Furthermore, in earlier phases of the negotiations developing countries and China were not without power. They were able to use this power at the birth of the Kyoto protocol.  Climate change is the most pure example of globalization. Redressing climate change requires a global approach, on the basis of a world consensus.  Such a consensus prevailed during the negotiations in Kyoto in 1996, where the protocol was adopted, and also in The Hague and Bonn in 2000 and 2001, where negotiations on the basis of this protocol resulted in a binding legal text, which was adopted in a world meeting in Marrakech in 2001.

Power and Rights

When global problems are at stake, factors beyond traditional economic, military and political power become important.  There is the power on the basis of capital, knowledge and technology. There is the power based on natural resources, be it oil, coal, or renewable energy sources.  Countries with huge landmasses suitable for solar energy or for bio fuels, with large river masses suitable for hydro energy or with large forests, become powerful too. When negotiations require full consensus in order to lead to operational results, poor countries that lack all of these resources have power as well. Their cooperation is necessary. Consensus is a necessity, because majority rule is not feasible. There is no mechanism enabling a majority to enforce implementation, whichever the size or composition of such a majority.  This enables smaller, poorer and weaker countries to play a crucial role in negotiations.

As such, power relations are no longer traditional. But we knew that already after Rio. Climate negotiations in Copenhagen did not fail because of the emergence of new power configurations in the world of today.

Did they fail because it is no longer possible to reach results within the United Nations framework?  It is indeed difficult to reach meaningful results within a UN framework, and it would be desirable to reform negotiation procedures within the UN. However, the UN as such is no hindrance. On the contrary, all negotiations on the Kyoto protocol were successfully concluded within the UN. The fact that nearly 200 countries have to sit together and talk is cumbersome, but doable.  Moreover, the system of the United Nations enables countries to contain each other’s power by exercising rights. The rights embodied in various UN charters guarantee that individual nations cannot simply be pushed aside. New rights, such as the ones based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” – which opened the possibility for the abovementioned preferential treatment – form another example.  In the UN it is always a combination of power and rights. Outside the UN only power counts.

Copenhagen: unprepared, ill-designed, poorly led

However, UN negotiations will only result in consensus if they are well prepared, well structured and well presided over. Copenhagen failed in all these respects.  The talks were not well prepared. Since Marrakech the focus was on implementation and rightly so, because the Kyoto Protocol still had to be ratified by the required number of member states.  Moreover, the new instruments, including the international financial mechanisms and emission trading still had to be made operational. This notwithstanding, consultations about the next stage started too late. When finally the talks were resumed, the negotiators started from scratch. They should have focused on efforts to improve the text that had been agreed with regard to the experimental period up to 2012, so as to extend this agreement to a less experimental second period in order to meet new and more ambitious targets.  However, instead of learning from the experiences during the first phase and considering possible changes, additions and improvements, the negotiators started all over again. No wonder that at the beginning of the final talks in Copenhagen nearly every paragraph of the text to be negotiated was still between brackets.

If negotiations would have been chaired well, a better result could have been obtained. The inexperienced Danish chairmanship failed. The chair did not get a grip on the talks and made some fatal mistakes, which resulted in a loss of confidence amongst some country groups. Once a chair is no longer perceived as professional and neutral, talks are doomed to fail.

To some extent this was due to the structure of the talks. It is my experience that final rounds of UN negotiations should be presided by the same chair that has been responsible for the pre-negotiations. This would guarantee inside knowledge about the issues concerned and about the positions taken by various players.  Ongoing negotiations with a rotating presidency, whereby a new president – for instance a host country politician – takes office at the beginning of a summit and stays on until the beginning of the next summit, lack accountable political leadership during essential periods. A chair that is responsible for the implementation of the results of a summit and the preparation of the next summit, to be led by a new chair, will be less effective than a chair that takes over at the end of a summit and is responsible for both the preparations and the proceedings of a new summit.

However, even if the climate negotiations would have been presided over differently, it would have been very difficult to reach results. It is for this very reason that the Copenhagen summit was structured as a real Summit, with a capital S. United Nations Summit meetings attended by Heads of State and Heads of Government never result in more than a statement of good intentions.  The leaders come to meet each other, to deliver speeches, to launch new talks or to sign an agreement that has been reached by negotiators on their behalf. They cannot negotiate themselves.  A group of more than hundred Heads of State meeting over a day or two, after which each of them has to fly back home, does not have the capacity to reach operational and binding results.  Heads of State should not be considered as a Deus ex Machina, who can work miracles once negotiations are stalled. On the contrary, expectations of their arrival is bound to lead to a stalemate. Diplomatic negotiators and even ministers will be inclined to postpone reaching agreement until the arrival of their leaders taking part in the real Summit at the end. Not all negotiators will react in the same way, but many will slow down their efforts. If a negotiation requires full consensus this can lead to paralysis.

Undoubtedly this was the case in Copenhagen.  The talks failed to reach concrete results for many reasons; including the way the talks were structured:  the presidency and the character as a Summit meeting. However, there was another structural default. Copenhagen was the venue of the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) and the 5^th Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto protocol.  Since Kyoto, talks taking place in the framework of the UNFCC and those about the Protocol have been intertwined. However, in 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, they were cut loose.  In 2007, in Bali (COP 13), it was decided that approaches to address climate change other than on the basis of the agreed binding Protocol would also be appropriate. The adoption in Bali of a two-track Road Map led to a series of parallel talks in the run-up to Copenhagen, with different objectives. Track one implied an effort to reach a new binding global agreement on the basis of UN principles and procedures. Track two centered around a less ambitious initiative of a group of like minded countries, brought together in some kind of a “coalition of the willing”, to coordinate policies on a voluntary basis. The latter talks were led by the one and only country that had not been willing to sign the Convention: the United States. This two track approach could only result in the gradual erosion of the Kyoto Consensus. Copenhagen was thus bound to fail due to the decision taken in Bali. This, in turn, was due to the decision taken by the US not to join the consensus.

The absence of the United States, the most powerful country with the highest emissions of greenhouse gases has been the real reason why Copenhagen failed. However, many other countries can be blamed as well. China announced its willingness to reduce the fossil fuel intensity of its economy, but this reduction would fall short of what was considered necessary to keep global warming under control. OPEC countries were still reluctant to cooperate, fearing a reduction in export earnings. African countries were afraid that an effort to keep global warming limited to an average of two degrees Celsius would result in still higher temperature increases in Africa, with disastrous results for their weak and poor economies. New alliances were formed amongst developing countries, sometimes for political reasons beyond climate change, weakening the position of developing countries as a whole. The European Union, which had been a frontrunner in the implementation of the agreements reached earlier and which for that reason could have capitalized upon its credibility, was internally divided and became sidelined in the final stages of the talks. Developing countries need funds to enable them to adjust to the consequences of climate change which is taking place anyway, as well as finance and technology in order to build an adequate capacity to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.  However, most other countries were reluctant to contribute substantial funds to these ends.  Many countries, rich and poor alike, were reluctant to allow full transparency of all their policies, which other countries considered an essential condition for both market operations, funding and domestic policy making. Countries did not trust each other anymore.

All these controversies could have been mitigated, if not overcome, if the United States would have shown new global leadership. Since the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992, all nations in the world had been willing to join a global consensus. In 2001, a new American administration decided differently. The US disengaged itself from the consensus.  That disengagement seemed crucial, because of the size and strength of the American economy.  Many people all around the world had hoped that the American position would change with a new leadership, demonstrating a renewed engagement, a new vision and a willingness to revive a consensus on the basis of worldwide principles, rights and values.

The course of events would have been different if the US would have demonstrated that it was prepared to step back from the position taken in the year 2000 by President Bush who had declared  “Kyoto is dead”.  His successor, who had inspired so many young people in his own country and abroad, could have taken a different position stating for instance: “From now we will join the consensus and commit ourselves to negotiate a new global treaty for the second phase, better than the first one”. Instead, President Obama, rather than repealing the death warrant issued by his predecessor, held a funeral speech.

Back to a single track

The strategy in place needs to be reconsidered. But it is necessary to first agree upon what is at stake. We need an agreement that meets the hopes and expectations of young people all around the world, the needs of those who are poor and the aspirations of future generations.  We need effective instruments to mitigate global climate change. For this, we need worldwide cooperation – no nation excluded. We need an agreement that will provide a level playing field to private business in all countries.  We need an agreement that offers different opportunities to countries in different positions. The world, finally, needs an agreement that is not voluntary, as was the case before 1997, but one that would commit its signatories to keep the promises.

All is not yet lost. An agreement is still possible if nations show more flexibility and mutual trust.  There are some positive signs: In Copenhagen quite a few countries showed a willingness to commit themselves to do much more than what they have been doing so far. This group includes some developing countries that are emerging powers. The willingness to change investment and production patterns seems to be more widespread than at the time than ten years ago, when I presided over COP 6.

However, it will necessary to bring the two tracks together: the Kyoto track and the US track. Simply continuing two tracks will lead to nothing. We cannot continue doing business as usual on the treadmill of the agenda that is foreseen for the coming year. The structure of the talks should be reviewed and the two tracks brought together. Merging these two tracks, showing a willingness to differentiate, to be flexible and to take each other’s concerns seriously should be the topmost political priority for the coming year. The UN Secretary General would be well advised to bring together a group of wise men and women – some IPCC scientists, some political leaders, and some experienced negotiators – and request them to help bring the talks back on a well designed single track, which allows countries to differentiate between policy instruments, provided that these will meet a common objective.

Read also:

Beyond Copenhagen: A response from Mikael Roman to Jan Pronk

Not One track, Not two tracks, but a completely new track: A response from Nicola Bullard to Jan PronkBullard

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Millions of people are living in forgotten cities. They are refugees and displaced persons, put away in camps at the margins of the modern world. Hardly ever is a camp closed down. Camps are swelling in order to offer refuge against continuing or newly emerging dangers. Generations stay for decades in one and the same camp. They are doomed to die on the same dumping-ground where they were born. 

Is this acceptable? It seems to be, actually. The outside world hardly offers a perspective on a new life outside the camps, perhaps only to a few so as to secure a little order within the camps themselves. Sustaining refugee survival within camps is easier and cheaper than halting the violence which they had to escape in the first place. They receive food, plastic sheeting, bore-holes and first aid. Clinics are set up to provide mother and child care. Occasionally some children get a little schooling, mostly in the open air, wi

thout books, pens, paper, blackboard and chalk and without salaries for the teachers. Thatched huts are upgraded into slums. Camp dwellers start exchanging belongings amongst themselves. Barter develops into markets. People try to make a living through prostitution and crime. Idleness fosters addiction to alcohol and drugs. Combatants come to hide themselves for a while within the camp and recruit youngsters for their militias. People in the camps start organizing themselves. The camps develop into cities, with an economy, a power structure and increasing violence.

Camps are cities in suspense. They suffer from shortages of water and sanitation, shaky food deliveries, oscillating relief assistance, despotic rulers, lawlessness and insecurity, both around the camp and inside.

The joy of having reached a sanctuary can boost a perspective. It can lead to action and persistence. However, in most camps life is marked by traumas and uncertainty. In these camps suffering abounds and life is desolate and empty.

In all refugee camps, only two things determine life and thought: memories and expectations. Recollections prevail. Inside the camps everything is being relived, time and again. Bombardments and attacks are recalled and retold. Rape and killings come back to mind daily, together with the nightmares of the flight, the threats and terrors on the way, the fear not to last out. Not all refugees are able to reach safety. In Darfur, one out of every seven refugees has been killed.

The recollections go together with the hope of a future in safety, outside the camp and with expectations about life in decency. Camp dwellers long for a return to the place where they belong. They cherish the hope of reconstructing hearth and home and the desire of resuming life back home or building a new existence somewhere else.

Refugees tell stories, time and again. Twenty five million refugees, and as many stories. In their stories the past prevails. But at the same time they are mesmerized by the future. People hope, without expecting much. They live between hope and desperation.

A camp may seem to be a static unit of time and space, dead and empty. However, it forms part of a turbulent history, part of a life full of tenacity and yearning. Present life within the camps is a function of both the past and the future. It is the sum total of stories, memories and contemplations – nothing more and nothing less: when expectations are betrayed and hopes are dashed, there is nothing left.

For refugees and displaced people in camps the present is empty, an endless repetition of nothingness: no jobs; no information; education devoid of sense; food, water, health and security in doubt – and, for the rest, waiting, just waiting, without any expectation. People sense that they have been forgotten, excluded and deprived of their rights. They find that they are voiceless, powerless and without any perspective. This feeling is right. In the eyes of people in the world outside a refugee is a loser, irrelevant, a burden, worthless, unworthy of rights indeed.

The longer the present lasts, the emptier life becomes. For millions of refugees and displaced people this is the reality of today. For them the future is a void, it means suffering. The past, on the other side, equals violence and death. The world they fled was a jungle. The camp, upon arrival, was a hiding place, an asylum and a sanctuary. However, gradually it became a dump, a junk heap and a prison. Like dumping grounds are covered with soil to put the junk out of sight, camps are wrapped up with relief to salve our conscience. Rather than offering women, children, the elderly, farmers, villagers and other civilians protection against evil powers that force them to seek refuge in a camp, the world is shielding itself from the camps with a thick layer of indifference. Rather than receiving displaced people in our midst we bury them far away from our own cities, outside our habitat, somewhere deep below the surface of a civilized society, like in dungeons where they easily are forgotten, out of sight, out of the picture, out of our minds.

The longer this lasts, the less hope flourishes – ‘there is nothing left to be done’ – but also there is increased bitterness, frustration and resentment. The more refugees consider themselves forgotten, the greater the chance that the violence which they escaped will be fed by camp realities. At a certain moment camp dwellers are no longer interested in a solution of the conflict back home. They may start interpreting the camp as a bulwark behind which walls they cherish their own truths. They will then give birth to offspring who have nothing to lose and only look forward renewing the fight. The resentment of such a new generation will not only be turned towards the enemy of their parents and ancestors, but against the world as a whole: ‘The world has written us off, now we are going to write off the world’.

Photo Credit: mknobil

Nowadays world summits do not function as they should. They fall short in three respects. Their composition seems to be rather arbitrary, to begin with. At one time a summit will consist of five world leaders; at another time six, seven or even twenty Heads of State or Government are meeting together. Now and then some others are being invited to come along for a day or two. A summit’s composition is not without any logic, but it is the logic of power rather than international law. It is limited power only, because countries that do not take part are not bound by the outcome of the summit.

Usually those outcomes, if any, are hardly worth mentioning. That is the second shortcoming. Summits, such as the recent ones in London (G20 summit) and L’Aquila (G8 summit) attracted much publicity. However, results have been meagre. At the London summit much less agreement was reached on a common response to the international financial crisis than would have been justified by the depth of this crisis. The agreement was limited to side issues such as tax havens. The real causes behind the crisis were not addressed. In L’Aquila world leaders were supposed to agree on a common policy to contain climate change. However, the agreement did not go beyond listing vague objectives, not binding anyone, not even the participants themselves. How these objectives were to be met was not indicated at all. The outcome was nothing more than a wish list.

Usually a summit meeting lacks an authority that can ensure due process. There is no apparatus setting the agenda, guiding preparatory negotiations, and – most importantly – looking after the implementation of possible results of the meeting. Implementation is left to the participating countries. These countries can give it a twist by delaying the steps required, or by putting them off indefinitely or introducing new unilateral conditions. They may even choose letting things slide, eventually. The summit event itself seems to be more important than its result. The general public is easily misled. People affected by an economic crisis or by climate change, who were expecting that something would be done conclude that matters stay as they were. The summit turned out to be nothing more than a show. Electorates seeing through this tend to lose their confidence in politics as such. This will make it even more difficult for governments to show political leadership later on.

The third shortcoming is that summits are not rooted in an accepted political, legal and administrative structure. They are not obliged to obey principles and rules of international law. There is no charter guaranteeing the rights of non-participants and minorities. There are no generally accepted appeals procedures and sanctions.

Anchoring summitry into the system of the United Nations may help coping with these difficulties.  This would kill two birds with one stone: coming down to business at a summit and making a concrete start with the long awaited reform of the UN. The workings of the UN can be made much more effective than they are at present. Bringing together in one meeting the representatives of two hundred countries does not make much sense, neither at the level of diplomats nor of ministers and certainly not at the level of Heads of State or Government. Such meetings are ritual affairs. Participants can listen to each other’s speeches. They can meet in the corridors and explore and exchange ideas. This may be useful in itself. However, effective decision-making requires meeting in smaller groups, which could consist of a fixed number of permanent members next to an agreed number of rotating members. When this composition is representative of the world community as a whole and rooted in a charter based structure, with rules guaranteeing the rights of non participating countries, business can be done effectively. Such meetings can be held at both the diplomatic and political level. Meetings at the highest possible level – Heads of State and Government – can provide a clear-cut mandate at the beginning of negotiations and function as a lender of last resort in order to reach final conclusions. Dependent on the agenda concerned these meetings could take place within the framework of a reformed United Nations Security Council. The UN administration could then be given the authority to oversee the implementation of political decisions made in the summit framework. For some issues the administration itself could be granted the power to take implementation in hand and be equipped with the necessary instruments and resources.

The two main issues mentioned above – the world financial crisis and climate change – are not the only ones that would require world wide handling, beyond talking and showing the flag. Food security, the erosion of biodiversity, the exploration and exploitation of the Arctic and the oceans, the transition towards sustainable energy, the proliferation of nuclear arms and the management of large conflicts such as those in the Middle East would also justify a different architecture of international decision making. United Nations summit meetings, held selectively, with legitimate procedures and a representative composition could play an important and effective role in addressing these questions.

Which countries would have the courage and wisdom take an initiative towards such a reform of both summitry and the UN?

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In 2001 the United Nations organised a World Conference on Racism in Durban. It was quite a turbulent conference. Developing countries had criticised Western countries about slavery, Apartheid and the injustice done to the Palestinian people. However, the final document of the conference had been adopted unanimously. The US had stayed away, which was not uncommon for the US during those years, but all participating countries had agreed. No country later on had distanced itself from this agreement. The negotiations had been difficult, but in the end all parties had showed willingness to compromise. As a matter of fact the final document was quite good. The United Nations had once more proven itself as the principal universal world platform, where countries could discuss a great variety of principles, norms, values and basic rights, and reach consensus. Such a consensus can help containing religious or ethnic conflicts. This would be of great importance, for the world as a whole, the South as well as the North, the West and the rest.

Racism Sucks

Such a consensus should regularly be preserved and modified. So, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to hold a review conference in Geneva, in 2009. The pre-negotiations were difficult again. For this reason many Western countries decided to step aside. However, they did so before the conference had started. This is wrong. Difficult pre-negotiations do not justify a pull out, in particular not when the previous experience has shown that a consensus should be within reach. In the end it turned out that also in Geneva developing countries were wiling to compromise. Once again it was proven that it is possible to have serious negotiations within the UN, resulting in a common agreement.

Some speeches held during the conference, such as the speech by President Ahmadinehad of Iran, were quite provocative. At the request of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon the President had moderated his tone, but, in the view of Ban, not sufficiently. So, the UNSG publicly distanced himself from his speech. And the Norwegian Foreign minister, speaking directly after Ahmadinehad, responded in terms not to be misunderstood.

This is how the UN works. Countries should discus, debate, confront each other, listen, negotiate and, in the end, reach a compromise and agree. Staying away is not constructive. It is arrogant, hypocritical or spineless.

In my view the text agreed in Geneva on “racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance” is even better than the Durban text. Many diplomats were afraid that at this conference Israel would become a special target because of its policies with regard to the Palestinians in general and Gaza in particular. For some western countries this fear was the overriding reason to stay away, out of protest. However, this protest was premature and empty. The final document does not refer to Israel at all. Anti-Semitism is being condemned explicitly and put on one line with, so-called, anti-Arabism, Islamofobia and Christianofobia.

The Geneva document is condemning genocide unequivocally. The Holocaust is being mentioned: “It should never be forgotten”. The declaration also denounces derogatory stereotyping and stigmatization of persons based on their religion or belief as well as of minorities in general, indigenous people, immigrants, foreigners and refugees. Also the advocacy of racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination is being denounced.

The right to freedom of opinion and expression is being declared essential in a democratic and pluralistic society, without any limitation. On the contrary: the declaration stresses the positive role these rights can play in the fight against discrimination.

These and other statements should serve as a yardstick for all countries, Western as well as Southern, the Netherlands as well as Zimbabwe, India as well as the UK. Countries boycotting this conference have missed an opportunity to promote non-discrimination as well as freedom of opinion all over the world. As a matter of fact, by staying away, these countries have further undermined the authority of the UN.

These countries have also withdrawn from possible criticism by other countries on increasing racism, xenophobia and intolerance in the Western world. Western countries are used to criticize developing countries for violating principles of democracy and human rights, including freedom of speech. However, they shirk being criticised themselves. In fact they declare themselves being above the law.

Such a position cannot be justified at all. The recent elections for the European parliament have resulted in a strengthening of parties at the extreme right of the political spectrum, including parties that call for a banning of the Koran and for halting immigration of Muslims and deporting people for the only reason that they are Muslims and therefore should be considered a threat to security. This is a clear example of religious discrimination, xenophobia and intolerance.

It was high time that the UN decided to hold world wide debates on discrimination. The UN Charter of Human Rights needs to be reconfirmed regularly, by new generations and their leaders in all countries.

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Having chaired the negotiations that translated the Kyoto Declaration into a fully agreed text a decade ago, I have since stepped somewhat outside of the climate change debate. But from this distance I have the impression that not enough has been happening. For instance the conflicts in Sahel where I have been engaged, have a notable resource scarcity component. If the balance between people with cattle on the one hand, and people with fertile soil and water on the other hand had not been so drastic, given the limited carrying capacity of the land, perhaps the disaster in Darfur would have been less enormous. I forecast there will be many such disasters in Africa in the decades ahead unless we do something about it. We need to focus on the consequences of climate change. For me the IPCC report and the Al Gore movie are all inputs into the debate, but I do not want to touch on the issues they raise, instead I would like to look at the present policies and what we should do in the years ahead.

What do we know?

We start first knowing that there is an annual capacity of the Earth to absorb a number of greenhouse gases. Scientists are still debating what exactly is absorptive capacity, but there is no question there is. Secondly we have to assume that the carrying capacity will be reached soon. And it will be surpassed, indeed surpassed many times if the present trend continues. The present trend is a small annual increase of emissions in some countries, big increases of annual emissions in particular in the US and big increases in Asia and, as a consequence of economic growth and industrialization, also in Africa.

If we foster economic growth in developing countries — even if economic growth is not all that sustainable development is about, we know that economic growth is necessary for development – then carrying capacity will be surpassed very soon. And emissions of greenhouse gases will be higher than the level that could be labeled safe or sustainable by any standard.

We also know that these consequences will be born by people in developing countries. And finally we know there are uncertainties: about the relation between climate change and biodiversity; between climate change and oceans; about whether climate change is a gradual process or a series of jumps. Indeed, the issue of climate change is extremely complex and solving it in a scientific way will create new uncertainties.

The Road after Rio: the Precautionary Principle

The world decided in 1992 at the Rio de Janeiro Summit on the relation between environment and development to base our policy in the future on the precautionary principle. In my view you have to know the precautionary principle by heart: ‘We will take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures……’ (Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 ILM 849)

The principle can be applied beyond the field of climate change when you deal with uncertainties from a political and ethical point of view.

The precautionary principle was embodied in specific international treaties. When I was Minister for the Environment in a debate on Genetically Modified Organs, we were able in a European context to have the principle enshrined in the pre-amble of the bio-safety protocols which we negotiated in Montreal. Whether the Europeans – at the moment under a lot of pressure of the US – are still able to live up to that principle is another question. But it is a political question which citizens and political parties have to build their policy choices upon.

You know the uncertainties, but you also know the ethical principle, then, you need a world wide agreement to stabilize the concentration of greenhouses gases in the atmosphere, because it is a global problem. And stabilization means reduction, and not just a simple reduction. We know that the reduction of the emissions has to be drastic.

We have to think about a reduction of 70 percent in about one hundred years, or 40 to 60 percent in the year 2050. Even then the concentration is 70 percent higher than in the pre-industrial period in which there was a certain degree of – I would say – sustainability at that time, before the trend was changing.

It is quite a target because a reduction of 70 percent in a period whereby you have say 2 percent economic growth means, on a one-to-one growth and emission basis, that each year you have an accumulative increase in the gap between the calculated growth in emissions and the reduction you have agreed upon. So there is a huge gap between the trend and what you have to accomplish. This requires major changes in technology application and major changes in economic behaviour. The targeted reduction requires a major transformation of the world economy and a major transformation of the technologies to be applied, and all that has to start in particular with those countries which did have in the past the highest emissions.

The nature of the problem

First, climate change is the global problem and second that it is urgent. It does not, it cannot lead to delays. It is that urgent. Third, you have to understand that climate change is the result of past activities as well as of present activities. Economists would say climate change is an external effect of economic behaviour. We know what that means: the consequences of such activities are not incorporated in the price and in the costs on the market itself. Climate change is the example of an external effect. This is the only external effect of any economic behaviour which is global, which is having its consequences everywhere in the world. This effect is mass, it is global, it is also long run. It is an external effect which is not taking place in the same period as the economic activity itself, it has a very long time-lag. The change in the atmosphere at this moment is the result of economic decisions on the application of technologies decades ago.

This means: it is an external effect not of a flow variable but of a stock. Consequences for the atmosphere are consequences of the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. At present the stock is changing because of the flow of present additions but the major consequences are the consequences of the past flows which are still in the atmosphere.

The past flow and the present stock are to a very great extent the result of activities of countries in the North, of countries which had an economic and a political and a power advantage in the past. That means it is necessary that in particular those countries we start to act on the basis of the principle of preferential treatment. This is a very well-known principle in international trade policies and international development policies where you give preferential treatment to countries which are behind in order to reach some equality in the future. You have to go for a global, coordinated approach because this is a problem which can never be solved by individual countries alone and, because it is so global and long-term and urgent, it is not possible to deal with it on a voluntary basis. You have to deal with it on the basis of binding policies.

So what can be done? Firstly you have to put a number of these principles in agreements so that policies really can be based upon them. These were the precautionary principle and the common and differentiated responsibility. You have to set concrete targets in relation to these principles, not vague, not qualitative, you have to be very precise because otherwise you will not meet your aims.

This is very complicated because you do not know everything and things are changing. That means that in terms of instruments you have to be creative, flexible and innovative. You adjust yourself to new insights and new phenomena on the basis of binding law which excludes the possibility of free riders, which guarantees implementation, which includes both incentives and sanctions, so that all peoples, countries, nations, states, would see this as just, fair and equitable.

Kyoto and beyond

Those were more or less the ideas underlying the negotiations. You know that we reached an agreement on the Kyoto Protocol and now we had to continue. So what did Kyoto mean? Kyoto embraced an integrated approach. It accepted quantitative targets, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, approaches, and efforts, as well as preferential treatment on the basis of the common but differentiated responsibilities. The Protocol spoke about mitigation in order to reach that reduction target, but in the Kyoto Protocol you also find a lot about adaptation: there will be climate change, there always has been climate change, and you have to adapt yourself to it. It is already in the Kyoto Protocol itself.

Because of climate change everybody has at a certain moment to mitigate and to adapt. The Protocol also speaks about support for capacity building, a new element in the developmental policy because development means that you have to be sustainable and you have to be able to meet problems in the world, indeed also the problem of external threat to you. The Kyoto Protocol speaks about support for capacity building. There was also talk about absorption of greenhouse gases, in particular in the framework of forests.

In the Kyoto Protocol there was already talk about mitigation across borders, which meant that the negotiations had to include elements of joint implementation and the clean development mechanism. Also in the protocol you will find elements of emission trading as a complement to what countries can do at home. And there were sanctions: not very harsh but fines and, what is more interesting, included a relation between what you did not accomplish in the present period and the burden of mitigation which you had to take upon yourself in the next period. So you had to top up the mitigation efforts in the present period with what you did not do, a shortfall in the earlier period could lead to exclusion from international consultations on the policies of the future.

In the beginning the elements in the Protocol were very vague but the subsequent Conferences of the Parties laid out very detailed terms in order to arrive at a legal text without any loopholes so that it could function as a basis of joint international policymaking.

Why was Kyoto successful?

Still Kyoto was successful, and that is important to state because the success of the past also may be a guideline for the future. Why was it successful? First, because at the time there was worldwide awareness of a global threat. It was replaced later by preoccupations with another global threat: security, homeland security, Al-Qaeda, etc. So nobody was speaking about climate anymore.

Secondly there was a joint political climate, leading to a global coalition between politicians and experts and bureaucrats and NGOs. Everybody came together for a while and it created a dialogue among people with different insights and different interests and it created a common aim to succeed. It was short lived but it did work.

Thirdly, there was – which is important – full agreement on the process. This meant acceptance by everybody of the IPCC which meant you had a worldwide independent secretariat; full agreement on committee structures; on the agenda and on the step by step approach.

There was that joint atmosphere and when Bush said Kyoto is dead, everybody said that is not up to you Mr. Bush because it is a multilateral process and one party cannot pronounce unilaterally that the outcome of a joint initiative is dead. We were not able to define the outcome and that helped a lot also to keep the US tied to the process. It was important for the future to say it was an outcome and a process that is concrete, ambitious, integrated, equitable and efficient, both in terms of market-orientation and in terms of the possibility to foster technological innovation. It is binding but at the same time it is flexible and to that extent you may say it is quite unique.

Because we agreed on a legal text at Marrakesh we got our rectification process and the whole thing became operational, but was a time lag before implementation started.

So, what do we know today?

We are living in a very different world now. First, there is much higher growth in the world, in particular among very populous countries such as China, India, South Africa, Brazil and a number of other countries have a much higher growth and increases in national income per capita and a much higher consumption per capita than we thought would be the case ten years ago. We have higher emissions than we expected ten years ago and agreed in Kyoto. Thirdly, we know that the whole mechanism is much more complex. The uncertainties are now understood better by scientists and we know that the consequences in terms of the natural physical consequences are greater than were outlined ten years ago by IPCC in the early reports. Consequences for warming, extremes and biodiversity and rise in sea level are in physical terms greater than expected ten years ago. We also know that the economic consequences of the physical consequences are more complex. For instance with regard to food production, the availability of water, migration streams and others. There are more disasters.

And there is an additional factor leading to greater inequality: globalization which is in itself a major threat for stability. There is a greater potential for conflict now, than ten years ago because of resources, because of climate, because of environment greater than we thought and also greater in practice. Climate change apart, there is a much greater than expected shortage of fossil fuels for energy utilization. The era of low cost energy, gas, coal and oil is over. There is not enough uranium for nuclear in the next decades for the world as a whole and everybody who is betting on nuclear is betting on something which is not at all technological. There is also a much greater problem of energy security. Globalization means global markets and it is not at all certain that there will be enough energy for them. That also has in itself a great conflict potential. Look for instance at the major problems between Europe and Russia and the fact that individual countries are trying to establish their own relations with the Russians.

Is there something positive in the last ten years?

On the other hand, first of all, we do know more, in terms of the outcome of scientific research, so on that basis you can expect better policy. Technological research in private industry has taken multiple directions, so technological change could yet help provide an answer. The positive decisions taken by the European Union to play an international role through target setting is broadening emission trading so that the specific mitigation target for the year 2020 are positive.

But there remain some big question marks. The first question mark is United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Bali, December 2007. Some were happy with Bali, but if you read the outcome objectively, it is not a road map, it is maybe the start of a journey, but so far it has no direction. It was an agreement to talk and that talk ought to have started already. It is an appeal, nobody has promised anything, nothing has been binding. There are some positive elements: there is more emphasis on adaptation than ten years ago. There is also emphasis on the need to avoid deforestation.

The second question mark is about biofuels. I share the concern that the first generation biofuels will not be sustainable, will have major consequences for water and energy use for production, but also in relation to food availability, food pricing and deforestation.

Conclusion

If I read the present political situation around climate change, countries are still just blaming each other. They are failing to implement and I am very concerned that non implementation of Kyoto creates the argument for the non-Annex 1 countries to say ‘no we are not participating because you failed to keep your promises’. It is not certain at all that the Kyoto target of the minus 5.2 is going to be met. There is an implementation gap. It is always ‘next time, next period, not yet’. Where is the urgency of feeling? Why is there still the focus on procedures, institutions and on the financial question of who is going to pay? The power question is still determining the conversations, which leads to a focus on secondary approaches in order to avoid mitigation. We have reached a situation where there is too much emphasis on for instance avoiding deforestation. Too much emphasis on adaptation which is leading attention away from necessary mitigation and is wrongly leading to compensation tactics. So rich people fly and pay a couple of dollars extra in order to compensate for some trees somewhere and then later on they will be cut. It is lip service. There needs to be more emphasis on a core approach to mitigation. All other approaches will not do the job. The attention on biofuels is an example of this. It is necessary to think about long-term targets of equal emissions per capita, of all inhabitants, of all countries in the long run. Without taking such a path we are risking a major disaster