need to understand the contribution of gender inequalities and differences to existing development challenges, and how addressing the differences can benefit the development outcomes that are pursued. It is important at the beginning of any planning process for the government to ensure that a gender analysis is undertaken in addition to other kinds of analyses, e.g., analysis of disparities between regions or by income level, of a particular development concern, as a prerequisite to understanding these issues and designing interventions and setting goals. This includes building an understanding of what gender inequalities exist (in opportunities, vulnerabilities, capabilities) and differences (in roles and responsibilities) within a development sector, and what gender-related challenges affect the performance of the sector.

Such an analyses can then be used to define the what and how of gender mainstreaming efforts – the objectives of such efforts and how these objectives will be achieved. For example, under the various challenges identified under the education subsector, it would have been possible to mention what gender inequalities and differences exist between the sexes and why. The identified gender-related inequalities and differences would then constitute the focus of gender mainstreaming efforts under the subsector. From this, in addition to a general statement about improving overall transition rates, because females are lagging behind males in this regard, an objective that could be proposed (the “what”) might be the achievement of gender parity in universities and TIVET institutions by a specific year. The vision would then articulate what interventions are needed (the “how”) to achieve this objective to improve the educational performance of females, and of the subsector generally.

#### 7.2.2 Collect sex-disaggregated and gender-sensitive data

It is also recommended that the government provide a strategy for the generation of sex-disaggregated data for effective and consistent gender mainstreaming. All data at the individual level (population-related data) that are necessary for informing planning
processes must be collected, analysed and consistently presented to illustrate gender differences. In the health subsector, for example, it would be useful to generate individual-level (as opposed to household-level), sex-disaggregated data on access to certain basic critical services and the satisfaction levels and challenges in the use of such services. The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development has been working on compiling a comprehensive gender database, but the information is limited because resources are often not available to enable the disaggregation of more data.

Additionally, it is important that the data collected be gender-sensitive. This is data collection that is informed by an awareness of gender differences in roles, responsibilities, behaviours, vulnerabilities, etc. Gender differences define needs and priorities, so it is important to collect data that can build on our understandings of these needs and priorities so that they can be addressed effectively. For example, it would be useful to collect data on time use patterns of males vis-à-vis females in different regions, by income class, religious and ethnic background, and rural and urban areas. This is important to understanding the time constraints different sexes face, and the factors behind these constraints that affect their abilities to develop themselves, undermine their overall productivity and erode their general wellbeing. Also, for the purposes of understanding the environmental challenges expounded in the vision, it would have been useful to understand the strategies males and females have adopted to cope with environmental degradation, based on their respective roles and responsibilities, knowledge of these issues, and available resources. Such knowledge would better enable the government to assist the different sexes to meet their basic needs and engage them in environmental conservation efforts.

Any strategy to address the availability of data for gender mainstreaming purposes must include a strategy to train all personnel involved in data collection, including enumerators and supervisors, in the conceptualization, collection, tabulation, presentation and dissemination of appropriate data. It is similarly important that planning officers, at subnational and national levels, be trained to understand the importance of such data and how they can be applied, as this will ensure that the data are utilized consistently in planning processes, and that gender issues are in fact mainstreamed into the outcomes of planning processes.

### 7.2.3 Engender performance monitoring and evaluation frameworks

Where development objectives have been generated in support of gender mainstreaming efforts, it is important that they be backed by an appropriate monitoring and evaluation framework. Gender mainstreaming calls for all individual level goals to be disaggregated by sex. Other performance indicators may be specific to a particular sex based on gender-sensitive data. Good examples of such performance monitoring indicators already exist in the 2008–2012 Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Gender Policy (GOK, 2008c). These could have been incorporated within the social pillar subsectors. They must be grounded in clear objectives, which should be based on the kinds of changes the government is trying to make in order to achieve the goals of gender equity and equality. For Kenya, these goals are set out in documents such as the National Policy on Gender and Development (2000) and Sessional Paper No. 2 on Gender Equality and Development (GOK, 2000, 2006).

Examples of performance indicators under the health subsector include: increase in clients’ satisfaction (by sex) with specified categories of health services (e.g., reproductive health services), the hours these services are available, and the location of these services. The environment subsector would likely find it useful to track the reduction in time spent collecting water and cooking fuel, and concurrently measure the decrease in the utilization of physically and environmentally unfriendly sources of energy, both by sex.

Both output and outcome indicators, informed by the objectives of gender mainstreaming efforts within the Vision, can be developed based on the kind of sex-disaggregated and gender-sensitive data that is collected. Output indicators measure the quantitative results of an intervention, e.g., number of government-managed primary health care facilities offering sexual and reproductive health services (specify the services). Outcome indicators refer to the objectives of an intervention and seek to measure the change that is taking place as a result, e.g., whether there is increased uptake of sexual and reproductive health services and by what percentage (e.g., males from A per cent to B per cent and females from Y per cent to Z per cent).

Through the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development, the government has already finalized a monitoring and evaluation framework for tracking the coordination and harmonization of gender mainstreaming efforts. This can be applied even now, and it should inform the development of the Vision’s next medium-term plan. The corresponding training manual has also been finalized and should be shared widely, with trainings undertaken in all public institutions as soon as possible. The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development should be given the political backing to enforce gender mainstreaming practice, once training has been given
to an institution. It should also be equipped with the necessary technical and financial resources to support public institutions in the process of gender mainstreaming and to build its own staff capacities to deliver effectively on its mandate.

### 7.2.4 Institute gender responsive budgeting

This was a strategy that the government indicated it would be adopting to support the goal of gender mainstreaming, but it is difficult to know how this will be possible in the existing situation where strategies appear gender neutral or gender blind. Gender-responsive budgeting is most effective where it is informed by an engendered development plan, because the desired gender-responsive outcomes and objectives are laid out and the kinds of activities needed to achieve these outcomes are identified. An appropriate monitoring and evaluation framework should also be in place. There is then a basis for planning the spending of national resources, i.e., the kinds of investment choices and the resources needed to promote gender equality and equity.

Different methodologies exist for engendering budget practice that can be adapted for use by the government. The government can collaborate with its development partners (donors and civil society) in building their capacities in this regard on an incremental basis.

### 7.2.5 Build awareness, capacity and ownership

Training targeted at creating awareness about the importance of gender equity and equality to development will build understandings about gender-mainstreaming and initiatives targeted at empowering women, the practice of gender mainstreaming, and the roles of institutions and individuals in the process. Such capacity building can be developed incrementally (but concurrently for the different levels of government) on the basis of an agreed, phased set of gender mainstreaming objectives. Under the role of institutions, it is important that they determine what differences exist between the sexes at different levels in their work force, what factors have defined these differences, and what can be done to address these anomalies in order to ensure balanced representation at all levels of the civil service.

To identify disparities, institutional audits of the gender balance in the workforce of the public sector at national and subnational levels are important. The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development is currently generating such reports biannually in line with the presidential directive on affirmative action. Data are currently available on some ministries, local authorities and semi-autonomous government agencies, which is useful in tracking progress. This presidential directive should be translated into law. The submission of data for these purposes should be made mandatory for all public institutions, and such reports should be disseminated to the general public.

On promoting under-represented groups, a common approach to training and mentoring individuals to reduce such disparities should be developed for the civil service and other public agencies, to build the capacities of marginalized groups to occupy positions where they are currently under-represented.

Generally, all staff should be allocated responsibility in line with the training they have received for the promotion of gender equity and equality in their work. Their performance appraisals should indicate what efforts they have undertaken, with what results, as well as the challenges, needs and priorities for greater effectiveness.

### 7.2.6 Strategically locate the Ministry of Gender and gender focal points

In order for the recommendations proposed above to succeed, it is important that the mandates of both the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development and the gender focal points in ministries be treated with the seriousness they deserve. This means revisiting the relationship between the ministry and other line ministries, and rethinking its location for the purposes of moving this agenda forward. It may be important to discuss whether there should not be a distinct ministry dealing with gender issues alone, capable of effectively coordinating and monitoring gender mainstreaming efforts across all line ministries, and compelling ministries to undertake particular actions in this regard.

The location, qualifications and authority of the gender focal points in the line ministries also need to be reconsidered and a discussion held about is what is needed to ensure that they are effective in undertaking their mandate. Although the responsibility of gender mainstreaming should be shouldered by all officers in government, all initiatives will be anchored in the office of the gender focal point. Given this, the gender focal points need to have the requisite expertise in gender issues in addition to the issues being dealt with by their line ministry (such expertise can be built incrementally). They should also be given the appropriate authority to undertake their work, and provided with the necessary human and financial resources to support them in their efforts.
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Appendix: Glossary

**Community maintenance work:** This can be divided into two. The first refers to community management work that relates to the provision of services at social events (e.g., weddings and funerals) and addressing gaps in the provision of basic social services (health and education). This type of work is largely undertaken on a volunteer basis. Women have tended to be more visible in this first category of community maintenance work. The second category refers to community politics, i.e., community representation, lobbying and local politics, which may sometimes be remunerated. Here, men have tended to take the lead role.

**Empowerment:** This concept, when partnered with gender equality, refers to the ability of women to control their destiny through equal access to such resources as education, health care, land and employment to enable them to exercise their own agency – that is, to make decisions and engage in political leadership and to live without fear of violence or coercion.

**Gender:** “Gender” refers to the attributes and opportunities associated with being either male or female, and the social construct of relations between women and men, boys and girls.* Understandings of gender are culture specific; they can also change over time. “Sex”, on the other hand, refers to the biological differences between men and women; differences that are biologically determined and that are unchanging and universal. While gender roles are learnt, changeable and different from culture to culture, sex does not change.

Biological differences have been used to justify the construct of gender roles, however. “Gender” has defined differences and disparities in the kinds of activities males and females can engage in. It has also defined access to and control over resources, opportunities and decision making power.

**Gender blind:** This refers to a situation in which policies, plans, programmes or individuals may not recognize that “gender” is an essential feature in determining life choices, power relations, development outcomes, etc. Gender unaware documents may frame issues in a neutral manner but they inherently privilege male perspectives on issues, e.g., development challenges, needs and priorities, and their understandings of the distribution of resources and opportunities.

**Gender differences:** This refers to the differential access to social, economic and political resources and opportunities and the ability to exercise individual agency, i.e., to make strategic choices and decisions and take action for the individual or collective good – all as a function of understandings of gender.

**Gender equality:** Refers to equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men, boys and girls. The drive for equality is about requiring those rights, as responsibilities and opportunities are not distributed on the basis of whether one is male or female. It also asks that the needs and priorities of both males and females be taken into account and accorded equal attention or value.

**Gender equity:** Equity refers to the practices of fairness and justice in the distribution of opportunities, benefits and responsibilities. It also refers to treating all individuals equally, on the basis of their situations and needs, and without reference to their gender.

**Gender gap:** This refers to the extent of these differences and inequalities (along gender lines), which are ascertainable through qualitative and qualitative data.

**Gender inequalities:** Gender inequalities occur when gender differences exist.

*Even then differences will exist among and between males and females, on the basis of their ages, income classes, ethnic groups, and religious and racial backgrounds.

**Gender neutral:** Unlike gender unaware
interventions, policies and plans, these recognize the existing gendered division of labour and distribution of opportunities and resources, but they do not seek to tackle them within the objectives of the work being proposed or undertaken.

**Gender roles:** These refer to a determined pattern of behaviour in terms of rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities assigned to women and men, boys and girls, in a given society, at a given time, on the basis of their sex. Gender roles are socially constructed and they can evolve (or differ), at different times.

**Practical gender needs:** These refer to the needs identified by a particular gender as a function of their societal role. These needs usually relate to the practical challenges they face, which will differ from society to society, and over time, and between income classes. They include water provision, health care and income-generating opportunities.

**Productive work:** This refers to activities carried out to generate goods and services for income or subsistence. Both men and women engage in this, but their efforts have been found not to be valued equally.

**Reproductive work:** This refers to the kinds of tasks involving the care and maintenance of the household and its members, including childbearing and rearing, cooking, cleaning, and caring for the sick. This work is usually unremunerated as often it is not seen as “real” work and therefore is not valued in the same way that productive work is. This work, which is labour-intensive, is undertaken predominantly by women and girls.

**Strategic gender needs:** These are needs that if fulfilled empower the individual or group. They seek to challenge a particular social hierarchy that is oppressive of the individual in order to bring about greater equity and equality. Again, they vary with context and include such issues as legal rights, affirmative action, equal wages for equal work, women’s control over their bodies, and gender divisions of labour in the marketplace and in the household, etc.

**Triple burden:** These terms refer to the fact that women tend to work longer hours and to distribute their time between their three types of work: reproductive, productive and community maintenance.